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“Smallholders, Cooperatives, and Food Sovereignty in Tanzania”: 
Why a Nation of Farmers Cannot Feed its People 
 
By Matthew Jaworski 
 
Abstract: Although the world produces more food than ever before, close to one billion 
people remain hungry worldwide. This problem is especially critical in the Global South, 
where the majority of the population are food producers. Such is the case for Tanzania, a 
developing country that is searching for solutions to its food insecurity. One solution 
involves cooperatives, seen as pro-smallholder, empowering the peasantry to overcome the 
barriers that impede their development, which equates to a positive effect on the nation 
feeding itself. Countering this is a modern, market based approach, which dilutes the role 
of the peasantry in favour of agribusinesses in order to ensure Tanzania’s food security. 
While the government claims to support both, it along with powerful international actors 
is throwing greater weight behind agribusinesses, opting for a food security based solution 
to the country’s food insecurity, at the expense of the peasantry and ultimately Tanzania’s 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Although the world produces more food and wealth than ever before, around 842 
million people still go hungry worldwide. During the recent global economic crisis, a rise 
in food prices caused hunger levels to peak in 2009, as 1.02 billion people could no 
longer afford the price of food, prompting the international community to search for 
solutions to the growing levels of food insecurity (“Food Insecurity” 4). This extremely 
complex problem is especially poignant within the Global South, where in many 
countries, the majority of the population is, in fact, producers of food themselves. Such is 
the case for Tanzania, as one of the world’s Least Developed Countries has been trying to 
uncover ways that will improve its peasant dominated agricultural sector in order to 
eliminate poverty and hunger within its borders.  
According to the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), high 
food prices are likely to persist, which actually places many peasants in jeopardy because 
they have been unable to benefit from the increasing price of food due to the rising costs 
of inputs such as seeds and fertilizer. Price volatility has also had a negative impact, as 
farmers are unable to plant and predict commodity price fluctuations. Within the free 
market, global consumer and producer trends can cause a rise or fall in commodity 
pricing, making food crops either unaffordable for local consumers, or unprofitable for 
farmers (“Price Volatility” 14-15). One proposed solution that aims to support 
smallholders within this turbulent liberalized market is put forth by the FAO, who cites 
recent evidence showing that rural organizations such as cooperatives are able to 
withstand such price shocks, if they are operating in a conducive policy environment, 





the FAO sees that cooperatives, “…are able to play a greater role in meeting a growing 
demand for agricultural produce on local, national, and international markets, and they 
can enable small producers to have some influence over the policy and programs that 
affect their lives.” (Crowley, Tercelli, and Ourabah 7-8).  
 In Tanzania, a country that has a longstanding history with cooperatives, but is 
also plagued by food insecurity, recent government initiatives have attempted to revamp 
the nation’s once vibrant cooperative movement by improving the environment in which 
they operate. In 2000, a Presidential Committee determined that the main constraints that 
have hampered cooperatives for decades was the liberalized market, followed by poor 
management within the cooperative sector (CRMP 1). In response, the current Tanzanian 
administration, led by President Jakaya Kikwete, has implemented policies that attempt 
to improve the financial standing of cooperatives by creating a cooperative bank, which 
would make obtaining loans easier, as well as implementing policies that crackdown on 
corrupt cooperative leaders. The most recent Cooperative Act of 2003, places limits on 
the tenure of managers, protects whistle blowers who alert authorities of malpractice, and 
eases cooperative registration all in the hopes of bringing Tanzanians back into the 
movement. The goal is to convince farmers that cooperatives are mechanisms that they 
can trust to benefit its members, not government and cooperative administrators 
(“Kikwete Pushes Coops”; “Coops Under Fire”; Maghimbi 9, 11).   
While the government is optimistic that these changes will create a conducive 
policy environment for cooperatives to function effectively, at the same time, the 
Tanzanian administration is also encouraging the expansion of agribusinesses. For 





Tanzania is to rid itself of poverty and hunger. In order to achieve this goal, outlined as 
the first Millennium Development Goal (MDGs) that aims to eradicate hunger by 2015, 
the country has embarked on various industrialized agricultural projects, such as AgriSol 
and the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT), in order to 
achieve greater domestic food production. These projects, supported by the policy 
initiative Kilimo Kwanza, or “Agriculture First,” created in 2009, promote the 
mechanization and large scale expansion of agriculture, as well as the use and 
development of improved farming technologies such as seeds, fertilizers, irrigation 
facilities, and pesticides (Mbatha; UNDP; “Kilimo Kwanza” 4-5). To include the 
peasantry into this process, “public-private” partnerships are being encouraged in the 
form of contract farming and out grower schemes, used to bring smallholders further 
“into the market.” This market based model of agricultural production is being promoted 
not just by the Tanzanian government, but also international development agencies such 
as the World Bank, wealthy philanthropists, and powerful agribusiness interests (Oya 1; 
Collier 73; Little 4; Chiwambo; Kikwete). 
While the expansion of the agribusiness sector is in its infancy, its growth 
generates serious questions with regards to how it will affect the rejuvenation process of 
cooperatives, the status of the peasantry, and Tanzania’s food insecurity. Given the 
current developmental path being pursued within the country, which greatly supports the 
expansion of agribusiness both financially and through policies laid out by the current 
administration, it appears that agribusinesses will surpass cooperatives as the most 
important rural development organization. While some peasants may benefit from 





and out grower schemes, overall, due to the expansion of large scale industrialized 
agriculture that will transform massive plots of land previously cultivated by the 
peasantry into single mono-crop cultures, smallholder farmers are at a serious risk of 
losing their lands and livelihoods. Thus, while rhetoric emanating from government 
circles appears to be encouraging the revitalization of cooperatives on the one hand, it is 
also, in association with powerful international actors, throwing even more financial, 
political, and institutional support behind the growth of agribusiness on the other. This 
could prevent cooperatives from regaining their former position of strength, as they will 
be unable to compete against these corporate giants. The effects of large scale agricultural 
expansion could thus adversely impact smallholder farmers, who will lose their place of 
importance within the development of Tanzania, amounting to greater food insecurity.   
On a global scale, the impact of large scale agricultural expansion is illustrated 
within the food security/food sovereignty debate, which involves a modern, market-
oriented solution to food insecurity, pitted against one that is pro-smallholder, 
environmentally sustainable, and centred on local needs. This study offers an important 
contribution to this discussion, arguing that as Tanzania continues to strive towards a 
food security based solution by further commercializing its agriculture sector, its negative 
effects on local food needs will prevent the nation from being food sovereign, an 
objective which has been expressed by the country’s leaders since independence 
(Meredith 250). Although cooperatives do not play a significant role within the literature 
surrounding food sovereignty, other than in perhaps Cuba, cooperatives in Tanzania were 
central in the country’s drive to become self-reliant, and pivotal for first President, Julius 





various goals he wished the newly independent country to achieve, in the article It’s Up 
to Us: Uhuru na Kazi, Nyerere states “…we want to build a country in which no citizen 
can go hungry while others have food…we believe this can be done through the 
development of cooperative enterprises…” (5). Although this state centric goal, tied into 
improving the lives of the peasantry through cooperatives, was not realized, this objective 
must be revisited through a food sovereignty framework in an effort to provide 
smallholders with a platform in Tanzania’s food policy for the first time in the country’s 
history.  
While cooperatives were originally used by the colonial authority and later the 
Tanzanian state primarily to increase cash crop production, they were also successful in 
empowering the peasantry, as they enabled smallholders to organize and sidestep 
exploitative middlemen so members could receive a fair price for their produce, which 
resulted in a positive effect on production, assisting the nation in feeding itself (Lyimo 
40, 46). According to Tanzanian scholar Sam Maghimbi, largely due to the cooperative 
movement, “between 1954 and 1968 Tanganyika was the only African state that 
consistently maintained a growth trend in food production higher than that of its 
population” (8). While it may not be the direct role of cooperatives to assist a nation in 
feeding itself, as they are primarily formed to improve the lives of their members, they 
are an organization that encompasses and supports the peasantry. As such, this thesis 
argues that cooperatives need to be examined through a food sovereignty lens, as this 
view champions the role and importance of the peasantry within a country’s food system. 
This food sovereign, pro-smallholder cooperative solution to food insecurity counters a 





modern technologies and the mechanization of agriculture, amounting to a reduced role 
of the peasantry within the developmental process of the country, thus forfeiting local 
food needs in favour of global market desires. 
Tanzania’s struggle to be self-sufficient in food production confirms Eric Holt-
Gimenez and Raj Patel’s argument, which depicts Africa as the most important battle 
ground for any sustaining solution to global hunger. For these food activists, as attempts 
are made by agribusinesses to pry open African agriculture to feed global demand, the 
local needs of the peasantry become obscured, allowing poverty and hunger to persist. 
This clash of interests mimics Africa’s fight for independence against its colonial 
masters, where the struggle to end poverty and hunger is essentially an agrarian question, 
which is to be answered by either a food sovereignty or food security based solutions to 
food insecurity (Holt-Gimenez and Patel 130, 132).  
Although multiple definitions of food security exist, food sovereignty advocate 
Philip McMichael has effectively conceptualized its meaning while providing a brief 
history of a term that has undergone various transformations. According to McMichael, 
the term “food security” arose out of the post-World War II era as an integral part of the 
international developmental discourse. During the colonial era, colonies supplied the 
urbanites of the metropolis with food and other agricultural products, as their agricultural 
sectors were engineered to primarily feed the appetites of European empires. Shortly after 
WWII, colonial independence movements coincided with the lackluster grain harvests 
occurring in Europe at the time, placing post-war rebuilding plans in jeopardy, and thus 
food security matured into a crucial component of the global development agenda 





in the form of “food aid,” offered by Northern powers to the developing world to prevent 
the spread of Communism and provide markets for the excess grains now being produced 
by the heavily subsidized and newly industrialized American agricultural sector 
(McMichael 171).  
McMichael argues that as food aid continued to flood developing markets, local 
producers were priced out, creating a growing dependency on cheap American foodstuffs 
in the Global South. This food dependency was further entrenched by the Green 
Revolution, as American led biotechnology (hybrid crops of mainly cereals), and 
synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, abetted by massive irrigation projects, were inserted in 
various developing nations’ agricultural sectors. As a result, the culture of mixed farming 
and seed sharing declined, overwhelmed by monocultures of staple grains, marketed to 
supply growing urban areas with cheaper food products (McMichael 171). By the mid-
1990s, 30 crops assumed the responsibility of providing 95% of the world’s calorie and 
protein intake, despite the fact that around 7000 plant species have been cultivated and 
collected throughout human history (Weis 16).  
The declining variety of food crops also corresponds with the transition of 
obtaining food security through a state centred development project to a globalized, 
corporate driven one, where the interests of a handful of private firms override public 
ones, guided by the principles of the free market. Under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay trading rounds (1986-94) and later the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Agreement in 1994, agriculture became liberalized, transforming 
food into a commodity (McMichael 170-172; Roberts 54). As such, these agreements 





solution to food insecurity, praised by neoliberals – today’s dominant ideologues who 
theorize that a free market is the best way of organizing all exchanges of goods and 
services – as the best way of maintaining global food security (Friedman and Friedman 
9). McMichael acknowledges that this fact was articulated by an American representative 
at the Uruguay trade round of 1994, who stated that, “the US has always maintained that 
self-sufficiency and food security are not one and the same. Food security – the ability to 
acquire the food you need when you need it – is best provided through a smooth-
functioning world market” (qtd. in 172). Within this market oriented solution to food 
security, food for everyone is provided by global markets, not necessarily local farmers. 
Smallholder farmers are to be integrated into the global market, often times working in 
collaboration with the aforementioned contract farming or out grower schemes, which 
assist the peasantry by bringing them into global agricultural value chains (Oya 1).   
Many, however, oppose this food security based project, as it has not eradicated, 
but in many instances increased the prevalence of hunger, by causing food prices to 
greatly increase (Holt-Gimenez and Patel 20). Offering an alternative solution to the 
world’s food problems are proponents of “food sovereignty,” who not only place an 
importance in the accessibility of food, but also food justice. While food sovereignty, a 
term originating from the World Food Summit in 1996, coined by La Via Campesina, or 
“the peasant way,” as a movement is not as active in Tanzania compared to places in 
Latin America, it does provide a counter assessment to food security that can explain the 
country’s continued food insecurity while offering pro-poor solutions to the nation’s food 
problem. Further importance is placed on such alternatives, as recent land and natural 





sovereignty perspective needs to be explored, as growing discontent from the country’s 
rural areas could be a sign of an emerging food sovereignty movement (“Mtwara riots”; 
Balaigwa).1 
To this end, La Via Campesina defines food sovereignty as the right of all people 
to healthy and culturally appropriate food, produced through sustainable methods, where 
producers have the right to define their own food and agricultural systems (La Via 
Campesina). According to Jamey Essex, a food sovereignty perspective places special 
emphasis on land rights, the livelihoods of smallholder farmers, environmental 
sustainability, localized production and consumption, the democratization of food where 
producers are more in control of agricultural value chains, and the protection of varying 
and vulnerable cultures (193). For those advocating for a food sovereignty based solution 
to food insecurity, championing these characteristics is crucial if the world’s food system 
is to benefit the global community and not solely those in control (Patel 292).  
The global food sovereignty movement itself has progressively spread with the 
onset of the most recent food crisis, whose early stages impelled one chairperson during 
the 2002 World Food Summit to state that, “Together with terrorism, hunger is one of the 
greatest problems the international community is facing” (qtd. in Clover 6). The current 
crisis, beginning in the mid-2000s, is particularly critical in the developing world, as most 
people spend the majority of their income on purchasing food (Collier 68). Characterized 
by skyrocketing food prices due to a lack of supply, the crisis has caused tempers to flare, 
igniting so-called “food riots” in over 30 countries (Collier 67; Bello 2). Many scholars 
                                                          





also believe that the rise in food prices inflamed the long standing political unrest and 
anger towards the growing economic disparity in North Africa and the Middle East, 
leading to the Arab Spring that began with riots in 2008 (Lagi, Bertrand, and Bar-Yam 1).  
Making the current food crisis even more perplexing is that the world actually 
produces enough food to feed 10 billion people, and yet around a billion people are 
chronically malnourished, while another billion remain under the threat of not knowing 
where their next meal will come from. At the same time, another 500 million people are 
clinically obese while 1.5 billion are overweight worldwide (Akram-Lodhi 4). Thus, 
despite the fact that the world produces more food than ever before, the current food 
system is unable to meet the needs of close to half of the world’s population. At a country 
level, a similar situation is illustrated in Tanzania, as the country has the potential to feed 
itself and become a major producer of food, yet continues to suffer from high levels of 
food insecurity, as close to 10% of homes are food insecure, while the nation as a whole 
remains a net food importer for both rice and wheat, two of its major staples (WFP 6, 10). 
In addition, as of 2013, according to the Global Food Security Index, which measures the 
risks and factors that drive food insecurity, such as affordability, availability, quality, and 
safety, Tanzania placed 95th out of 107 countries (The Economist Intelligence Unit). 
Largely an agrarian society, which despite its colonial history is relatively 
peaceful and politically stable compared to other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Tanzania’s population is just over 45 million, with close to 80% of people deriving their 
income and livelihoods from the agricultural and natural resource sectors. The 
overwhelming majority of the farming population are peasants, who make up 90% of the 





Today, agricultural production accounts for just over 26% of the country’s GDP, 
although in the past it has been responsible for over half of Tanzania’s economic 
production (Mbiha and Ashimogo 102). While the country is capable of growing a wide 
variety of crops, staples in mainland Tanzania in cereal crops include mainly maize, 
sorghum, millets, rice, and wheat while non-cereals include pulses, cassava, bananas, and 
potatoes. Of its traditional cash crops, the country produces mainly sisal, coffee, tea, 
cotton, cashew nuts, and pyrethrum while non-traditional exports include sesame, 
sunflower, and cardamom (Maghimbi, Lokina, and Senga 41; Ministry of Agriculture 4).  
Despite these figures indicating the importance and prominence that farming has 
on Tanzania’s socio-economic structure, the country has been food insecure for decades. 
In 2011, the country was forced to import around 300,000 metric tonnes of food aid to 
prevent 3 million people in the Central and Northern parts of the country from starvation 
(Northern Star Reporter). According to Uwazi, an information group dedicated to 
“liberalizing” data in order to better inform the public, over the past decade an estimated 
600,000 children below the age of five have died because of malnutrition. Since 2000, the 
death toll attributed to a lack of nutrition is comparable to such horrific events as the 
Rwandan genocide and the combined deaths resulting from the Asian tsunami and 
Haitian earthquakes, yet its gravity is often ignored (Uwazi 1).  
Notwithstanding these issues, the country also has great agricultural potential. 
According to the World Bank, Tanzania is, in fact, a sleeping giant with the ability to not 
only feed itself but to also become a major food exporter within the region (“Kilimo 
Kwanza” 3). ActionAid Tanzania goes one step further, as the non-government 





thanks to the improvements in technology, which finds the Rufiji Basin, covering 20% of 
the country stretching from the Indian ocean to Tabora in the North and Mbeya in the 
South, to have enough agricultural potential to feed not only Tanzania, but all of Africa 
(x; Mwalyosi 16). Optimism surrounding Tanzania’s food potential is universal, but how 
to best tap into this is still up for debate (Wolter 14).  
Before the country reaches its agricultural potential, however, it must first resolve 
its current issues of food insecurity. In order to understand what kind of obstacles are 
preventing Tanzania from becoming self-sufficient in food production in the first place, 
the origins of the country’s food insecurity must be illustrated through a food sovereignty 
lens in order to better understand what has caused these food issues to persist, how 
cooperatives improved the food situation in the country, and if they can do so again. The 
roots of Tanzania’s agriculture structure, that sees the country focused on producing what 
it does not consume, were planted during the colonial era by both the Germans and later 
the British, but continued after independence as well, including both the socialist and free 
market phases of Tanzania’s post-colonial history.  
Although free from European rule, African states adopted development strategies 
that saw a continuation of colonial economic patterns. African agriculture thus remained 
centred on producing cash crops for European nations in an effort to retain foreign 
exchange dollars and investment to industrialize other sectors of their economies, 
preferring urban class interests over rural developmental needs (Mapolu 141). Since this 
coincided with rising oil prices, droughts, and other economic shocks, for Tanzania, the 
importation of manufactured goods used to create an industrial base caused a greater 





that overshadowed development of its domestic food sector, permitting its harmful 
colonial legacy to continue (Tanzania’s Food Trade 8; Davidson 221). As such, 
substantial planning and economic investments returning to the periphery that could be 
used to improve the living standards of the peasantry were not forthcoming 
(Msambichaka 124). For Pascal Zachary, neglecting the rural economy has been 
particularly widespread throughout Africa, as African elites have never appreciated the 
importance of agriculture (26). Since profits generated by state bodies did not reverberate 
back to rural areas, other than in failed attempts to mechanize or to orchestrate 
resettlement programs in hopes of emulating a Western designed path to development, 
peasants have been left to surmount natural, structural, and economic obstacles by 
themselves with little sustained government support (Mapolu 139-140).  
These problems include market isolation due to location and poor infrastructure, 
commodity price fluctuation, and an inability to receive bank loans because their 
operations are seen as a risky investment that can create a poverty trap for smallholder 
farmers. Competition emanating from larger farming operations and extortion from 
middlemen can also prevent farmers from selling their produce at a fair price, leading 
many into subsistence cultivation. High transportation costs, a lack storage facilities, and 
an absence of inputs necessary to increase yields can also impact their production, 
resulting in costly post-harvest losses. There are also natural obstacles that can include 
soil erosion, floods, droughts, diseases, and further challenges exacerbated by climate 
change that can also harm production levels, negatively effecting income and living 
standards (Livingston, Schonberger, and Delaney xi, 8, 13-18; Lyimo 41). These issues 





smallholder farmers because of their lack of resources, making them more vulnerable to 
the risks that are associated with the vagaries of an agricultural cycle dependent on hoe 
technology and rain-fed crop production.  
Nevertheless, due to the fact that Tanzania continues to deal with issues of food 
insecurity in its smallholder dominated agricultural sector, some believe that any solution 
to national food insecurity must come through smallholders themselves. Since they make 
up the overwhelming majority of the population, the welfare of the peasantry lies in 
conjunction with that of the entire nation. In Tanzania, this sentiment was expressed as, 
“agriculture is the backbone of the nation:” “kilimo ni uti wa mgongo wa taifa.” This 
mantra is further echoed by Olivier De Schutter, currently the UN Special Rapporteur on 
the Right to Food. For him, improving the livelihoods of smallholder farmers must go in 
partnership with solutions to food insecurity, as this will also decrease levels of 
urbanization, preserve ecosystems, and decrease poverty (De Schutter 3).  
But in order for smallholder farmers to become a major player in solving the 
nation’s food insecurity issues, they need assistance to help deal with barriers that impede 
their own standard of living. For decades, this responsibility has fallen on cooperatives, 
seen as a mechanism that can support the peasantry in improving their socio-economic 
situation. Cooperatives in Tanzania operate within a tier system, where primary 
cooperatives and unions function as the basic structures of the movement. Secondary, 
tertiary, and fourth tier cooperatives funnel underneath, with all cooperatives being 
formed voluntarily by their members. While in the past, lower level cooperative societies 
operated independently from primary societies, the Cooperatives Act of 2003 attempts to 





cooperatives in order to maintain efficiency and prevent a thinning of resources. These 
societies are further supported by government institutions as well as independent 
organizations such as the Savings and Credit Cooperative Union League of Tanzania 
Limited (SCCULT) and the Tanzania Tobacco Cooperative Apex Ltd (TTCA). The 
government also owns the most advanced cooperatives college in sub-Saharan Africa, 
located in Moshi (MUCCOBS), used to train managers as well as other professionals. 
The Tanzanian Federation of Cooperatives (TFC), is atop of the entire cooperative 
structure, which is a confederation that represents, promotes, serves, and coordinates the 
development of all cooperatives in mainland Tanzania. It is an independent, non-political, 
non-government organization that observes international cooperative principles and is a 
member of the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) (Maghimbi 10-13; TFC 3; 
CRMP 1-4). 
 According to the ICA, cooperatives are based on the values and principles of self-
help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity, and solidarity. Membership to a 
cooperative is also voluntary, done so to gain access to goods and services that members 
require to improve their standard of living. While members receive a limited return on 
equity, all members receive benefits proportional to their use. Profits are also 
redistributed to members based not on the amount of capital invested but on the amount 
of business transacted, while each member has one vote in determining the direction of 
the organization regardless of the amount of shares or business they do within the 
cooperative (Nadeau and Thompson 8; Chambo 3; DFID 1; “ICA”).  
To this end, the FAO and scholars like Adam Chambo, former principal of 





improve the lives of their members if operating within a conducive policy environment, 
which involves assisting cooperatives in competing within a liberalized market. Chambo 
further champions the use of cooperatives over agribusiness, arguing that on a global 
scale, “…food insecurity is looming if production and distribution is left to the divisions 
of multinational companies,” and instead believes that, “…the family farm and 
cooperatives can provide a decentralized system of food security and employment,” and 
thus is better positioned to create an environment where Tanzania can solve its food 
insecurity (Chambo 7). Furthermore, cooperatives should also allow small farms to reap 
the same advantages of large scale ones such as economies of scale, thus potentially 
avoiding the need for industrialized farms that could displace the peasantry due to their 
expansionist practices (Lyimo 24). 
The benefits of cooperatives have been famously defended by Alexander 
Chayanov, who wrote about the peasant economy in Russia, but was extremely 
influential for cooperative theorists in Tanzania and beyond. For Maghimbi, the success 
cooperatives enjoyed, particularly in the 1950-60s when the government supported and 
allocated monopolies to cooperatives on certain cash crops, can be attributed to what he 
calls the “Chayanovian model” of cooperatives, where peasant crop marketing 
cooperatives were widely used across the country. This model was also prevalent in 
Russia, India, and other developing nations where large countries had a peasantry 
dominated population, which protected smallholders from globalization and large scale 
producers (Maghimbi 7-8; Chayanov xiv-xvi).   
 While these principles and values of cooperatives are universal, they have not 





later after independence, cooperatives operated as a part of the state. Cooperatives were 
later abolished by the government in 1976 after decades of relative economic success, 
because the government accused many of these organizations of being corrupt. While this 
was certainly true, it is more likely that the government abolished cooperatives because 
they were concerned of the growing power and capital accumulation that some 
cooperatives were generating, which eventually led to their dissolution as they were seen 
as a capitalist threat to the country’s socialist agenda. Once they were reinstated, 
cooperatives remained as an offshoot of the government. Reforms enacted in 1991, under 
pressure from Western donors, discarded the socialist state centric model in favour of a 
volunteer based one, known as the “Rochdalean model,” in an effort to rejuvenate the 
cooperative movement. Such a feat would prove to be difficult, however, given the level 
of distrust and tarnished reputation cooperatives had garnered within the peasantry after 
years of failed and heavy-handed government interference in the movement (Maghimbi 
9; Lyimo 67-68).  
Given the renewed emphasis in Tanzania and international development policy on 
the role of cooperatives today, this thesis will investigate if cooperatives will be able to 
return to a position where they are able to assist smallholders in surpassing the barriers 
that impede improving their standard of living, which will ultimately help in solving 
Tanzania’s food insecurity issues (Crowley, Tercelli, and Ourabah 7-8; CRMP 1). As 
mentioned earlier, in recent years the government has encouraged a rejuvenation of the 
cooperative movement after years of forced hibernation as they too see the role of 
cooperatives as an essential one if smallholder farmers are to improve their lives and 





programs have been issued by the government since the 1990s in order to address 
problems of corruption, membership empowerment, structural weaknesses, and to 
modernize cooperatives to assist them in competing in the free market in the hopes that 
they can regain their prominence within the country’s developmental process (CRMP iii; 
TFC ii). In response, by 2008, cooperative registration had swelled to around 8500 
nationwide, directly affecting close to 8 million people, whereas in 2000, cooperative 
membership only hovered around 55,000 members total (Maghimbi 26; Lyimo 91). Due 
to the encouragement by the current government, and increasing involvement by 
smallholder farmers, cooperatives must be closely examined in order to discover if they 
are, in fact, as capable of assisting smallholders and eliminating its food insecurity as 
their defenders claim.  
The Tanzania of today, however, is far different from when cooperatives were at 
their peak in the 1950-60s. Since economic privatization and the liberalization of the 
market, which occurred under the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) of the 1980s, 
competition for market share is fierce, something that was missing in the early days of 
independence when the government allocated cooperatives with a monopoly over 
marketing certain cash crops. In addition, the government is also encouraging the 
industrialization of its agricultural sector through the emergence of large scale 
agribusiness, which they see as another key component to obtaining food security. Under 
such policies as Kilimo Kwanza, the administration is attempting to increase the scale, 
mechanization, and commercialization of Tanzania’s agricultural sector (“Kilimo 
Kwanza” 5). Thus, with a different economic and political landscape that supports a food 





to play a more prominent role in Tanzania’s agricultural sector, it is difficult to imagine 
that cooperatives will be able to support smallholder farmers as they did in the past. To 
truly rejuvenate the cooperative movement, policies more in line with the ideals of food 
sovereignty are needed to allow cooperative societies to operate in a conducive policy 
environment, which will ultimately empower the peasantry, instead of policies that allow 
agribusinesses to overpower smallholder farmers.  
This thesis is divided into three main chapters in order to illustrate the roots of 
Tanzania’s food problem and assess the role of cooperatives in the future. Each chapter 
will discuss the major policies and events that have impacted the agricultural sector, 
demonstrating how the Tanzanian government has dealt with the nation’s food insecurity. 
The state of cooperatives will also be observed throughout in order to show when the 
movement was successful, why it was able to prosper, how and why it eventually 
declined, its current condition, and its possible future. Progressing in a chronological 
manner, the first chapter, divided into three sections, documents the history of Tanzania’s 
agricultural sector, beginning with the colonial period (1884-1960), followed by the post-
independence era (1961-1981), and finishes with the period of structural adjustment 
(1982-present). The next chapter, divided into two sections, will then bring readers into 
the present context, as it illustrates how the current developmental discourse seeks to 
obtain food security through the open market, alluding to the dangers this brings when 
corporations become increasingly in control of food. Once the foundation of Tanzania’s 
current context is constructed, the next section will discuss the government’s attempt to 






In doing so, this thesis will demonstrate that as the government continues to adopt 
a food security based approach to its food insecurity, by promoting the expansion of 
industrialized agriculture, the importance of cooperatives is likely to further dissipate, 
diminishing the role peasants play in the development of the country. While proponents 
of food security may favour such a move, arguing that smallholder farmers are not 
capable of feeding the country, this thesis cautions that further food insecurity is likely to 
persist if the peasantry is not given the proper support needed to become a major part of 
the solution. As such, this thesis favours a food sovereignty based solution to Tanzania’s 
food problem, which promotes the idea that the peasantry must remain intact and in more 
control of local food systems in order to fight the poverty and hunger that has plagued the 
country for decades. Cooperatives occupy an important role within this food sovereignty 
based solution to Tanzania’s food insecurity, as they can be used as an organization that 
supports the peasantry, enabling them to surpass the barriers that impede their 
development. Since the current government’s actions counter this, political reform 
emanating from opponents of the regime or from civil society itself may be the only way 












Chapter 2: Methodology 
Prior to conducting research for this project, I had been to Tanzania on two 
separate occasions, spending approximately one year there in total. In that time, my love 
for the country grew to the point where I now consider Tanzania to be my second home. 
My time in the country has primarily been as a volunteer, where I worked for the Anna 
Schubert Mackeja Kwofie Foundation, operating in Shinyanga and specifically in the 
village of Nhobola. The organization’s long term goal is to raise funds to build irrigation 
facilities for the farmers in the village, who cultivate under semi-arid conditions and 
without access to local markets because of their geographically isolated location. Having 
seen the difficulties these farmers faced, once I was enrolled in the International 
Development Studies Master’s program at Saint Mary’s University, I wanted to conduct a 
research project that would shed light on these obstacles, as well as potential solutions to 
their plight. Once my course work was completed, I returned to Tanzania for a third time 
in order to interview people working within the agricultural sector. While the interviews 
conducted are not the basis of the research, they did provide me with a unique 
opportunity to record the opinions of Tanzanians on the issues surrounding food 
insecurity, and greatly impacted the direction of the thesis.  
Primarily, the data collected for this study was collected by using qualitative 
research methods. Statistical information on food production, investment and planning 
directed towards the agricultural sector, how much food the country is importing and 
exporting, and what crops are being grown are used to delineate the magnitude of 
Tanzania’s food system. Government documents were also reviewed in order to 





implemented at that time. Information collected through qualitative research methods in 
the form of open-ended interviews are used to provide insight into what is currently 
happening in Tanzania throughout the various levels within the agricultural sector, as 
well as to provide an intimate view of cooperatives by those affected by these 
organizations. Interviews are cross-referenced with the use of other sources such as news 
feeds, journal articles, and other published works in order to further highlight and 
confirm their contribution. By compiling information through these research methods, the 
thesis seeks to better explain why Tanzania continues to suffer from issues of food 
insecurity, and why cooperatives are unable to assist smallholder farmers as they did 
before the 1970s.  
The main focus as well as the units of analysis are Tanzania and its agricultural 
sector. Since smallholders and cooperatives are key components to solving the nation’s 
food insecurity issues through a food sovereignty framework, they are the other units of 
analysis that will be documented within this research. Agribusinesses will also be a unit 
analyzed, as they are being proposed by food security advocates in the belief that they 
can help the nation become food secure. 
In all, 29 people were interviewed from July 17 to August 19, 2013, in the regions 
of Moshi, Arusha, Morogoro, Shinyanga, and Dar es Salaam. The areas of Dodoma, 
Singida and Iringa were also visited, but no interviews were conducted. Of those 
interviewed, 23 were male and 6 were female, while 2 wished to remain anonymous and 
unidentified. Ages ranged from the early-20s to the mid-60s and above. Age was not 
considered to be of particular importance or focus in this study, although it was observed 





leadership role or of high academic standing did tend to be older, but this should not be 
surprising as experience is often needed to achieve these types of positions. The age 
breakdown was also fairly even, as there were 16 people who were believed to be around 
the age of 20 and above, and 13 people believed to be around the age of 60.  
It is important to note the overwhelming male to female ratio, which is a 
reflection of the fact that the direct involvement of women in Tanzanian cooperatives is 
greatly disproportionate to men. This is confirmed by Andrew Bibby, who states that men 
dominate primary cooperative membership in Tanzania, as only 1 in 5 members are 
women, who are also underrepresented in leadership positions. Although recent 
legislation has attempted to address this issue, clearly more needs to be done to empower 
women within Tanzania’s cooperative sector, an issue that is also a large part of the 
argument emanating from advocates of food sovereignty (Bibby 23).  
The regions visited are host to some the largest and oldest primary agricultural 
cooperatives as well as the TFC, the umbrella organization that oversees all cooperative 
activity within the country. These regions are also home to the country’s major academic 
institutions as well as the political and commercial centres of Tanzania. This allowed for 
access to fellow academics and policy makers working and analyzing the agricultural 
sector, cooperatives, and legislation.  
Given the time frame as well as budget restrictions, these areas were also selected 
because of existing contacts already established from previous trips to the country. As the 
interview process began, further contacts were made, creating linkages to other people 
involved within the agricultural sector. The areas visited also represent varying climates, 





arid and fertile conditions, providing a unique glimpse into how certain regions differ in 
terms of makeup and food security. In doing so, information was uncovered as to how 
each region deals and interacts with their specific issues of food insecurity.  
The study involved interviews with smallholder farmers, directors of 
cooperatives, the director of the TFC, agribusiness directors, professors and students who 
focus on the agricultural sector, wealthy landowners, members of the coffee board, 
cooperative members, scientists conducting research on Genetically Modified Organisms 
(GMOs), personnel from the department of Agriculture, Food Security, and Cooperatives, 
as well as members of the NGO community and farming associations.  
This study will attempt to document the varying viewpoints originating from the 
different levels operating within the complicated matrix of the country’s food system. 
Within this structure, farmers are the producers on the ground level, but also interact with 
NGOs, farming associations, agricultural extension officers, and agents of cooperatives, 
who then report to their respective administrators. For agricultural extension officers, 
after they have collected their data, eventually, that information is carried to higher levels 
of government who, it is hoped, will then be able to create policies that reflect the 
situation farmers are facing on the ground, assisting them in trying to improve their 
standard of living. Directors of agribusinesses and the scientists conducting research on 
GMOs were interviewed because they are the newest actors in relation to the agricultural 
sector. Interviewing members within this area assists this thesis by gaining insight as to 
how these new players will impact smallholders and the country’s food security in the 





interviewed, as they are also critically analyzing how to improve the lives of the 
peasantry and solve the country’s food problem.  
Each interview took approximately one hour and was conducted in an open-ended 
format. Questions were prepared prior to each interview in order to maintain some 
structure, but often one question would lead to a new one and snowball from there. 
Overall, however, the time frame allotted allowed me to go back to the questions I 
wanted answered. All interviews were recorded in a notebook. Originally, I had thought 
to record each interview, but after speaking with a friend also conducting research in the 
country, I decided not to do so as many of his interviewees were not comfortable with 
being recorded.  
Most interviews were conducted in English and in an informal, one-on-one style 
within a private or semi-private setting. Exceptions to this were interviews done with the 
majority of farmers, for they were either conducted in the village or on the farmers’ 
fields. These were done in a group format, but remained open ended and informal. There 
are two reasons for this. First, farmers were interviewed on the farm after a long day’s 
work, and as the interviews were being conducted, others joined the conversation. I did 
not want to reject anyone for fear of losing their potential contributions if they left the 
area, so decided to allow the group interview to continue. It also assisted in keeping the 
interview within a reasonable timeframe and allowed participants to comfortably discuss 
the issues being presented. The second reason for the group interview format was that the 
interviews being conducted were in a village in which I have been on numerous 
occasions having volunteered there for an extended period. Every time I have been there, 





certain time constraints and again, for fear of losing any potential contributions of those 
being interviewed. These interviews were conducted in KiSwahili with the assistance of a 
translator.   
The questions directed towards smallholder farmers focused on highlighting the 
major challenges they faced and how or whether cooperatives were assisting in 
overcoming these barriers. Their views on government policies or actions were also 
asked in order to garner their opinions about what should be done to improve their 
situation. Despite the fact that some appeared to be more isolated than others, finding 
markets for their produce was described as the greatest challenge for all of them. For the 
group of farmers in Arusha, land was also an issue, as they felt they had the manpower 
and expertise to cultivate more farmland, but did not have access to expand their 
operations. Although not a formally registered cooperative, the farmers in Arusha 
believed they practiced similar cooperative values such as sharing profits and having an 
equal say in decision making.2 None of the farmers interviewed in Shinyanga were 
members of a cooperative, and felt they did not have access to join such an organization 
due to their isolated position.3
 Farmers individually interviewed in Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, Moshi, and 
Arusha expressed the need for the cooperative movement to be strengthened, believing 
that they could greatly assist smallholder farmers and were definitely needed if their 
situation was to improve. Nonetheless, all of these participants highlighted numerous 
problems with the current state of cooperatives, including their inability to provide 
                                                          
2 Interview with a group of Arushan farmers, July 19th 2013, Arusha, Tanzania. 
3 Interview with a group of Nhobolan farmers, July 31st 2013, Shinyanga, Tanzania. 




payment, credit, or delivery of produce and inputs on time, as well as a failure to deal 
with market accessibility and corruption.  
Prior to coming to Tanzania to conduct the field research portion of this project, 
my initial assessment was that cooperatives were doing an adequate job in assisting 
farmers surpass the barriers they face, which is why they were being encouraged by the 
government, scholars, and various international organizations. While there are some 
positives, overall the supposed revival of cooperatives appears to be limited. The study 
then changed its focus in order to discover what was preventing cooperatives from 
regaining its position of strength within the agricultural sector. Since cooperatives 
appeared to no longer be playing an important part in the lives of smallholder farmers, the 
thesis also needed to understand the impact of agribusinesses on smallholders as well as 
reflect upon the capitalization process that the country’s agricultural sector is currently 
undertaking, as these elements would further impede a rejuvenation of cooperative 
societies and have a direct impact on the overall socioeconomic conditions facing the 
peasantry.  
This change in focus began with the first few interviews conducted, as all 
participants said farmers no longer trusted these organizations. Although many 
cooperatives were registered, most were found to be either dormant or barely functional. 
This theme showing the decay of cooperatives continued throughout the research project, 
as participants from across the country said the same thing. Even the word “cooperative” 
appeared to give off a vibe of negativity, failure, corruption, and a cause of wounds that 
have yet to heal. Despite this, however, most expressed a need for cooperatives, or at 
least another organization to step in to assist smallholder farmers. Some also alluded to 




the fact that the “cooperative spirit” was still alive and well in the country, despite the 
fact that cooperatives no longer held the same sway with people as they once did. 
Participants also expressed concern about some of the large scale developments 
beginning to occur in the country, from large commercial farming projects, to the 
possibility of allowing GMOs into the country’s agricultural network, to land grabs used 
for biofuel production.  
The research itself is sanctioned by the Research Ethics Board (REB) at Saint 
Mary’s University in Halifax, as well as the Tanzania Commission for Science and 
Technology (COSTECH), the governing body that oversees all research being conducted 
in Tanzania. All interviews followed the specific guidelines of each governing body. 
Participants were free to decline any proposed interview or question without penalty and 
allowed to remain anonymous if desired. As a gift for their participation, each will 
receive a copy of the thesis after it is graded, or at the very least a condensed version of 
the document. It is also hoped that it will be translated into KiSwahili at a later date in 













Chapter 3: Literature Review 
In order to illustrate the theoretical arguments covered in this study and to 
encapsulate the case of Tanzania within a global context, this thesis will assess the works 
of other scholars who have written on the major issues pertaining to this research. The 
literature review is divided into four parts. The first deals with the theoretical framework 
behind the perspectives of food security and food sovereignty, analyzing how each school 
of thought confronts national and international issues of food insecurity, the role of the 
peasantry, as well as how each explains the recent global food crisis and the importance 
of such an event. The second part focuses on the theoretical analysis that advocates for 
cooperatives, articulating the arguments of scholars who state why they are needed to 
assist smallholder farmers in improving their lives, allowing them to have a positive 
contribution to a nation’s food security. Continuing this focus on the role of the 
peasantry, part three discusses the agrarian question and how it is being answered in 
Tanzania, leading into the fourth and final part of the literature review which explores the 
potential impact of agribusinesses on smallholder farmers and what the emergence of the 
global food regime means for their development and wellbeing. Extensions of 
commercial agriculture, GMOs and the biofuel industry will also be examined in this 
section in order to demonstrate their potential effects on the country’s agricultural sector 
and existing smallholder farmers. Due to the fact that industrialized agriculture is in its 
infancy stage in Tanzania, parallels between the country’s agricultural sector and other 
nations’ will also be drawn in order to show the direction in which Tanzania could be 
headed as it continues to modernize its agricultural structure.   




An agricultural sector itself has a variety of important functions that impact 
economic, environmental, nutritional, gender, age, health, and cultural spheres, each 
having an essential role in the developmental framework of a country as well as enabling 
it to be food secure. Which direction the agricultural sector should take and how these 
domains are characterized is shaped by one’s theoretical perspective. In order to clearly 
distinguish between the two primary schools of thought involved in this debate, those 
pertaining to the theory that is more economically driven, market oriented, and in favour 
of a capitalist mode of agricultural production will be called the food security school, 
arguing that agricultural production is primarily economic while food production for local 
consumption is secondary.  
Indeed, those belonging to this school argue that the agricultural sector’s primary 
objective is to be Tanzania’s economic engine, as it remains the largest contributor to the 
country’s GDP. As such, a focus on cash crop production should be maintained in order 
to accumulate funds that can be used to purchase foodstuffs that are available on the 
global market at a cheaper price. Others, however, would argue that it is vital for 
Tanzania to feed itself, and not rely on the world market, opting instead for food self-
sufficiency and sustainability as a nation’s sovereign right. This perspective, 
championing local food production in order to ensure domestic nutritional needs over 
economic growth, will be dubbed the food sovereignty school of thought. Both schools 
will be reflected upon throughout the thesis in order to provide commentary over the 
main events that have shaped Tanzania’s agricultural sector. It must be stressed, however, 
that regardless of the theoretical perspective, both schools purport to address themselves 
to the alleviation of hunger. How to achieve this end is thus the central debate. This first 




section of the literature review will now observe the works of other scholars and how 
they articulate the respective theories, exemplifying how they can be applied to solving 
the current global food crisis as well as the food situation in Tanzania.  
 
The Food Security School of Thought  
 Food security advocates such as world renowned economist Paul Collier argue 
that the root causes of food insecurity are irrelevant, for they do not lead to any solution 
to the current food crisis, which occurred after years of relative food price stability (67-
68). In his article Politics of Hunger, Collier states that the cause of rising food prices 
emanates from the rapid economic growth in Asia, and in particular India and China, the 
world’s two most populated countries. As peoples’ wages increased, their diets changed, 
causing new stresses within the world’s food supply as more people substituted their 
traditional, carbohydrate heavy diets for ones more Western oriented and protein 
concentrated, by consuming more meat (Collier 68). This has placed increased demand 
for feed or more specifically grains, of which six kilograms are needed to produce one 
kilogram of beef (Collier 69).4 In traditional diets, these grains were consumed directly. 
But as societies gain more wealth, the working class goes through what food activist 
Haroon Akram-Lodhi describes as a “gastronomic transition” (59). As a result, more 
grains are being transferred to raise more livestock for consumption, which in turn causes 
a decrease in food supply, resulting in the sharp rise in the price of food and hence a food 
                                                          
4 To further demonstrate how much grain is being used for animal as opposed to direct human 
consumption, Raj Patel states that 60% of American grains are used for animal feed in the United 
States (298). If growth rates continue in certain regions of the Global South, their grain 
consumption numbers are likely to mirror that of the United States and other Western nations, 
causing further stresses on the future of global food security.  




crisis as more people can no longer afford the escalated food prices (Collier 69).  
 For Collier, the crisis in the developing world is further exasperated because it 
simply does not have a “modernized” food system. Agriculture is predominantly rain-fed, 
characterized by a lack of technology, and poor infrastructure. The Global South is also 
suffering from an underdeveloped and often nonexistent industrialized agricultural sector, 
under stress due to population pressures, and increasingly facing adverse weather 
conditions due to climate change. Farmers are also penalized due to the current ban on 
GMOs in Europe and parts of the developing world, as well as a lack of access to local 
and external markets and low incomes; all of which have negatively impacted production 
levels, particularly for smallholder farmers who make up the majority of the population in 
the developing world (Clover 7; Wolter 29; Collier 67-68).  
For advocates of food security, it is smallholders themselves that are major 
contributors to the food problem, or at the very least are getting in the way of the 
solution. Simply put, peasants are not producing enough, predominantly for subsistence, 
and as such are preventing supply from matching global demand, allowing the food crisis 
to occur (Wolter 14). They are also deemed to be inefficient, unable to specialize in a 
certain crop due to their small scale, technological know-how, and entrepreneurial skills, 
which would help them increase their income within the global market given the proper 
conditions, such as market demand, infrastructure to facilitate delivery of products, and 
access to processing to capitalize on value added production (Sachs 37, 53). These 
sentiments are shared by Tanzanian agricultural economics professor Andrew Temu, who 
believes that the problem with the lack of agricultural production is attributed to the 
peasantry, as the size of their farms are too small to cultivate the country’s available 




fertile lands, and their tools are too primitive to maximize its yields. To solve this 
problem, Temu argues that Tanzania should adopt rules that increase the size of farms 
through a minimum acreage for smallholders. Temu adds that,  
…perhaps a more fundamental problem lies in the predominance of traditional rain-fed 
smallholder production system in the scale of 0.25 to 3 hectares in the rural Tanzania that 
is supposed to provide livelihood to over 80 per cent of the population. The failure to 
promote commercial farming, in particular the development of medium to large-scale 
commercial farms significantly explains the low productivity growth of the country’s 
rural sector. 
(Temu 25).  
 
Temu further champions large and medium scale commercialized agriculture, arguing 
that smallholder farmers lack the capacity to utilize technological improvements such as 
irrigation because of its high costs, lack of access to improved irrigation technologies, 
and inadequate physical infrastructure (Temu 25; “Irrigation Transfer”).5 Researcher 
Denise Wolter is likeminded, pointing out that because the agro-food industry is not 
developed in the Global South, countries are unable to meet demand. In Tanzania, for 
instance, in 2008 domestic sugar consumption amounted to 12 kilograms per person per 
annum, the equivalent of more than 340,000 tonnes of sugar, but local production only 
amounted to 263,000 tonnes, unable to match local demand (Wolter 15). 
Collier further adds that the majority of peasants are ill-suited for the 
entrepreneurial role that farmers must adopt in order to increase production and become 
modernized. For Collier,  
In modern agriculture, technology is fast-evolving, investment is lumpy, the private 
provision of transportation infrastructure is necessary to counter the lack of its public 
                                                          
5 According to Temu, there are 29.4 million hectares of land that is suitable for irrigation 
development, which accounts to about 31% of all arable land. Currently, only around 227,000 
hectares of land undergo irrigation, which amounts to less than 1% of potential levels. For Temu, if 
Tanzania remains dependent on the peasantry, irrigation potential will never been met, and thus 
production levels will continue to remain stagnant (6).  




provision, consumer food fashions are fast-changing and best met by integrated 
marketing chains, and regulatory standards are rising toward the holy grail of the 
traceability of produce back to its source…Large organizations are better suited to cope 
with investment, marketing chains, and regulation  
(71-72). 
 
Furthermore, smallholder farmers are not reproducing themselves, as their offspring are 
more likely to move to the city in search of higher incomes and less labour intensive 
work found in other sectors (Collier 71). As such, Collier calls for an end to the 
romanticisms he asserts is held by members of the middle and upper classes in the North, 
as well as some development specialists, arguing that small scale, organic farming is 
simply not capable of feeding the world. While still sympathetic to the plight of the 
peasantry and not as far on the right of the political spectrum as Collier, Henry Bernstein 
adds to this skepticism, arguing that small scale producers lack the surplus necessary to 
feed non-farmers, a segment of the world’s population that continues to grow as more 
people leave rural areas for urban ones. While both favour a scaling up of farm sizes, as 
well as championing the market, which under capitalism has been able to feed more 
people than ever before, Collier further advocates for the use of improved technologies - 
specifically a wider adoption and acceptance of GMOs (Bernstein 23-24; Collier 68).  
Harking back to the points made by Temu and Wolter, food security advocates 
will often point to India and Brazil as models of success, whose agricultural sectors 
exemplify what must be adopted throughout the developing world (Collier 73). India 
welcomed the Green Revolution after it was adopted first by Mexico. Through its 
adoption, India’s agricultural sector became characterized by large scale, mono-crop 
farming, synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, as well as high yield variety seeds that have 
fed and generated incomes for millions of people throughout the 1960s-1980s (Sachs 




177; “Agriculture for Development” 46). The country, historically plagued by drought, 
famine, and monsoons, went from food insecure to being a net food exporter thanks to its 
adoption of modern, commercialized agriculture (Sachs 177, 259-260).  
Like India, the Brazilian agricultural model also takes advantage of advanced 
farming technologies as well as increasing its scale of operations, which has transformed 
the nation into a massive, globalized food producer, particularly with regards to soy. A 
favourite crop for agribusinesses due to its versatility and nutritional properties, as it is 
nitrogen fixing and high in protein, the cultivation of soy is greatly spreading alongside 
the expansion of commercialized agriculture around the globe. With regards to Tanzania, 
AgriSol, an American based firm, plans to focus mainly on soy production, alongside 
palm oil, despite the fact that demand and production for soy is virtually nonexistent, 
only amounting to 8000 metric tonnes being produced in 2005 (Jones et al 12). While 
AgriSol claims to produce for Tanzanians first, according to Raj Patel, 80% of the 
world’s soy is, in fact, for feed used by the livestock industry, which is more reflective of 
the increase in global animal consumption that was mentioned earlier in this section, and 
not that of domestic needs (168). As such, it is likely that the soy based animal feed is to 
be used for export, a fact that AgriSol admits too in their plans for future production 
(AgriSol). 
The growth in scale in Brazil has also allowed for the cultivation of farmland that 
was previously unused, an issue seen throughout much of sub-Saharan Africa, including 
Tanzania. Calling for an expansion in scale, the Brazilian model, while Collier admits has 
displaced smallholders and has been harmful to the local environment, has only caused 
damage when not properly regulated. On the positive side, the increase in scale has led to 




growth in contract farming and out grower operations that include peasants within the 
supply chain. Within this framework, peasants supply a large central business, which has 
enabled many smallholders to gain access to credit and improved technologies, giving 
them more opportunities to increase their incomes, standard of living, and household food 
security (Collier 73). For Collier and others, what has happened in India and Brazil needs 
to occur in Africa as well. More specially, Africa needs to experience its own Green 
Revolution in order to maximize its agricultural potential and have production meet its 
growing demand and the new challenges that appear on the horizon, such as climate 
change.  
As such, proponents of food security argue that Africa’s Green Revolution must 
be fuelled by improved farming technologies. The least developed region in the world is 
also the fasting growing population wise, the most food insecure, and the most vulnerable 
to global warming. Thus, the adoption of GMOs is a must, for the biotechnology is seen 
as the best way to fight against droughts, floods, and disease. Its design, they argue, can 
be genetically engineered (GE) to specifically combat these obstacles and increase yields 
(Collier 76). These sentiments are echoed by former Secretary General of the United 
Nation’s Kofi Annan. Associated with an Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa 
(AGRA), he has become a major spokesperson for sparking Africa’s Green Revolution 
and a self-proclaimed champion of smallholder farmers in Africa.6 For Annan,  
Seeds have been the main problem…Farmers are using seeds that are 20 years old. They 
have been locked out of science. Now we are introducing high-yielding, pest-resistant, 
drought-tolerant varieties. We are also working to liberalise the market. If farmers get a 
                                                          
6 At the end of 2013, Annan stepped down from being chair of AGRA, but is still committed to food 
and nutritional security in Africa (Mudasia-Mwichuli and Farnoudi 1).   




bumper crop and do not have a market for their surplus, they will not repeat the effort the 
next year.  
(Financial Times). 
 
Currently the production of GMO products are prohibited from commercial use in almost 
all African countries, including Tanzania, while the usage of fertilizer, necessary for these 
high yield seeds to produce to their potential, is limited because of unaffordable prices 
(Collier 76).7 Although there are risks associated with the implementation of 
biotechnology, which will be discussed later, in an interview with an expert on 
biotechnology, they argued that GMOs were still needed to increase yields. For the 
participant, food insecurity in Tanzania is primarily caused by a lack of production, 
which must be addressed by any means necessary. If future problems did occur, they 
would be dealt with later.8  
 As the quote from Kofi Annan also signifies, in order to further improve the 
plight of developing nations, proponents of food security advise that it is best to take 
advantage of the global market. By capitalizing on the comparative advantage they have 
in growing crops such as coffee, tea, and sisal, Tanzania can sell these goods on the 
global market in order to increase their incomes, climb out of poverty, and become more 
food secure. The theory of comparative advantage, illustrated by Adam Smith in his book 
Wealth of Nations states that, 
It is the maxim of every prudent master of a family, never to attempt to make a home 
what will cost him more to make than buy…What is prudence in the conduct of every 
                                                          
7 At the time of this writing, only four African countries: Egypt, South Africa, Sudan, and Burkina 
Faso produced GM crops. Unless milled, the import of GM foods are banned in Angola, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
Cameroon, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Uganda, and Tanzania are currently conducting field trials on 
GM crops, the final step before full approval of commercialisation (Tran; Interview with Dr. Tairo, 
scientist, August 12th 2013, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania).  
8 Interview with a researcher of biotechnology, August 3rd, 2013, Morogoro, Tanzania. 




private family, can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can 
supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy of them 
with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have 
some advantage 
(qtd. in Sapsford 70). 
 
In other words, produce what you can produce best, cheaply, and efficiently, and buy the 
rest.  
In relation to agriculture, this line of reasoning is demonstrated perfectly in the 
Jeffery Sachs’ book The End of Poverty. In it, the world renowned economist depicts a 
scenario where a hypothetical smallholder farmer can increase their family’s wealth while 
at the same time meet its food needs by changing from food to cash crop production. The 
example provided is to show through a micro level how nations can become food secure 
while at the same time improving their economies. Upon comparing a household that 
only grows crops to feed itself,  
… [This] household decides to shift to vanilla as a cash crop. The next year the household 
earns $800 in vanilla, and uses $600 to buy four tons of grain for food. As more vanilla 
farmers arise in the region, a new group of trading firms also forms, specializing in 
shipping and storage of vanilla, food, and farm inputs. 
(Sachs 52-53).  
 
With this example, Sachs argues that a farmer, given the right conditions, can 
theoretically move from a life of subsistence to one that gears production towards the 
market. Since household income has increased, the family can not only buy the food it 
needs, but it is also wealthier, giving it a way out of poverty.   
These sentiments are further echoed by John Block, former secretary of 
agriculture for the United States. In the Uruguay trading rounds of 1986, Block stated, 
“the idea that developing countries should feed themselves is an anachronism from a 
bygone era. They could better ensure their food security by relying on US agricultural 




products, which are available, in most cases at lower costs” (qtd. in Holt-Gimenez and 
Patel 49). This viewpoint proclaims that as long as people are able to have access to food, 
that is the main concern, and not who produces it, how it is produced, or where it comes 
from. It also implies that a comparative advantage is a favourable one in terms of both 
production and consumption. If a nation, like the United States, through its well 
established agribusinesses is able to generate enough food at cheap prices, then global 
consumers should benefit.  
Thus, the proposed solutions to food insecurity lie within the global market that, 
through liberalization, can free the Global South from both hunger and poverty. An 
increase in agribusiness and further adoption of advanced farming technologies in the 
developing world will thus only reinforce a stronger global food security system in light 
of the new challenges presented by climate change, increased population growth, dietary 
transformations, and urbanization. Those who champion the free market structure that 
allows the most efficient companies to feed the world would therefore place their faith in 
the current economic system itself in order to solve the recent food crisis that, from a 
food security perspective, is based on a lack of economic accessibility and food 
production.  
 
The Food Sovereignty School of Thought 
Diverging from this faith in neoliberalism, however, is economist Ha-Joon Chang, 
who argues that the North’s trumpeting of the free market is both misplaced and 
hypocritical, for they developed their own economies by the same methods they now 
preach the Global South not to practice. For instance, the United States and Britain, two 




nations that today are some of the most vocal in encouraging free trade, became the great 
powers of their day through exercising extensive protectionist policies (Chang 48). 
Explaining this duplicity in his book, Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the 
Secret History of Capitalism, Chang observes that although there is some deviation, 
industrialized nations developed mainly by heavily taxing imports and subsidizing their 
own industries, yet encouraged the developing world to do the opposite.9 For them, 
protecting local industry from more powerful foreign entities was pivotal for their 
development. Only when these companies matured did countries remove barriers to trade, 
allowing the once infant businesses to expand internationally (Chang 50). The policy 
reversal executed by the Global North is twofold, as their industries were now well 
established, requiring new markets to continue their economic progression while at the 
same time preventing industrial competition emanating from other countries to develop 
(Chang 48). Chang describes this process as “kicking away the ladder,” which began 
shortly after WWII, and was abetted by the two major international financial institutions 
(IFIs), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, and the world’s trade 
organization, GATT, which later became the WTO (61). 
Created during the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 by the United States and 
Britain to oversee a newly liberalized global economic order, the IMF was originally 
assigned to oversee and maintain international currency stability while the World Bank 
was created to rebuild war torn Europe after WWII. Although their initial objectives 
became obsolete, they continued to exist, focusing their attentions on restructuring 
                                                          
9 According to Chang, the Netherlands and Switzerland, until WWI, were left open to the world 
market, but sidestepped traditional neoliberal policies in other ways, such as ignoring patent 
protection, in order to develop their own economies (15).  




economies in the Global South to aid economic development and eliminate budget 
deficits at all costs (Millet and Toussaint 47-49). The first round of GATT talks also 
occurred after WWII in 1947, used to regulate international trade. Later upgraded to the 
WTO in 1995, Chang describes the WTO as,  
…a powerful agency pushing for liberalization not just in trade but also in other areas, 
like foreign investment regulation and intellectual property rights. The WTO now forms 
the core of the global economic governance system, together with the IMF – in charge of 
access to short-term finance – and the Word Bank – in charge of longer-term investments 
(23).  
 
These organizations make up what the author calls the “unholy trinity,” as they promote 
neoliberal policies that favour the Global North at the expense of the developing world, 
as these institutions are structurally dominated by the world’s richest countries who make 
the global market not as free as they advertise (Chang 13).  
As Chang explains, the IMF and World Bank are governed by the North, who 
control 60% of the votes in both institutions, with the Americans having a built in veto 
power due to the size of their individual vote, which is based on contributions. Although 
the WTO’s voting structure is different than these financial institutions, as votes are 
allocated one per country as opposed to equaling the dollar amount invested, the WTO’s 
decisions are made in secret by a group of rich and a few emerging developing countries 
such as India and Brazil, while other developing nations are prevented, sometimes 
physically, from attending core meetings, or simply do not have the intellectual and 
negotiation capacity to participate (Chang 35-36).10  
                                                          
10 It is reported that in various WTO meetings from Geneva in 1998 to Cancun in 2003, all 
important negotiations were held in “Green Rooms,” attended by invitation only. Rich and large 
developing countries were allowed to participate, while delegates from countries in the 
developing world were physically removed, as was the case in the meetings that occurred in 
Seattle in 1999 (Chang 36-37).   




Since the concentration of power within these organizations is held firmly in the 
Global North, their interests effectively shape both the market and the direction of the 
developmental discourse (Chang 37). As a result, Southern government involvement 
within this dialogue are discouraged in order to secure the advantage Northern countries 
have in terms of trade, and thus the same subsidies, funds for research and development, 
and tariffs that are used to protect industries within industrialized nations are not mirrored 
in the developing world. With regards to agriculture, this duality is witnessed in the fact 
that industrialized nations provide over $200 billion in subsidies per year for its 
agricultural industry, while the developing world is prevented from doing so because of 
the neoliberal policies implemented by the IMF, World Bank, and WTO, and for the 
simple fact that they do not have the same economic resources (Chang 77; Weis 25).11 
Alas, the Global North’s control over the “unholy trinity” has left the Global South 
captured within an “unfree” world market system. With regards to food security, due to 
the massive wave of underdevelopment that has occurred at the direction of a Northern 
led market, advocates of food sovereignty accuse the free market economy for allowing 
the current problems within the world’s food system to persist, highlighted by the most 
recent food crisis. 
For this school, the causes of the global food crisis encompass some of the ones 
depicted by theorists advocating for food security, but the root causes go far deeper. 
Indeed, along with an increase in global meat consumption, the growth of the biofuels 
industry, droughts in major wheat producing countries in 2005-06, high oil prices, and 
                                                          
11 At the same time, wealthy nations provide less than $1 billion in total to developing agriculture 
throughout the Global South (Weis 25).  




food price speculation have all contributed to the rise in food prices, but are only 
approximate causes of the recent food crisis (Holt-Gimenez and Patel 10). At the very 
core of today’s global food insecurity is the agro-industrial complex, its increasing 
attempt to control the world’s food, and the destruction of agricultural food systems in the 
Global South that have left the developing world dependent on food aid from the Global 
North (Holt-Gimenez and Patel 22; “From Food Crisis” 142). 
For food activists like Eric Holt-Gimenez and Raj Patel, the current food crisis 
has been brewing for decades. In their book, Food Rebellions! the authors outline in 
detail the four main reasons that explain why the agro-industrial complex has emerged 
and how it has caused so much damage to local agriculture. Overproduction and food aid 
emanating from the North, the effects of the Green Revolution, the implementation of the 
SAPs imposed on the South, and free trade and the WTO have all had a hand in 
destroying agricultural structures in the South while creating an environment for 
multinational agribusinesses to flourish (Holt-Gimenez and Patel 24-25). A flood of 
excess grains in the form of food aid crashed local prices throughout the Global South, 
forcing many farmers in the developing world into subsistence and decreased local 
production. While it drastically increased yields, the Green Revolution eliminated much 
of the planet’s biodiversity, transformed agriculture into a monoculture, oil based sector, 
led to the monopolization of seed and chemical inputs by Northern companies, and 
displaced thousands of peasants from their land due to the expansion of large scale 
farming. SAPs further opened up developing nations’ markets to Northern companies by 
breaking down tariffs, dismantling national marketing boards, and eliminated price 
guarantees as well as government led agricultural assistance programs, paving the way 




for deregulated markets. Finally, at the hand of the WTO, as well as the IMF and the 
World Bank, under the guise of “free trade,” the Global South was prevented from 
protecting their food systems from outside interference, while at the same time Northern 
countries were able to better protect their own economies from similar foreign intrusion 
(Holt-Gimenez and Patel 24-25).  
For food sovereignty advocates, the poverty and hunger that exists in the world 
today are caused mainly by political decisions on the part of Northern countries, and not 
due to the failure of the peasantry, production, overpopulation, or food scarcity. Instead, 
the reasons for why 3 billion people remain food insecure are because of policies that 
have allowed for the overproduction of food and poverty itself to continue (Holt-Gimenez 
and Patel 25). In response, social movements have sprouted around the globe in order to 
take back the right to food.   
This belief in “the right to food” is best conceptualized by social movements like 
Food First, established in 1975. In its mission statement their goal is,  
…to end the injustices that cause hunger, poverty and environmental degradation 
throughout the world. We believe a world free of hunger is possible if farmers and 




Through this lens, they argue that all nations have the right to gear their agricultural 
sectors and policies toward becoming self-sufficient in food production, and not toward 
producing strictly for the market or be dominated by agricultural industries that produce 
food that is harmful to the health of the individual and to the environment (Bello 136). 
Henceforth, each country is responsible for its own food sovereignty, and have the right 
to make this responsibility a priority.  




Via Campesina, establishing itself in 1993, is the originator of the food 
sovereignty concept. Translated as “the peasant way,” the organization is one of the 
world’s largest social movements with around 100 million members who have mounted 
various protests against the WTO and effectively united smallholder farmers around the 
world in pursuit of a more unified, democratic food system that protects peasants in the 
face of globalization (Roberts 5; Bello 12-14). Both movements and others that champion 
the ideals of food sovereignty believe that the protection of smallholder farmers, who are 
amongst the poorest people in the world, is paramount if the world is to rid itself of 
hunger and poverty (Holt-Gimenez and Patel 19).  
While the food sovereignty movement is more established in Latin America 
compared to Africa, there are examples on both continents that can serve as a beacon for 
the situation in Tanzania, in terms of how cooperatives are used under a food sovereignty 
framework and how the peasantry occupies an important part within a nation’s 
agricultural policies. In Cuba, agricultural cooperatives have become vital to the 
country’s food production. Once the Cold War ended in 1989, the Soviet Union could no 
longer fuel Cuba’s oil dependent agricultural sector. To withstand the economic crisis 
that would ensue as a result of the Soviet Union’s collapse, the Cuban government 
installed austerity measures that included dividing large state farms into Basic Units of 
Cooperative Production, where former employees were given land to cultivate under 
newly formed peasant cooperatives. Today, almost all peasants belong to either a Credit 
and Service Cooperative (CCSs) or an Agricultural Production Cooperative (CPAs). 
CCSs are made up of peasant households who own their own farms and work on them 
individually, but come together in a cooperative to achieve economies of scale in 




marketing harvests, obtaining credit, sharing farming equipment, etc., while CPAs are 
collective farms where all land and productive assets such as machinery, warehouses, 
etc., are owned collectively. Now a model of sustainable agriculture, this mode of 
collective agricultural production has allowed Cuba to go from a system that was heavily 
industrialized to one that is more environmentally sustainable, or in other words, away 
from a food security based model to one more in line with the principles of food 
sovereignty, where production for domestic food needs and the wellbeing of the 
peasantry is paramount (Rosset et al. 165-166).  
Two examples in Africa also highlight the importance of food sovereignty by 
institutionalizing its ideals within each nation’s agricultural policies. Mali, although 
slightly more agrarian, is a country that is similar demographically to Tanzania, with over 
80% of its people living in rural areas, with 97% of its people being smallholder farmers. 
In 2006, agricultural policy began to reflect the longstanding wishes of the peasantry, as 
pressure from the country’s leading farming organization, the Coordination Nationale des 
Organisations Paysannes, drafted the Loi d’Orientation Agricole, which included a 
commitment to the principles of food sovereignty. This made Mali one of only a handful 
of countries in the world to make food sovereignty a part of their written constitution and 
a critical piece of its agricultural policies (Beauregard 40).  
While it predates the term food sovereignty itself, the actions and policies derived 
by Burkina Faso’s Thomas Sankara must also be mentioned. Attempting to build a 
national economy based more on domestic needs, Sankara was determined to have one of 
the world’s poorest countries to become self-sufficient in food production. To do so, 
policies shifted away from cities and focused on the periphery, with 71% of investments 




being allocated to the agricultural sector in his five-year plan for self-reliance. Within 
only a few years of Sankara taking office in 1983, the country, through its support of the 
peasantry, became self-sufficient in food production. In articulating the importance of a 
nation feeding itself, one of Sankara’s most famous statements is also echoed by food 
sovereignty proponents today as, “he who feeds you, controls you” speaks to what Rosset 
and many others argue, that food sovereignty is an issue of national security - critical in 
maintaining one’s national sovereignty over superpowers who could potentially use food 
as a weapon or as an extension of colonial rule (Rosset 22; Harsch 364; Mungai 26; 
Dembele).  
These sentiments celebrating food self-sufficiency and in particular the 
importance of the peasantry are not based on romance, as food security advocate Paul 
Collier claims, but is instead based on the fact that smallholder farmers play a much more 
important role within the global food system than some may realize. While Bernstein too 
believes that only industrialized agriculture, through a global market driven food system 
can feed the world - activist, parliamentarian, and food sovereignty proponent Walden 
Bello argues instead for a local market centred food system, which can be sustained by 
smallholder farmer production (Bernstein 23). According to Bello, smallholder farmers 
make up roughly a third of the world’s total population, but are responsible for two thirds 
of the world’s food production (15). In addition, Bello acknowledges in his book Food 
Wars, “to cite just one well-known study, a World Bank report on agriculture in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador showed that small farms were three to 
fourteen times more productive per acre than their larger competitors” (qtd. in 13). 
Andrew Coulson further highlights the value of smallholder production in China. The 




world’s most populous nation has an average farm size of 0.3 hectares, few large scale 
farms, and yet is one of the most efficient food producers in the world (“Kilimo Kwanza” 
2).  
With regards to Tanzania, James C. Scott explains that peasants, because of their 
small scale, were able to effectively readjust their settlement patterns and farming 
practices in accordance with climate changes, new crops, and new markets with great 
success in the decades prior to the villagisation process that began in the 1970s (253). 
Even today, 95% of the country’s food production emanates from smallholder farmers 
(Mbunda 3). Thus, production levels and the supposed scarcity of food availability, even 
if it were the cause of the recent food crisis and Tanzania’s own food insecurity, cannot 
be blamed on these small scale agriculturalists. Rather, for Tanzanian scholar Richard 
Mbunda, the state, which has relinquished its role over regulating markets under the 
direction of its food security based policies, must take back the responsibility of 
interfering in markets when needed in order to ease food price fluctuations, which would 
re-establish support behind the peasantry (3-4). Small scale producers can also not be 
blamed for the devastating toll that farming has on the environment.  
In part due to their small size, but also because of the equipment they use, 
smallholder farmers largely operate independently from the extraction of fossil fuels for 
they have no machinery to power, nor do they depend on chemically induced fertilizers 
and pesticides because of their unaffordable prices (Bello 15). As such, peasants offer a 
more sustainable mode of production, having to rely not on methods that try to conquer 
nature, but work with their local environments by using the skills and knowledge of the 
land that they have accumulated over generations.  




Just as food sovereignty is seen as an alternative to food security, agro-ecology 
can be seen as an alternative to industrialized farming. Food does not necessarily need to 
emanate from cultivated fields, but can also come from forests, meadows, and coastal 
regions that are often destroyed by agricultural expansion. Nutritional foods and 
medicines do not need to be separated either, nor must they come from the pre-existing 
notion of a Western diet, for even weeds and insects have been proven to provide an 
excellent source of proteins, vitamins, and minerals all necessary to obtain a healthy diet. 
Regions that adopt these forms of unconventional foods have also been found to generate 
incomes. For instance, the FAO estimates that non-wood products from the world’s 
forests can be valued at $120 billion per year. They have also been proven to provide an 
invaluable source of employment and food for rural communities, particularly women 
(Roberts 68-80; Altieri 35). Indeed, organic farming practices utilized by smallholder 
farmers appear to be better for consumers, producers, and the environment on a whole, 
signalling the call for a decreased emphasis on commercially favoured crops and modern 
farming methods.  
According to food activist and feminist Vandana Shiva, if the United States were 
to convert 10,000 medium sized farms to organic farming, the emissions reduction would 
equate to the removal of over a million cars (Soil Not Oil 111). If India were to adopt a 
more food sovereignty based approach to its food insecurity, crops that provide a higher 
nutritional value would be four times more widespread instead of crops that are grown 
because they fetch a higher price on the world market. For instance, millet, far more 
nutritious than wheat or rice, also uses only 200-300 millimetres of water compared to the 
2,500 millimetres needed to grow high yield rice varieties (Soil Not Oil 110). For food 




sovereignty proponents like Shiva, it is nutritional value, the health of consumers and the 
environment, and the welfare of smallholder famers that must come first, for these 
interests do not come at the expense of food security, whereas producing for the market 
and industrial farming does.  
For investigative science journalist Thomas Pawlick, the undesirable effects that 
industrial agriculture has on the environment encompass pollution, soil degradation, 
wildlife habitat destruction, waste of fresh water resources, loss of biodiversity, and the 
introduction of “exotic” species which include those manufactured by bio-engineering 
that threaten biodiversity (124). Each category has disastrous implications for the 
environment, expressed in a variety of ways which are exacerbated further by the 
increasing expansion of agro-industrial developments around the globe. Although it 
would be far too lengthy to discuss how each area impacts the environment individually, 
in general terms, industrial agricultural practices are the primary cause of 400 coastal 
“dead zones” worldwide that, due to the damage caused by fertilizer runoff, amount to an 
area of 245,000 km2 or roughly the size of England or Ghana (ETC Group 7, 17).  
The dependency on fossil fuels at all levels of the production process, from 
manufacturing fertilizers to running the machinery to transporting the products, equates 
to the agricultural industry producing three calories of fossil fuel energy to produce one 
calorie of food energy (Bello 36). Indeed, transportation, a vital component of the modern 
day food system, ships food from farm to plate traveling around 2,414 km for the average 
American, accounting for a tremendous amount of carbon dioxide emissions (Cool Foods 
Campaign 120). According to Raj Patel, the ever expanding global livestock industry 
alone produces 18% of all carbon dioxide equivalent emissions, contributing more to 




global warming than driving cars (299). The industry has also been cited as the primary 
contributor in decreasing the number of natural pollinators, such as honeybees and 
butterflies, causing devastating effects for farmers and those within the honeybee industry 
throughout Europe and North America, due to its usage of harmful pesticides (ETC 
Group 16; CBC News; Fausset).  
 This environmental damage was acknowledged in April 2008, as a group of 
researchers from the World Bank, FAO, and other UN agencies created the International 
Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development 
(IAASTD), which produced one of the most comprehensive studies on agriculture to date 
(ETC Group 45). According to the study, “…industrial agricultural has been successful in 
its goal of increasing crop yields worldwide, but has caused environmental degradation 
and deforestation that disproportionately affects small farmers and poorer nations” 
(Ludwig). The report also acknowledges that this form of agriculture is largely dependent 
on fossil fuels, massive irrigation projects, and chemically based pesticides and fertilizers 
and thus its practices are not seen as sustainable, which should be the main goal of 
agricultural development. To counter such a destructive system, the report recommends 
that small scale, low-impact farming practices must be protected, and that peasants, fisher 
folk, pastoralists, and indigenous peoples participation is crucial to preserving the world’s 
ecological health (Ludwig; ETC Group 45).  
Large scale agribusinesses are not only producing in a harmful way to the 
environment, but they are also manufacturing products that are harmful to the individual 
consumer. The food industry’s use of sodium, fat, and sugar, along with their ability to 
create the perfect cocktail of these ingredients allows them to maintain a hold on 




consumers, manipulating them into continually purchasing their processed foods despite 
their lack of nutritional value (Lustig 1316). This has led to a growing body of 
researchers and doctors voicing their concerns over how the food industry is deteriorating 
the health of the general population, and how it is hooking people onto continually 
consuming food that is detrimental to one’s health, which will drastically increase 
healthcare costs worldwide, potentially crippling the already exhausted health services 
within the Global South.  
According to medical professor Dr. Robert Lustig, America’s growing sugar 
consumption in the form of high-fructose corn syrup, what he literally describes as 
poison, has led to increasing rates of obesity, type 2 diabetes, and metabolic syndrome 
(1307). Pawlick also adds that in Canada and the United States, the consumption of fat 
and sodium has risen by 65% and 200% respectively since 1950, while the increase in 
sodium in the average diet is considered as the primary cause for high blood pressure and 
depleting calcium levels (6-7). In addition, foods that are supposed to provide people with 
their daily nutritional requirements are no longer providing the same value as they did in 
the past.  
The varieties of fruits and vegetables sold at grocery stores today are chosen by 
the food industry not on a nutritional or flavour basis, but because of their higher yield 
potential, thickness and firmness to ensure transport durability, colour uniformity, 
resistance to disease, and climate tolerance. Furthermore, these foods are treated with 
synthetic fertilizers that mainly focus on replenishing only a few nutrients in the soil, so 
even consumers that attempt to eat healthy by avoiding processed foods are not getting 




the necessary micronutrients needed to maintain a healthy diet (Pawlick 11, 14, 22-27).12 
In-organic fertilizers used over a long period of time without proper crop rotation or 
nutritional replenishment are found to degrade the soil’s nutrients, thus downgrading the 
nutritional content in food. According to Pawlick, since 1963, a wide variety of foods, 
from tomatoes to chickens, dairy products to broccoli, have witnessed a decrease in their 
vitamins and minerals, but have seen a dramatic upswing in sodium and fat content 
(Pawlick 26-27). Questionable animal feeding practices, the amount of drugs used to 
prevent diseases in livestock, pesticide usage, and the consumption of GM foods are also 
either harmful to humans or their long-term impacts are unknown (Cummins 81-87).  
While issues of obesity are more readily observed and discussed in the developed 
world, for they have an already well-established food industry, these problems are also 
increasing in the Global South. According to researchers T.C.E. Mosha and S. Fungo, in 
Tanzania, the prevalence of obesity among men and women in urban areas is estimated to 
be 30% and 28.6%, respectively. While the authors attribute this growing waste line in 
part to people leading inactive lifestyles, they also point to a poor diet with low 
nutritional value, and high consumptions of fats and sugars (Mosha and Fungo 1, 9-10).  
Farming, land, and the environment are all linked. If the land is abused by farming 
practices, agricultural outputs will decline and in time, the land may be unsuitable for 
agricultural practices. Thus, both production levels and sustainability must be a part of an 
                                                          
12 Most fertilizers focus mainly on boosting the levels of nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium 
(NPK), even though there are multiple nutrients and microorganisms that require other forms of 
replenishment. A healthy soil is one teeming with millions of organisms that, once depleted, can 
lead to soil infertility and less nutritious foods consumed by animals and humans. While initial 
growth has been experienced with the use of synthetic fertilizers, over years of abuse, the land 
produces lower yields, as has been witnessed in the regions that experienced the Green 
Revolution in India (Oil Not Soil 101-102). 




approach that will best achieve food security for not only today, but for the future as well. 
Maintaining a food system that ensures that nutritional products reach the plates of 
consumers is also a part of this, and for advocates of food sovereignty, this can best be 
achieved by smallholder farmers. In support of this notion, the report conducted by the 
IAASTD recommends that solutions to hunger and climate change need to focus on this 
form of ecologically friendly agriculture, and not its industrialized counter-part, 
especially if African nations are to experience a truly green revolution (Ludwig).  
Due to its focus on championing the central role of the peasantry and having 
solutions to food insecurity that are environmentally sustainable, food sovereignty offers 
an effective and healthy alternative to a food security based solution to the world’s food 
problems. Given the fact that Tanzania’s population is mostly made up of smallholder 
farmers, advocating for industrial, modernized agriculture could result in the removal of 
the peasantry from their ancestral lands, which could have serious social and political 
implications. As such, this thesis is in favour of a food sovereignty based solution, 
placing local smallholder farmers at the forefront of any resolution to the country’s food 
problem, instead of a food security based solution to food insecurity, which aims to 
condense the role of the peasantry within global agricultural systems.  
To maintain their relevance, however, smallholder farmers will need assistance in 
surpassing the barriers they face in order to help themselves as well as to assist in 
resolving Tanzania’s food insecurity. Many scholars and international organizations 
argue that cooperatives can fulfill this role of empowering the peasantry, enabling them 
to reach a higher standard of living, which will in turn assist in feeding the nation as a 
whole as well. This next section will now look to the literature surrounding cooperatives 




in order to understand how these organizations can theoretically assist smallholder 
farmers surpass the barriers they face. 
 
Cooperatives 
There are a few famous thinkers that are attributed with being forerunners of 
modern day cooperative societies whose ideals can be seen in cooperatives within 
Tanzania. In the aftermath of the industrial revolution, Robert Owen, Dr. William King, 
the Rochdale Pioneers, and Francois Charles Fourier were all instrumental in 
orchestrating the cooperative movement in both Britain and France. Robert Owen, 
considered by many to be the father of cooperative societies in Britain, had the goal of 
creating communities that were self-sufficient, living together, and producing what they 
would also consume (Rhodes 1; Lyimo 12). He believed that as a cooperative, the poorest 
villagers would then be able to acquire communal property and cultivate as a group, 
which would create employment and a stronger entity that could surpass exploitative 
middlemen, allowing villages to gain a “fair price” for their produce (Tchami 6). 
Following Owen’s example, Dr. William King started a consumer cooperative in 1827 in 
Brighton, England, emphasizing that cooperative membership should be voluntary and 
neutral in terms of political and religious convictions, and not compulsory or guided by 
political or religious ideologies (Lyimo 14).  
In 1832, encouraged by Owen and Dr. King’s work, the Rochdale Pioneers, a 
cooperative society in Rochdale, England, stressed the goals of promoting employment, 
creating products that society and its members needed, establishing “a self-supporting 
home colony of united interests,’” and allowing for the distribution, production, and 




administration to be governed by the members of that society (Rhodes 1-2). While these 
pioneers were putting their theories into practice in England, Francois Charles Fourier 
was creating the phalanxes in France; agricultural communities that had both an 
economic function and a social role. He placed a special importance on communal 
ownership of the land, a focus on agricultural production, and a reduction of distribution 
costs (Lyimo 14-16). It is important to observe the contributions of these pioneers 
because many of these characteristics can be seen, at least on paper, in Tanzania’s Arusha 
Declaration, established in 1967, outlining how Nyerere wanted to create a society based 
on cooperation, following his vision of African socialism.  
Central to this political manifestation were cooperative societies themselves, as 
their ability to overcome barriers to assets, information services, and to market 
agricultural commodities were viewed as a necessity to strengthen Tanzania’s rural 
classes. These are issues that all farmers must deal with, and cooperatives provide a 
vessel to overcome such hurdles. In order to tackle these complex issues for the majority 
of smallholder farmers, an organization is needed that unites them, pooling their minimal 
resources together in order to assist them in operating a cost effective business (Chambo 
5). Historically within Tanzania, cooperatives were able to collect crops in a timely 
manner from farmers, minimize late payments, and increase the value added to their 
products through grading, quality standards, and bulking, where commodities were 
storied or shipped without undergoing processing and packaging (Msambichaka 121). 
Cooperatives were also seen as a tool to bring otherwise isolated farmers into the market 
to sell perishable commodities (Chambo 6).  




 According to Chambo, Tanzania’s historical relationship with cooperatives has, in 
fact, a direct correlation with its ability to become food secure. In measuring the 
percentage of people with food energy deficiency, Tanzania was only behind Uganda and 
tied with Kenya at 43.9% in 2000 (Chambo 6-7).13 This is in comparison with countries 
who had smaller cooperative movements like Rwanda and Senegal, who in 2000-01 had 
percentages of people with food energy deficiency at 65.3% and 60.2% respectively. 
Chambo attributes this largely to Tanzania’s cooperatives movement, although he also 
points out that the largest cooperatives operated in favourably climatic regions to supply 
foodstuffs like bananas and maize, as well as allowing for peasants to purchase goods in 
the market through the sale of cash crops such as coffee and tobacco (7).  
As mentioned earlier, according to Maghimbi, the cooperative model that was 
most widely used in Tanzania and attributed to its success from the 1920s up until the 
1970s is what he calls the “Chayanoian” model, named after its creator, Russian 
cooperative theorist Alexander Chayanov (7). Chayanov, who conducted much of his 
research on the model of the peasant economy in Russia and on peasant economies in 
Western Europe, from the early 20th century to the collectivization campaigns of the 
Stalinist period, argued that cooperatives were vital to the success and survival of the 
peasantry, particularly in industrializing countries with a peasant dominated population.  
In bringing Chayanov’s peasant economic model to Tanzania, Goran Hyden uses 
the concepts of “the peasant mode of production” and the “economy of affection” to 
                                                          
13 Energy deficiency can be either acute or chronic and is caused by a lack of food consumption. 
Measured in adults by the body mass index, acute energy deficiency is associated with body 
weight loss and reduced physical activity. Chronic energy deficiency is when individuals have 
adapted to an inadequate level of food consumption, where individuals have never ‘lost’ weight 
but have grown less because of malnourishment (Kurpad, Muthayya, and Vaz 1053).  




describe the economic situation in the country’s rural areas as well as to understand the 
economic behaviour of the peasantry. For Hyden, each smallholder farmer represents a 
single, unspecialized unit of production who produces primarily for their own needs, with 
minimal exchange occurring between farmers. Cooperation among the peasantry is only 
temporary, caused by food emergencies that can arise due to droughts or disease. 
Interestingly, assisting others appears to be one of the few risks peasants are willing to 
take, even if those risks could involve the adoption of new inputs that could increase 
production, because for Hyden, peasants are not primarily concerned with earning capital, 
but interested more in acquiring social capital instead. Survival and reproduction, and not 
production, is the peasantry’s main focus – where work or improved productivity is not 
an end in itself, but is only a means to live. In his economy of affection, which precedes 
the cash economy, “…economic action is not motivated by individual profit alone, but is 
embedded in a range of social considerations that allow for a redistribution of 
opportunities and benefits in a manner which is impossible where modern 
capitalism…dominates the process of redistribution” (Hyden 12-13; 18-19).  
For Chayanov, who further trumpeted smallholder farmers for their hardiness and 
tenacity for survival in often difficult conditions, socio-economic and political unrest 
within the peasantry was likely to increase if capitalism, through the expansion of 
industrialized agriculture, was allowed to erase this pre-existing peasant mode of 
production, as the growth of commercial farms can come at the expense of lands already 
used by the peasantry. In addition, the emergence of large scale producers can influence 
commodity prices, as their machinery allows large scale farmers to cultivate more land 
with increasing intensity, resulting in more production, allowing them to benefit from 




economies of scale. While an increase in production may positively impact food 
insecurity and benefit larger farms who produce these goods, small farmers risk being 
priced out of the market, unable to compete against farms that can afford to sell their 
produce at lower prices. Add to this the land accumulated by industrialized farms, and a 
number of peasants could become landless, forced to sell their lands because they can 
cannot compete against these giant food producers (Lyimo 20; Chayanov xi, 5).  
To avoid such a scenario, which would greatly increase poverty in the 
countryside, Chayanov advocated for cooperatives that can not only protect smallholders 
from the expansion of industrialized agriculture, but also assist them in gaining access to 
markets and enable the peasantry to produce at levels on par with modern farmers. For 
Chayanov, cooperatives can do so by either being concentrated vertically or horizontally. 
In his concept of “vertical concentration,” peasant organizations are able to manage 
different stages of food production, such as packaging, processing, marketing, and selling 
goods, and not solely the cultivation of crops, allowing members more control over the 
agricultural value chain. Another form of cooperative production is expressed in his 
concept of “horizontal concentration,” where a collective is formed, uniting various 
farmers in the cultivation of one or more crops, or to bring peasants together to complete 
an important, labour intensive task in a short time frame, such as building a storage 
facility. In each cooperative model, multiple smallholder farmers are able to ban together, 
potentially producing multiple crops under one organization that can also undertake the 
processing and or storage of such products, rather than leaving these operations to larger 
industries who, under capitalism, use the peasantry as low level labourers within their 
production schemes. Thus, instead of encouraging the advancement of industrialized 




agriculture, the state and private investors should look to supporting cooperatives 
financially in order to allow them to foster the needs of the peasantry, while enabling 
these organizations to produce at similar levels compared to large scale farms (Chayanov 
xi-xxxii, 1, 3, 7-9; Freyhold 24). 
For Maghimbi, the Chayanovian styled cooperative – which differs from the 
British originated Rochdale model which is more voluntary and consumer based - has a 
history of protecting small farmers from being overtaken by large scale farmers and from 
the pressures that smallholders face under globalization. The success of these 
cooperatives lie in their ability to, “…advance the position of the poor without making 
any special changes in the economic equilibrium and without substantially destroying the 
organizational plan of the small-scale rural economy” (Maghimbi 7-8). These 
cooperatives could then gain some of the advantages that large scale farms occupy, such 
as technical improvements and economies of scale. Throughout its history, this model’s 
makeup was responsible for contributing to the success of both cash and food crop 
production. Although Maghimbi admits that the cooperative movement in Tanzania is 
currently not as strong as it once was, he does see it having the potential to reduce 
poverty if it can reform to take advantage of the current laws and regulations of the 
warehouse receipt system (WRS) (32). 
Introduced in 2005, the WRS allows farmers to store grains as collateral in order 
to receive credit while waiting to sell once prices rise. Created by the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the system is being encouraged by the government 
across the country. However, the government has also been criticized for causing 
inefficiencies, as officials have been accused of using the service for personal gain. 




Sturmius Mtweve also reports in The Citizen that the public still lacks awareness on how 
to use the WRS, while the system also suffers from poor storage infrastructure, a lack of 
legal and regulatory framework, weak supervisory institutions, and is still unable to 
attract key stakeholders such as banks for financial support (“WRS”; Mtweve).  
While the success of the WRS is contentious, for the FAO, there is no doubt that 
cooperatives are a necessary tool that can be used to alleviate rural poverty and assist in 
making nations more food secure. According to the FAO, smallholder cooperatives can 
gain from pooling members’ resources to negotiate better contract farming terms and 
lower prices for seeds, fertilizers, and equipment in order to increase production. 
Improved market opportunities and land rights are also more likely to occur for 
smallholders under a cooperative compared to ones that operate individually (“Reducing 
Hunger and Poverty”). In a recently released report, the FAO also cites evidence that 
agricultural cooperatives can allow smallholder farmers to benefit from the rising cost of 
food prices because of the organizational structure that operates within the cooperative. 
The FAO further,  
…recommends the promotion of these special enterprises as a way out of hunger and 
poverty. It emphasizes the need to empower and support the growth and sustainability of 
agricultural and food cooperatives. It also recommends that governments and policy 
makers put in place the right policies, transparent legislation, incentives and opportunities 
for dialogue, because all of these are necessary conditions for cooperatives and producer 
organizations to develop and grow.  
(“Feeding the World” 3). 
 
The Tanzanian government also recognizes the importance of strengthening the position 
of cooperatives in the country’s national development strategy, known as MKUKUTA. In 
the document, the government outlines its plans to financially support a robust 




cooperative movement, encouraging growth within this sector (Ministry of Finance 45, 
57). 
Two key elements are strongly illustrated when observing the literature 
concerning cooperatives as a whole and within a Tanzanian context. First, cooperatives 
are a potentially important tool that the peasantry needs in order to be protected from 
larger scale operations who dominate the global market and threaten smallholder farmers 
through their expansion. Secondly, cooperatives were indeed pivotal in alleviating 
poverty and helping maintain food security in Tanzania during the 1950-60s, meaning 
that at one time they did work and successfully assisted smallholder farmers in improving 
their lives. Its encouragement by the current government and others can thus be 
understood, as they appear to be an important organization that assists peasants in 
improving their standard of living while at the same time providing them with an 
autonomous position where they themselves are in control of their own welfare. While it 
may not be the role of cooperatives, assisting the peasantry will ultimately aid in the 
development of the country, as poverty and hunger levels are likely to subside under the 
protection and support smallholder cooperatives can offer.  
 
The Agrarian Question 
 Understanding this role of the peasantry as a central component to the capitalist 
development of Tanzania is best articulated within debates around the “agrarian 
question.” Originally proposed by Karl Marx in Das Kaptial, he describes how capitalism 
first enters rural England through a process of “‘so-called primitive accumulation’” 
(Akram-Lodhi 39). Here, with strong linkages to what is beginning to occur in Tanzania, 




with respect to the expansion of industrialized agriculture and “land grabs” that surround 
biofuel production, Marx describes how small-scale peasants who dominate the 
countryside in number are later expelled from farming through land purchases and 
expansionist plans from newly formed capitalist farmers (Sulle and Nelson 29; Akram-
Lodhi 40). Wondering whether the peasantry would align themselves with the socialist 
struggle against capitalism or become a counter revolutionary force, Marx ultimately 
believed that the peasantry would eventually be squeezed out of existence (Maghimbi, 
Lokina, and Senga 10). 
Fellow German scholar Karl Kautsky in 1899 formulated a two part agrarian 
question, one theoretical and the other political. It asks: what are the dynamics of 
capitalist agriculture and given those dynamics, what stance should a state take towards 
the peasantry? Much like Marx, Kautsky believed that small farmers would be erased by 
capitalism and that the state should do nothing to prevent this from occurring 
(McLaughlin 25). The fact that smallholder farmers endure, however, suggests that this 
question remains unanswered.  
For Terence Byres and Henry Bernstein, this question also includes the 
contribution of agriculture to the capitalist development as a whole as well as the role of 
agrarian classes of labour in the struggle for democracy and socialism (2). For Jason 
Moore, the agrarian question also has an ecological component that deals with the 
impoverishment of the land through agriculture’s “material exploitation,” which is largely 
ignored (3). In addition to these expansions to the agrarian question, social movements 
like Via Campesina and others further demonstrate that perhaps a resurgence of the 
peasantry has occurred in the last few decades and that the agrarian question must be 




revisited entirely in order to explain this phenomenon (McLaughlin 25).  
 For Tanzanian scholars Sam Maghimbi, Razack Lokina, and Mathew Senga, at 
the core of this question is the right to land and how or who will determine its usage (25). 
Under the land regimes established by both the Germans (1884-1916) and the British 
(1918-1960) Tanzanian ownership rights were ignored, legitimizing their removal from 
the land. Germany’s Imperial Decree of 1895 and later Britain’s Land Ordinance Act in 
1923, amended in 1928, declared that all lands, occupied or not, were treated as Crown 
lands except when private individuals or communities possessed documentation declaring 
their ownership, which required government approval. Although these laws recognized 
traditional communities as land owners through their occupancy, these regulations did not 
protect their land rights. For under the colonial land regime, landholdings that were 
granted by the administration were held superior to customary ones, enabling the 
exploitation of Tanzanian land and labour by combining both property and sovereignty 
into one package that was controlled by the state. Therefore, land rights and title deeds 
were only granted to settlers and foreign companies, alienating locals in favour of a 
system that viewed land, “…held and administered for the use and economic benefit, 
direct or indirect, of the natives of the Territory” (Maghimbi, Lokina, and Senga 25-26; 
Shivji 2-4; Sulle and Nelson 36). While this duality between “customary land rights” and 
“granted rights of occupancy” has been negated by the Land and Village Acts of 2001, 
contentions remain surrounding how land is classified, evaluated, purchased, and how 
proper compensated is provided (Sulle and Nelson 37).  
 While these ongoing land issues will be discussed in detail later in the thesis, the 
quandary of how land is used for capital extraction brings Akram-Lodhi to answering a 




more modernized version of the agrarian question in one of two ways. Either the world 
continues in the same direction as it has been, by promoting deeper food globalization 
and slowly Southern agricultural structures mirror the ones already existing in the North, 
depicted by large tracks of mono-crop cultures, mechanization, irrigation, and a heavily 
industrialized agro-foods industry, and global agriculture becomes completely 
industrialized. Or, governments’ shift their policy focus to reconstructing local 
economies, land justice, and food sovereignty (Akram-Lodhi 26). If this capitalist 
expansion into agriculture is allowed to pass completely, it is believed that the peasantry 
in Tanzania faces the possibility of being removed, or abandon the land completely, or 
permanently shuffled onto the outskirts of development, as witnessed by similar events 
across the globe where the expansion of the capitalist mode of production has come at the 
expense of the peasantry.  
As large-scale agricultural expansionist projects increased in Brazil during the 
1950-60s, many peasants were forced from their lands. By 1950, 62% of those in the 
agricultural economy were landless. Food riots ignited in 1962 over inflation and in 
retaliation to the ongoing neglect of the local food system in favour of urban industry, 
giving root to a vibrant food sovereignty movement that can be witnessed today, led by 
such groups as the Landless Workers’ Movement (Bello 13; Patel 177). Although strikes 
by worker’s unions and cries to alter Brazilian agricultural policy proved unsuccessful, 
elites who spearheaded large scale agricultural expansion treated these uprisings as a 
serious threat to their industrial ambitions. In 1964, after being in power for only three 
years, a leftward leaning, peasant friendly government was forcefully overthrown in a 
coup that was sponsored by both the CIA and Brazilian elites in favour of a military 




dictatorship that secured their interests (Patel 177, 180).  
Under President Jakaya Kikwete, Tanzania’s current government parallels the 
rightwing one in the Brazilian example, as it is also inclined towards elitist interests, 
industrializing agriculture, foreign direct investment, and the development of its biofuel 
industry, as well as its ongoing experiments with biotechnology (“Kilimo Kwanza” 5). Of 
particular interest to this study are biofuels and GMOs, as they present two highly 
controversial issues connected to the emergence of the agro-industrial complex that will 
greatly impact Tanzania’s agricultural sector, the country’s food insecurity, as well as the 
wellbeing of the peasantry. The final section of the literature review will delve into these 
developments in order to explain the rise of agribusinesses around the globe as well as in 
Tanzania, and their potential impact on the country’s smallholder farmers.   
 
Agribusiness 
Accounting for the rise of the agro-industrial complex, food sovereignty 
advocates argue that the very market that food security proponents champion has allowed 
for the creation of powerful multinational food conglomerates that have, in turn, caused 
the food crisis the world is now entrenched (Holt-Gimenez and Patel 20). Patel 
challenges these advocates of food security, arguing that placing faith in the market and 
in various “anti-trust” or “competition” commissions that exist in certain countries, used 
to prevent the creation of oligopolies, is an egregious mistake. When firms approach 
these market regulators, they justify their merger on the basis of efficiency and an 
improved economies of scale that, they argue, will benefit consumers. In other instances, 
companies have been able to avoid these negotiations altogether, “…by means of a 




revolving door arrangement in which regulators, after a stint of good behaviour as 
government officials, are given substantially better paying sinecures in industry” (Patel 
104-105).  
While the market is to usher in an increase in efficiency and lower prices, as food 
security proponents’ claim, Patel argues that the opposite has occurred with respect to the 
food industry. The market has actually provided more structural power to the largest 
companies, resulting in less competition and more power held within a handful of 
multinational corporations. As a result, both farmers and consumers have paid the highest 
price for this amalgamation of power, having been squeezed by corporations that now 
dominate the global food value chain. Within the United States, the real price of a market 
basket of food has increase by 2.8% since 1984, while the farm value of that food has 
fallen by 35.7%. In addition, market concentration has also led to higher food prices in 24 
of the 33 food sectors (Patel 104). As companies continue to amalgamate, competition 
between food companies diminishes, leading to higher food prices. 
While the free market has allowed these companies to expand their influence 
across the globe, they have been welcomed by the current Tanzanian government and 
encouraged by international developing agencies to restructure the country’s agricultural 
sector. The World Bank, USAID, and World Vision, are all throwing their weight behind 
multinational corporations such as Monsanto, Syngenta, Nestle, and Tyson Foods to 
assist developing countries in increasing their agricultural output and agro-food 
distribution to improve national food security. In Tanzania, this is most evident in the 
developments of SAGCOT, where multiple aid agencies and agribusinesses, although in 
competition with one another, have come together under this expansionist project to 




increase agricultural production within a 300,000 km2 area that makes up the country’s 
Southern corridor. According to SAGCOT, of the 7.5 million hectares of arable farmland 
that exist in this zone, only 30% is currently cultivated, thus industrialized agriculture is 
needed to expand this cultivated area to increase production (“Land Draft” 2; “Investment 
Blueprint” b, 5; Cupp; Africa Practice & ESEA). 
The decline in competition between agro-giants, as well as the growth of a 
handful of agribusinesses, is clearly outlined by the ETC Group’s article Who Owns 
Nature? The international organization dedicated to conserving and advancing the 
sustainable development of cultural and ecological diversity and human rights explains 
that, 
From thousands of seed companies and public breeding institutions three decades ago, ten 
companies now control more than two-thirds of global proprietary seed sales. From 
dozens of pesticide companies three decades ago, ten now control almost 90% of 
agrochemical sales worldwide. From almost a thousand biotech start-ups 15 years ago, 
ten companies now have three-quarters of industry revenue. And, six of the leaders in 
seeds are also six of the leaders in pesticides and biotech. Over the past three decades, a 
handful of companies has gained control of that one-quarter of the world’s annual 




The tremendous amount of power held within only a few companies over the world’s 
food system is incredibly daunting. Along with their economies of scale, vast financial 
wealth, and political influence are also innovations that are increasingly changing the face 
of agriculture, food, and the planet itself.  
These companies are spearheading the movement for agricultural systems across 
the globe to adopt biotechnology and biofuels in order to increase yields and create 




greener sources of energy, along with increasing the incomes of those farmers involved.14 
Thus, biotechnology and biofuels can be seen as extensions of commercialized 
agriculture, both of which are in the beginning stages with regards to Tanzania 
(ActionAid vii). The repercussions from biofuel production and large scale agricultural 
expansionist projects such as AgriSol and SAGCOT, however, are already being felt and 
will certainly have a significant impact on the future of Tanzania’s agricultural sector, 
shedding light on how its own agrarian question will ultimately be answered. 
One such example occurred in July of 2013. In Kikwete’s home district of 
Bagamoyo, about 70 km outside of Dar es Salaam, farmers claimed that the Swedish 
company EcoEnergy had acquired 5,000 hectares of community held land after promising 
villagers with new schools, health care facilities, and employment. The company, in 
collaboration with the government obtained the land from the villagers, claiming that the 
land was an abandoned cattle farm, despite the fact that villagers had been living in the 
area since the 1950s. Despite arguments and protests from the villagers, around 600 
families have been forced off their land so that EcoEnergy can proceed with their plans to 
produce about 125,000 metric tonnes of sugar which will go towards biofuel production 
(“Biofuel Land Grab”).  
The biofuel industry itself has witnesses a boom since the energy crisis, making 
the discovery of new, cleaner sources of energy an increasing priority for the developed 
world (Borras, McMichael, and Scoones 576). Oil prices are at all-time highs and 
                                                          
14 Biofuels originate mainly from biomass that is transformed into a gas, liquid, or solid fuel. The 
main types of biofuels include biodiesel, ethanol, or purified biogas derived from crops, plant 
residues, or wastes. All of these can be used as a substitute for traditional fossil fuels used for 
transportation, domestic, and industrial uses (Sulle and Nelson 7). 




Western nations, particularly the United States, have longed to find ways to relinquish its 
dependency on oil originating from the Arab world (Collier 76). Energy consumption 
within these countries has also not decreased and the emergence of newly industrialized 
economies has further impacted the world’s energy supply. In addition, the growing, 
although late concern placed on climate change, is also encouraging countries to find 
greener sources of energy in order to pull away from the world’s dependency on 
environmentally harmful fossil fuels. In this light, biofuels can also be considered as a 
“win-win” for they provide a clean energy solution without forgoing economic growth 
(Borras, McMichael, and Scoones 576). 
According to Andre Croppenstedt, an economist with the Agricultural 
Development Economics Division of the FAO, biofuel production will also assist in the 
effort for developing countries to obtain their food security. For Croppenstedt, biofuel 
production will not compete with food production as long as the demand for biofuels 
generate incomes for smallholder farmers and create investments that will raise 
productivity in food production. He also argues that biofuel production is similar to the 
growth of cotton, explaining that the growth of cash crops stimulate other agricultural 
productivity (IRIN). Furthermore, being a new industry, it will create new jobs, as well as 
provide developing nations with another valuable export crop that can be used to balance 
its payments and gain valuable foreign exchange dollars (ActionAid ix). With increased 
incomes, workers no longer have to farm and can now purchase foodstuffs that are 
provided cheaply through the global market. In addition, it will save oil importing 
countries millions, as biofuels can provide a valuable substitute for fuel (Sulle and Nelson 
7). Not everyone, however, agrees with these claims.   




According to Saturnino Borras, Philip McMichael, and Ian Scoones, “proponents 
of such investments argue that the land is underutilised or even ‘idle.’ This narrative 
justifies the appropriation of land for new investment, transforming ‘wastelands’ into 
green and productive landscapes” (581). In reality, however, these lands are often 
occupied by peasants as farmland, ancestral lands, or forested areas that villagers depend 
upon for their livelihoods (Sulle and Nelson 3, 26, 29; Roberts 68-78). The amount of 
land cleared for biofuel production can also be unnerving. In Indonesia for instance, 80% 
of its rainforest, which covered 77% of the country in the mid-1960s, has disappeared in 
large part due to timber exploitation and palm oil production used for biofuels. While 
CGAIR, an agricultural researching firm, cites that around 1.3 million jobs have been 
created through biofuel production in Brazil, Holt-Gimenez argues that the biofuels 
industry only generates one-tenth of the jobs created by family farming per 100 hectares 
in the Amazon, where biofuel plantations are referred to as the “devil’s orchards” 
(“Biofuels-Myths”; Dixon et al. 52; Borras, McMichael, and Scoones 577). These 
examples of land grabbing and the removal of the peasantry in the pursuit of capitalist 
development is nothing new, as Marx describes under his “primitive accumulation,” but it 
is certainly increasing behind the emergence of agribusiness and the growth of the biofuel 
industry (Borras, McMichael, and Scoones 579).  
 For Borras, McMichael, and Scoones, these “land grabs,” are also infringing on a 
peoples’ right to feed themselves as well as further degrading the local environments in 
order to produce these agro-fuels (Borras, McMichael, and Scoones 578). Contrary to 
what advocates say, according to Vandana Shiva, biofuels actually cause more carbon 
dioxide emissions resulting from the clear cutting practices used to remove forests and 




grasslands for their production as well as for the energy used to process crops into liquid 
biofuel (Soil Not Oil 80). They are also an inefficient source of energy and a poor 
substitute for fuel. If all the corn and soy grown in the United States was used for biofuel 
production, it would only substitute for 12% of the gas and 6% of the diesel. It also 
requires 5.7 Liters of gas and 6,435 Liters of water to produce one Liter of ethanol (Soil 
Not Oil 81). Why this form of inefficient production continues, argues Shiva, is because 
of the profits raked in by agribusinesses, who gain from the sale of their seeds, pesticides, 
herbicides, fertilizer, and equipment used to grow and convert crops into energy (Soil Not 
Oil 83).  
Biofuels are also seen as an extension of past colonial relationships, as they are 
becoming the new mono-crop export of today’s globalized world. There is even an 
emergence of a South-South trade, as swelling economies such as Brazil are participating 
in the land grab in Africa for biofuel production (Borras, McMichael, and Scoones 579). 
While these developments are only beginning in Tanzania, they appear to be escalating. 
According to a recent study conducted by the farming association MVIWATA that 
documents the increasing land grabs occurring in the country, Tanzania has an average of 
five land conflicts per day, three of which involve large investors and smallholder 
farmers (Pesatimes). One of the latest incidences occurred in June of 2014, where 
villagers in Lipokela and Litukila, in the Ruvuma region, had given up their land, 
unaware of the severity of the negotiations they were about to attend. Upon meeting 
investors, tired and hungry, those in Lipokela were promised food, while farmers in 
Litukila were assured they would receive a small amount of cash, which they thought 
they would obtain just for attending the meetings. Villagers were confused, however, as 




they were immediately given a plate of food and the equivalent of just over a dollar each 
by the investor, who then received over 2,000 and 20,000 hectares of land in exchange 
from each village respectively. Having been accompanied by police, the villagers also felt 
threatened, and decided that taking the compensation was better than coming away with 
nothing. The land deals have also caused a rift between villagers and their leaders, as the 
leaders accused the villagers of being too ignorant of land policies, while villagers 
accused their leaders of being corrupt, blaming them for collaborating with investors 
(Lazaro). As similar incidences of land grabbing continue, controversy surrounding this 
issue will surely intensify as more and more people are removed from their lands.  
While retaliation from the peasantry in response to these land grabs has 
sometimes resulted in protests, Tanzanian civil society does not appear united enough at 
this time to mount a full rebuttal to the expansion of large scale agriculture. MVIWATA, 
the farming association who conducted the study on land grabs mentioned above, is made 
up of over 200,000 smallholders and a member of Via Campesina, appears to be one of 
the few organizations that is providing smallholder farmers with a united voice against 
such actions committed by the government and agro-businesses. At the same time, 
however, there is evidence that suggests its own agenda is not entirely committed to the 
welfare of smallholder farmers. For on the one hand, MVIWATA states that it is deeply 
concerned about the ongoing encroachment of large scale agricultural expansion 
occurring within the country, yet on the other hand has applauded the work of AGRA and 
accepted financing from the same organization that is heavily involved with large scale 
farming operations occurring in the country. AGRA, for instance, is heavily involved 
with SAGCOT, which was a part of the land deal that purchased land from the villagers 




of Lipokela and Litukila (Chiwambo; Lazaro). Critical of these actions, according to one 
informant, the association has become somewhat of a dysfunctional, misdirected NGO, 
controlled by its administration and adhering to its financial base, instead of those they 
are supposed to represent.15 One of the co-founders of the farming association but no 
longer officially affiliated with MVIWATA, Dr. Mattee, also expressed concern in our 
interview, stating that the original goal of the organization, to provide peasants with a 
united front against common political, socio-economic, and cultural obstacles, was no 
longer visible.16  
 Another highly controversial segment of agribusiness that should raise the ire of 
organizations that purport to empower the peasantry is their use of biotechnology. 
According to Shiva, the process that created GMOs, being sold by the global food regime 
as the cure for world hunger, originated from the piracy of thousands of years of 
indigenous knowledge. For example, 
Indian farmers evolved 200,000 varieties of rice through their innovation and breeding. 
They bred rice varieties such as Basmati…but new intellectual-property-rights regimes, 
which are being universalized through the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights 
Agreement of the World Trade Organization allow corporations to usurp the knowledge 
of the seed and monopolize it by claiming it as their private property…corporations like 
RiceTec of the United Sates are claiming patents on Basmati rice. Soybean, which 
evolved in East Asia, has been patented by Calgene, which is now owned by 
Monsanto…centuries of collective innovation by farmers and peasants are being hijacked 
as corporations claim intellectual-property rights on these and other seeds and plants 
(Stolen Harvest 7-9). 
 
                                                          
15 Interview with anonymous, August 8th 2013, Morogoro, Tanzania. 
16 Interview with Dr. Mattee, Professor at Sokoine University, August 8th 2013, Morogoro, 
Tanzania. 




This “biopiracy,” carried out by scientists of the first Green Revolution who collected 
germplasm from peasants, contributed $10.2 billion per year to US corn and soy 
production in the 1970-80s (“Out of AGRA” 465).  
The company owning 90% of all related GMO patents and indeed a pioneer of 
agro-industry is the largest of these biotech giants. Monsanto, who has a particularly 
seedy history filled with corruption, deceit, and environmental destruction is today one of 
the most powerful corporations in the world. From losing a multimillion dollar court 
settlement after being found responsible for knowingly dumping toxins that poisoned the 
residences of Anniston, Alabama in the United States for over 30 years, to harassing 
family farmers over patent abuses across North America, to preventing scientific journal 
articles from publication that shed light on their devious practices, Monsanto has 
certainly had its fair share of scandal (Robin 10, 69, 148; Patel 141-146).17 Yet the 
company and the technology they helped create is being supported by AGRA, as well as 
wealthy philanthropists such as Bill Gates, Warren Buffet, and the Rockefeller 
Foundation to assist in spreading GE crops around the globe in what is being dubbed as 
the second Green Revolution. For them, the adoption of GE crops is vital for Africa to 
feed itself and is the best way to ensure food production in the face of the challenges that 
climate change presents farmers, such as increases in floods and droughts (“Out of 
                                                          
17 In an effort to withhold scientific evidence that GM corn was illegally transplanted to Mexico, 
numerous agribusinesses pressured the academically acclaimed journal Nature to remove a study 
that argued that corn in Oaxaca showed traces of genetic contamination. The magazine had never 
retracted an article in its 133 year history. Once the pre-peer approved article was removed, its 
authors were prevented from advancing their academic careers, facing numerous character 
assassinations emanating from Monsanto based firms, who are also increasing their control of 
knowledge by becoming major donors of universities throughout the United States, limiting the 
academic freedoms of those who find evidence that place their interests in jeopardy (Patel 141-
143). 




AGRA” 467). Given the controversy and negative backlash that Monsanto has endured, 
however, Tanzania must exercise extreme caution when dealing with an entity that could 
potentially have disastrous ramifications if allowed to enter its agricultural sector.18 There 
are also debates as to whether the technology is even accessible to smallholders, raising 
concerns about the true beneficiaries of this technology. 
In order to facilitate a conducive environment for the biotechnology to produce 
the promised high yields, GE seeds need the necessary inputs of fertilizers and pesticides, 
and are often cultivated with the use of irrigation systems and heavy machinery, 
inaccessible to the majority of smallholder farmers (Robin 292-293).19 The in-organic 
varieties of some of these products are also induced with a heavy dose of poisonous 
chemicals, which are extremely harmful to the environment and could potentially 
negatively impact biodiversity and human health (Bello 16; Robin 308). The GMO 
technology itself, according to Eric Holt-Gimenez, has also never been proven to actually 
assist in feeding the world’s population, as the majority of GE crops go instead towards 
feed and fuel (“Of Myths and Men”).  
                                                          
18 In the last few years, marches against Monsanto have been conducted in over 50 countries, 
protesting the company’s pursuit to patent life and, their use of dioxin; which is the key ingredient 
behind Agent Orange, and the devastation it has caused on the environment and smallholder 
farmers around the world (MAM; Robin 43). Oddly enough, despite the growing public backlash, 
Monsanto’s CEO was recently awarded the 2013 World Food Prize, along with other biotech 
pioneers such as Syngenta (Abbott).   
19 According to agricultural extension officer Mujuni Kamwesige Mutembei, in our interview he 
explained that these in-organic materials are not the only way to increase yields. Upon comparing 
a farm that uses chemically induced materials and modern hybrid seeds to one that uses organic 
materials and traditional seeds, the yield levels are virtually the same. The quality of the product 
produced, however, is far better on the organic farm, which is also much better for the 
environment, and for one’s palate (Interview with Mujuni Kamwesige Mutembei, agricultural 
extension officer, August 3rd, 2013, Morogoro, Tanzania). 




Worse still is the fact that because of the amount of money backing this proposed 
solution, others are potentially being ignored (Patel 158).20 Biodiversity itself, along with 
a decentralized food system, claims Shiva, is the best way to ensure the world’s food 
security, even in the face of climate change (Soil Not Oil 105). Droughts and floods are 
nothing new to farmers, nor are their age old solutions. For Emma Liwenga, who studied 
food insecurity in semi-arid Mvumi, in the Dodoma region, peasants have been 
developing ways of adapting to their harsh environments for centuries. According to the 
researcher, to lessen the effects of droughts or floods, smallholders exchange livestock 
for grains, destock their cattle in order to preserve grasslands and prevent disease, rotate 
crops, farm in a scattered land pattern, and use local indicators such as the appearance of 
certain constellations or the greening of fruit trees in order to determine when to begin 
hoeing and when to plant, maximizing rainfall and avoiding planting during the dry 
season (Liwenga 13, 79-80). Acknowledging these tactics by no means diminishes the 
fact that the area is poverty stricken and plagued by food insecurity, but these examples 
allude to the fact that smallholder farmers have their own ways of mitigating and 
adapting to difficult climatic conditions, enabling them to survive despite the difficulties 
they have faced. This example also shows that land that could be seen as “unused” may, 
in fact, just be dormant for a certain time, but used later by peasants as their own means 
for mitigating the effects of climate change. Thus, an expansion in biofuel production 
                                                          
20 According to Patel, Holt-Gimenez, and Shattuck, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, with 
over $30 billion at their disposal, had set up AGRA in 2006 and already spent $1.3 billion on 
agricultural development grants, mostly in Africa (17). Such large sums of money going towards 
the research and development of biotechnologies in Africa is seen as overshadowing alternative 
solutions that are more environmentally sustainable and small farmer centric (Patel 158). 
 




could strip peasants from this strategic resource, providing another reason why agro-fuels 
presents a large obstacle to smallholders.  
For esteemed economist Amartya Sen, the actual cause of drought or famine itself 
reflects more upon the socio-economic and political climate within the country, thus 
requiring a solution that focuses on these areas, rather than one that could potentially 
confront a climatic change from a technological standpoint. In his book, Development as 
Freedom, the economist argues that hunger is not just a balance between food production, 
agricultural activities, and population growth, but is more about maintaining a position of 
entitlement that allows people with minimal incomes to purchase food (Sen 161-162). If 
Sen is correct, and because commercialized agriculture and agro-fuels require less labour, 
the political decision to modernize the country’s agricultural sector could actually 
increase the incidences of hunger within the country by decreasing the agricultural labour 
force, the nation’s primary source of employment.  
The skills and knowledge that the peasantry has acquired in mitigating the 
challenges climate presents should thus not be ignored when discussing solutions to food 
insecurity, and instead be supported further. Otherwise, if large scale agriculture is 
allowed to engulf the nation’s agricultural sector, many smallholder farmers will be 
forced from their lands as well as from the developmental process. Without other well 
established economic sectors to house these new found labourers who have migrated to 
the city, millions more will fall into ever greater depths of poverty, a phenomena that 
Mike Davis describes as creating a Planet of Slums.21 
                                                          
21 In his book with the same title, Davis documents the global change that sees more people living 
in urban areas compared to rural ones for the first time in human history (14-15). According to 
Davis, with levels of industrialization being unable to maintain the growth of urban populations 




Chapter 4: Roots of Tanzanian Food Insecurity and the Rise and Fall of the 
Cooperative Movement 
 
Ultimately, Tanzania will be food secure when it is able to consistently feed its 
people and able to withstand internal and external shocks that could create issues of food 
insecurity. These internal shocks are represented by adverse weather conditions such as 
droughts and floods that present a great challenge to food production. External shocks are 
market oriented, characterised by fluctuating commodity prices that have an impact on 
Tanzania’s economy and prevent food accessibility because food prices become too high.  
This chapter of the thesis is devoted to illustrating how the country became so 
vulnerable to these shocks, and is divided into three parts: the colonial period (1884-
1960), post-independence (1961-1981), and the period of structural adjustment to the 
present (1982-present). Each historical period will exemplify how the development of the 
agricultural sector has been misdirected throughout Tanzania’s history, operating in a 
food security like fashion, focusing mainly on cash crop production for the global market 
instead of foodstuffs for local consumption, causing the nation to be food insecure. The 
history of the cooperative movement will also be documented throughout this chapter in 
order to highlight its strengths, weaknesses, and what caused the movement to decay. 
Each period will also demonstrate how the focus of Tanzania’s agricultural sector has 
never been directed to benefit the peasantry, but instead to use the peasantry primarily for 
the economic benefit of outsiders. At first, Tanzanian agriculture was geared towards 
producing for European interests. After independence, agriculture was used by 
                                                          
since 1970, slum growth has actually increased more rapidly than urbanization throughout the 
Global South (17).  




Tanzania’s elite and urban classes to jumpstart other sectors of the nation’s economy and 
balance its payments, while rural areas experienced massive intervention schemes that 
ultimately failed to bring development to the countryside. After liberalization occurred in 
the 1980s, private businesses began to drive the interests of the agricultural sector, 
focusing agricultural production towards the global market, forgoing the principles of 
food sovereignty that prioritize  local food needs and the wellbeing of Tanzanian 
smallholder farmers.   
 
The Colonial Period: 1884-1960 
Tanzania was forcefully overtaken and colonized by Germany, who declared its 
ownership of the territory during the Conference of Berlin in 1884-1885. Then known as 
Tanganyika, the colony’s economic policy was to implement plantation agriculture, 
focusing on cash crop production that could be used by and for the benefit of the Empire, 
and not food crops that would feed the local populace. Africans who were not on settler 
lands could also participate in this practice, and were in fact compelled into doing so 
through a hut tax. This tax was either paid off by crop production sold to the Germans, 
and later the British, or through the outright confiscation of their lands, or by Africans 
labouring on European plantations, who operated in often slave like conditions (Yeager 
11).  
Prior to colonialism, Tanzanian farmers produced what they needed, trading its 
surplus to the local market. Under colonialism, however, this changes, as cash crop 
production sold on the global market became the priority, ignoring local needs as 
European interests trumped those of the community. Since this transition, producing for 




the market has remained and is fundamental in understanding how Tanzania’s 
agricultural sector is currently structured (Msambichaka 118). 
Shortly after the Germans laid claim to Tanzania, they began to usher in European 
settlers, encouraging both them and locals to produce cash crops in order to fuel its 
industrial needs. They introduced cash crops such as sisal, coffee, rubber, and cotton; 
production of which was to return back to the metropolis (Hayuma and Conning 1). Extra 
effort was placed not only on the growth of these crops, but also to prohibit the growth of 
foodstuffs. In the Kilimanjaro and Kagera regions, both coffee and banana trees were 
grown. However, allowing the two to grow and flourish together was prevented despite 
bananas being the main food staple in the region. Instead, banana trees were used only to 
create a wind barrier and for mulching in order to protect and increase coffee production. 
In the Mwanza region, cereals could not be grown before cotton, as it was believed that 
the insects and pests that they harbour would have a negative impact on the production of 
the cash crop (Msambichaka 120). In both instances, cash crop production superseded 
food crop production.  
Sisal, a drought resistant crop, was grown mostly on plantations and not by 
smallholders. Due to its export value, however, it was planted in extremely fertile areas 
with rich soils and adequate rainfall. Sisal could have grown and produced similar yields 
in semi-arid regions of the country, thus allowing foods such as maize, rice, fruits, and 
vegetables to be grown in the more fertile areas (Msambichaka 127). However, because 
cash crop growth was the colonialist’s primary concern, the importance of food 
production for local consumption was overshadowed.  




For L.A. Msambichaka, meeting local nutritional needs is the foundation of any 
agricultural sector and the engine of socio-economic development. Simply put, adhering 
to local food needs creates, “…greater stamina for work, greater labour productivity, and 
ultimately greater income.” Since Tanzanian agriculture has always placed a greater 
emphasis on cash crop production, however, these primary objectives have never been 
reached by the country’s agricultural sector (Msambichaka 136). Neglecting foodstuffs 
would also lead to the abandonment of some traditional food crops and varieties that were 
locally grown in pre-colonial Tanzania, decreasing the country’s natural biodiversity 
(Msambichaka 119).  
 In order to increase cash crop production further, the British, who overtook 
Germany as Tanzania’s colonial rulers after WWI, allowed for the formation of 
cooperatives in major export producing areas of the country, beginning in Kilimanjaro 
and later spreading to Bukoba and Mwanza (Lyimo 34). Grievances emanating from the 
peasantry about being exploited by Asian and European middlemen as well as a lack of 
access to credit threatened to decrease production, forcing the British to allow for the 
creation of agricultural cooperatives in order to support the peasantry and maintain cash 
crop growth (Lyimo 32). Although this aggravated European settlers who were trying to 
gain a monopoly over coffee production in Kilimanjaro, it provided smallholder African 
farmers with a guaranteed market for their produce as well as much needed financial and 
technical support (Lyimo 35). 
Under the Cooperatives Societies Ordinance of 1932, all cooperative societies 
operated under the stipulation that they must prove to be economically viable to the 
Registrar, who was appointed by the Governor of the territory (Lyimo 97). The Registrar 




had the power to grant loans, conduct inquiries, and disband ineffective cooperative 
societies. Being under colonial rule, however, cooperatives in this era lacked the 
democratic organization found in conventional cooperatives as producers were compelled 
to sell their crops to their cooperative societies, as cooperatives were under the full 
direction of the colonial authority (Lyimo 106). Still, these newly created cooperatives 
were highly successful in reducing poverty in rural areas as well as increasing production, 
as these organizations enabled farmers to bypass unfair marketing practices of mainly 
non-African traders so they could receive higher prices for their goods and provide an 
avenue for increased economic mobility and political advancement (Sizya 4-5).  
The early success of cooperatives and their positive effects on income can be 
witnessed in their increasing responsibilities that were awarded to them by the colonial 
government to market crops, the increasing number of cooperative societies, and the 
amount of crops produced and export dollars earned. Although the Ordinance that 
authorized the registration of cooperatives was only established in 1932, within five years 
the coffee board overseeing all coffee purchases was dissolved into the successful 
Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU), the country’s first and longest standing 
cooperative (Lyimo 36).22 In 1945 there were 79 registered cooperatives, and by 1952 
they had increased to 474. Also in 1945, Tanzania produced 7,633 metric tonnes of 
cotton, which grew to 14,335 tonnes in 1952, and grew again to 34,790 tonnes in 1960. 
                                                          
22 It should be stressed here that the colonial government, while allotting more power to 
agricultural market crop cooperatives, did so not to empower the local population, but to instead 
allow the colony to produce more for Britain’s own benefit. Cooperatives, while improving the 
lives of particularly the rural poor, are created to primarily serve colonial interests, and not its 
members, a practice widespread throughout Sub-Saharan Africa (Wanyama, Develtere, and Pollet 
1, 3).  




Coffee exports also increased, earning Tanzania $1,500,586 in 1945, $5,813,097 in 1950, 
and $11,564,227 in 1955 (Iliffe 57). Also emerging from these early, successful 
cooperative societies are their leaders who would begin to play a pivotal role in 
Tanzania’s fight for independence during the 1950s. Paul Bomani, S. A. Kandoro, S. A. 
Maswanya, and I. M. Bhoke Munanka were all cooperative organizers located in 
Mwanza, who played significant roles within the country’s independence movement 
(Iliffe 57).  
Tanzania, however, did not gain its freedom from Britain until 1961. Until then, it 
remained a League of Nations and later a UN trusteeship territory, directed by the United 
Kingdom, whose primary function was to produce for the metropolis, often times at the 
expense of its own wellbeing (Davidson 145). During the 1940s, greater agricultural 
production from Tanzania and other colonies was required in order to fuel the war effort 
as well as to assist in Europe’s reconstruction once WWII was completed in 1945. The 
British further tried to ramp up this output with the implementation of the “plant-more-
crops” campaign in an effort to increase cash crop production through large scale farming 
initiatives (Yeager 16).    
Large scale farming operations were established across the country, such as the 
Mlalo rehabilitation scheme, the Mbulu scheme, and the Sukuma land scheme. Each 
project sought to bring the advantages of modernized agriculture in order to increase cash 
crop production. Perhaps the most infamous of these large scale farming initiatives, was 
the Groundnut Scheme of 1946. Although these large scale operations did not reach their 
desired objectives, the Groundnut Scheme proved to be an epic failure, clearly illustrating 
that large scale, commercialized agriculture was not guaranteed success within such a 




diverse country like Tanzania. While the Groundnut Scheme operating in the country’s 
Southern regions was to provide war torn Britain with margarine, food, and industrial 
oils, the project was abandoned in 1951, only five years after its inception, having wasted 
a total of nearly $70 million (Cole and de Blij 467). Making matters worse for Tanzania, 
was that at the same time of this project, the central part of the country was suffering 
from a serious famine (Davidson 83). Still, the British went ahead to produce for itself, 
and not for those who needed foodstuffs the most.  
There are many factors that can be attributed to the disappointing results of large 
scale agricultural operations in Tanzania. For Scott, the blind faith development policy 
makers during this era placed in mechanized farming, the lack of proper planning needed 
to understand the country’s varying landscapes, the adverse climate conditions, and the 
differences emanating within the peasantry itself all played extensive roles in preventing 
the success of these grandiose farming operations. With respect to the peasantry, these 
schemes assumed that all smallholders desired the same crop mix, techniques, and yields, 
and thus attempted to mold them into a standardized model of cultivation. As a result, 
these schemes suffered from the lack of dynamic and flexible farming methods that these 
areas required, something that the peasantry had been using for generations (Scott 228).  
It is also interesting to note, that one of the companies involved in the Groundnut 
Scheme was the United African Company, a subsidiary of the agro giant Unilever. While 
the company was very much involved in the failure of the scheme, it appears that 
Tanzanian officials have forgotten or forgiven their blunders, as they are also a major 
partner of SAGCOT, one of the country’s latest ventures into large scale agriculture 
(Scott 228; Africa Practice & ESEA). Thus, despite industrialized farming’s past failures, 




policy makers continue to view this model of agricultural production as a key component 
to its food security.  
In addition, while the developmental discourse during the colonial era encouraged 
mechanized farming as a way of improving production, smallholder cooperative societies 
were also being promoted by the colonial administration and were highly productive 
themselves. Arguably, their success made the push for these farming schemes that 
ultimately failed, an unnecessary risk to undertake. The trumpeting of the two differing 
models of development, one that can be since as a primarily social organization while the 
other more capitalist, also parallels the situation of today’s developmental discourse in 
Tanzania. International aid organizations and the current government are championing 
both cooperatives and industrialized farming at the same time in order to improve the 
situation of smallholders and assist the nation in becoming food secure. However, since 
cooperatives and large scale farming schemes can present, in general terms, opposing 
paths of development, the growth of each comes in direct conflict of the other. As this 
thesis will later discuss, ultimately it is the social, political, and economic environment in 
which each development model operates in that largely determines its success.  
Under colonial rule, this environment was shaped by its European rulers, as 
Tanzania’s agricultural sector focused on producing for the world market, ignoring local 
food needs. This direction of the agricultural sector has remained, for the prioritizing of 
cash crop production did not change after independence and as such, can be seen as the 
roots to the current food insecurity problem. Cooperatives at this time were successful, 
mainly because they were given proper support from the government, in the form of 
increased crop marketing responsibilities. The second part of this chapter will now 




discuss the continued rise and eventual fall of cooperatives in the post-independence era, 
as well as how and why Tanzania maintained fixated on cash crop production, which has 
resulted in the country’s ongoing food insecurity.  
 
Post-Independence: 1961-1981  
Although Tanzania would gain its independence from Britain in 1961, the push 
for independence slowly began in the late 1920s, greatly accelerating after WWII, cueing 
many European settlers to flee the country (Davidson 146). Vital to the independence 
movement were cooperatives, a fact acknowledged by future Minister of Agriculture Paul 
Bomani, as he stated that cooperatives were a source of empowerment, as well as a 
pivotal social organization that assisted farmers in bypassing Asian and European 
middlemen, and one that allowed for a socio-political organization that united Tanzanians 
against colonialism (Lyimo 40, 46).  
Upon gaining independence in 1961, Tanzania’s main objective was to develop a 
self-reliant, egalitarian nation devoid of class divide (Meredith 250). In order to achieve 
these goals, that appear to be in line with a food sovereignty perspective, under the 
direction of the country’s first President Julius Nyerere, Tanzania began to adopt the 
ideals of “African socialism.” This ideology was a blend between socialist ideals that 
preached communal verses individual gains while at the same time encouraging African 
traditional values of cooperation (Osabu-Kle 172). These values are quite similar to those 
of the pioneers of modern day cooperative societies, as they promote equal rights to land, 
social development over profit, and encourage the creation of a cohesive unit of 
agricultural production.  




Having played such an important part in achieving the country’s independence, 
cooperatives supporting smallholder farmers would again play a key role in the 
development of African socialism in the newly independent state (Lyimo 44). Thought to 
also have a positive impact on production, government initiatives would lead to an 
explosion of the cooperative movement after independence, as the number of registered 
societies increased from 857 in 1961 to 1,533 in 1966 nationwide, while the volume of 
produce handled went from 145,000 tonnes in 1961 to 496,000 tonnes in that same time 
span (Lyimo 46; Saul 357). Facilitating this growth was also the Bank of Tanzania, 
launched in 1962, later renamed the National Cooperatives Bank in 1964, which provided 
loans to cooperatives in order to purchase more crops and finance other agricultural 
projects and research, creating an ideal environment for cooperatives to operate 
(Maghimbi 3).  
Furthermore, the Cooperatives Societies Ordinance of 1963 declared that 
cooperatives were, indeed, necessary for peasants to achieve economic growth and 
development, and thus must become an integral part in building African socialism and 
self-reliance (Lyimo 107). So pivotal to the development of the country, the government 
felt that cooperatives should be given even more responsibility to drive this process 
forward because of their increasing accumulation of capital, involvement in rural areas, 
and because they appeared to be an instrument of development itself, as if cooperatives 
themselves and not their structure, management, or environment equated to their success 
(Lyimo 107; Saul 357-358). 
As a result, to spread the cooperative movement to the most isolated parts of 
Tanzania, the economic viability stipulation initially installed in the Ordinance of 1932 




was removed under the Cooperatives Societies Act of 1968 (Lyimo 107). Believed to be 
an instrument of development themselves, it was hoped that with cooperatives spread 
throughout the country, some of the success that the nation’s largest cooperatives found 
in its major export crop areas could be replicated elsewhere (Lyimo 44). In this light, 
under this Cooperatives Act, the government promoted the creation of cooperative 
societies in the areas of transport, consumer, savings, and credit in the hopes of boosting 
these sectors of the country’s economy (Lyimo 107) 
In order to empower cooperatives further, the government also allocated 
marketing crop cooperatives with a monopoly over the purchase of certain crops 
produced by the peasantry, allowing the largest and most established to truly flourish. 
Under the Agricultural Products (Control and Marketing) Act of 1962, cooperatives were 
given a monopoly over purchasing crops including maize, cashew nuts, ground nuts, and 
coffee from peasants, which were then sold to marketing boards such as the National 
Agricultural Products Board and the Tanganyika Coffee Board (Lyimo 45).  
Monopolies like these were beneficial to their members because they allowed 
them to pool their produce together within a larger organization that could use its size and 
marketing power to ease price volatility that occurred throughout the year, allowing 
farmers to obtain the best prices within the international market place. Such a 
monopolistic position also ensured the survival of cooperatives as well as providing a 
reliable market for farmers to sell their produce on a consistent basis (Wanyama 2; Fridell 
8). The move by the Tanzanian state to grant such power to cooperatives is similar to the 
one made by Canada to allow for the creation of the Canadian Wheat Board. Pressed by 
years of social action and organized protests by farmers that fell in conjunction with the 




harsh political and economic times of the depression and WWII, the Wheat Board was 
created in 1943, granting it a monopoly over all Western Canadian wheat. For both 
Tanzania and Canada, these monopolies allowed farmers to benefit from improved 
pricing for their produce and a greater distribution of benefits for the many farmers 
involved (Fridell 14).  
With regards to Tanzania, production itself between the years leading up to and 
past independence (1950s to early 1970s) was in large part accredited to cooperatives 
themselves, and these government allocated monopolies attributed greatly to their strong 
performance (Maghimbi 3). By 1968, the cooperative movement reached its peak, as 
Tanzanian cooperatives became the third largest in the world in terms of percentage of 
market share of agricultural exports, behind only Denmark and Israel (Maghimbi 2). 
Cooperatives also had an impact on producing foodstuffs, as Tanzania was one of the few 
African countries to maintain agricultural growth over its increase in population during 
this time (Maghimbi 8).  
As such, it can be observed that the relationship between the government and 
cooperative societies during this time was at its most beneficial for both parties, as the 
policy environment created by the state allowed these rural organizations to thrive. 
Cooperatives were given the responsibility to increase production and improve the lives 
of their members while the government appeared content with playing a supportive role 
from a distance. Allowing cooperatives to have a monopoly over crop marketing and 
supporting them when financially called upon, but not interfering in an administrative 
sense, thus allowed cooperatives to excel because they were directed by their economic 
feasibility and under the guidance of its members, and not a political ideology. Although 




corruption began to seep in during this period as some cooperatives were becoming 
increasingly top-down in nature, having been administered by wealthy peasants that took 
advantage of their prominent position, which this thesis will address later, it must be 
noted that despite this, cooperatives were assisting smallholder farmers on a whole as 
well as positively attributing to Tanzania’s food security.  
In highlighting the importance of keeping the momentum of self-sufficiency 
going, Nyerere proclaimed that, “We have to build our economy by concentrating first on 
agricultural development. That is the industry we have, and which can be expanded with 
our existing capital and manpower.” (qtd. in Isinika et al. 21). Going one step further, 
Nyerere pledged upon independence that Tanzania would become self-sufficient in food 
production by 1980 (Msambichaka 117).  
Despite this apparent desire to direct its agricultural structure more in line with the 
ideals of food sovereignty, shifting emphasis from cash crop production to food crops, the 
reality is that after independence, Tanzania’s policies did not make these necessary 
changes. Instead, both progressive smallholders and private commercial estates were 
encouraged and production was directed towards cash crops to gain access to valuable 
foreign exchange dollars and to balance the country’s payments (Sterkenburg and Wiel 
110). This emphasis on cash crop production is witnessed through Tanzania’s, “…budget 
allocations, research activities, extension service, distribution of inputs, price incentives, 
etc.” (Msambichaka 121). Yet despite this attention, due to falling market prices, export 
earnings were disappointing. Worse, development of four regions in Southern Tanzania-
Iringa, Mbeya, Rukwa, and Ruvuma-believed to have great agricultural potential with a 
favourable climate that could be used to grow all major staple crops were left neglected, 




isolated from the political centres of influence in Dodoma and Dar es Salaam 
(Msambichaka 122).23  
Tanzania also did not diversify its cash crop production, as they maintained the 
existing agricultural commodities market that they inherited from their former colonial 
rulers. Having production tied to the desires of the world market allowed current demand 
for a specific commodity to dictate what products would be produced at that time (Bello 
116). For Ian Gillson, Steve Wiggins, and Nilah Pandian, although diversity is the best 
way to reduce the dependency on vulnerable commodities, developing countries often 
have great difficulty in diversifying their production.24 According to these authors,  
many of these countries are Least Developed and or among the EU’s associated countries 
in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. Almost all of the countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa rely on primary commodities (including non-agriculture) for over half of their 
exports, with some countries relying particularly on one, two, or three commodities 
(Gillson, Wiggins, and Pandian 8).  
 
As such, Tanzanian agriculture was trapped within a market system that forced the 
country to rely primarily on known commodities that Europeans wanted, such as sisal, 
coffee, tea, and cotton, for their export earnings as opposed to venturing into non-
traditional exports that carried greater risks due to their uncertain demand; an example 
                                                          
23 This isolation has also been physical in nature, for the main road leading South from Dar es 
Salaam remains unfinished even today, despite the promise to do so at the country’s 
independence in 1961. Until recently, the Mtwara region, which is east of Ruvuma and is situated 
along the Indian Ocean, did not receive much attention from the media, multinational 
corporations, or the government; whose people are perceived by the rest of the country as 
backward, pejoratively known as washamba, which can be translated into ‘hicks’. Many also view 
this physical detachment as a symbol of Southern dislocation from the broader history of 
Tanzania, and some contend it is the result of deliberate ostracism by the central government. 
Some have even argued that this marginalization has historical roots, witnessed in a ‘hidden 
agenda’ against the South that apparently followed the Maji Maji rebellion against German 
colonial rule from 1905-07 (Guardian Correspondent). 
24 For Gillson, Wiggins, and Pandian, there are three ways to diversify from vulnerable 
commodities: to produce different crops, venture into other economic sectors, or to capture 
higher proportions of the value chain (3). 




that clearly illustrates the dangers of a market led food system, equating in the loss of a 
nation’s food sovereignty (Sterkenburg and Wiel 110). 
Despite this, during the early years of independence, the greatest contributor to 
economic growth was the agricultural sector, as its production accounted for over 50% of 
the nation’s GDP while coffee, sisal, and cotton accounted for around 60% of foreign 
exchange earnings, exemplifying just how dependent Tanzania was on its agricultural 
exports (Wobst 8). Since it was the backbone of its economy, the government was forced 
to make cash crop production a priority ahead of food crop production in order to develop 
other sectors of the country’s economy. This sacrifice of not developing the food crop 
sector, however, has given rise to the country’s current food security issues.  
Aside from economic growth and agricultural output, President Nyerere was also 
concerned about the direction his country was taking socially. According to him, a small 
elite class was forming, endangering his socialist aspirations (Davidson 229). Among the 
accused were some of the more successful cooperatives in the country, generating a 
healthy surplus. As a result, the President began to invoke policies in an effort to reverse 
this trend.  
In order to achieve his socialist objective, the first of three, Five Year “National” 
Plans, starting in 1964 and ending in 1969 were implemented (Stephens 168). A part of 
this plan was a government led initiative of resettlement, sought to quell both the rising 
inequality within the country as well as to promote a strategy of self-reliance. These goals 
were outlined in the Arusha Declaration of 1967, where Nyerere established his socialist 
objectives under the policy of Ujamaa. Meaning “familyhood,” Ujamaa was to be the 
crown jewel of Nyerere’s African socialism and one that was hoped to increase the speed 




at which the country would adopt his socialist mindset. With respect to agriculture, 
Ujamaa was influenced greatly by Maoist China and Western development models, 
specifically the Tennessee Valley Authority that had developed capital intensive 
agriculture in the United States as well as the economic mobilization from WWII (Scott 
224).  
  At first, Ujamaa called for the voluntary movement of people from urban and 
scattered rural areas to villages created by the government that were based on communal 
coexistence. All families pertaining to Ujamaa villages lived and worked together, 
sharing the fields where they grew crops as well as sharing in their profits. Education, 
water, and health care improvements were key to this developmental process and all 
profits made were to go to improving these social structures. All villages were 
encouraged to grow cash crops to increase incomes, and a minimal acreage quota for food 
crops was installed to assist in self-sustaining food production (Isinika et al. 71). It was 
also hoped that these new Ujamaa communities would enable peasants to gain access to 
larger farms and through modern techniques and equipment to be able to increase 
production, similar to what had occurred in the West (Meredith 253).  
 The Arusha Declaration also called for cooperatives to assist in the Ujamaa 
process as well as the development of rural Tanzania, just as the Ordinance of 1963 had 
proclaimed (Lyimo 52-53). Under the Cooperatives Societies Act of 1968, however, the 
government gave itself powers of intervention and to supervise the cooperative 
movement. Again, just as the British directed under the Ordinance of 1932, this infringed 
on the democratic nature of cooperative societies as well as their inherent political 
neutrality, as Tanzania at the time was ruled by a one party state. With the government 




firmly entrenched within the cooperative movement, the Registrar was given power to 
solve problems within communities, taking this duty away from cooperatives themselves 
(Lyimo 109).  
As part of the Ujamaa procedure, many cooperatives amalgamated, some for 
financial reasons, but mainly because of political decisions emanating from the 
government. It was thought that this would subdue the capitalist characteristics that the 
government accused the KNCU and others for having, and thus in order to fit 
cooperatives within Nyerere’s socialist agenda, many stronger marketing crop 
cooperatives were forced to join with weaker cooperative unions, now run by the Ujamaa 
villages, under the watchful eye of government administration (Lyimo 54; Maghimbi 
5).25 This greatly angered many within the cooperative movement, as members believed 
that cooperatives were just becoming an extension of the government. Indeed, according 
to Scott, resettlement can be seen as a way to make rural Tanzanians easier to politically 
control under the state’s desired communal living (224). Imprisoned by colonialism, 
Tanzanians were now being administratively constrained by their own government.  
Cooperative members, however, were already beginning to experience losses of 
both direction and finances emanating from corrupt cooperative administrators who were 
running these societies like their own personal fiefdom. According to a Special 
Committee of Enquiry in 1966 as well as reports conducted by the government on both 
the KNCU and the Victorian Federation of Cooperative Unions (VFCU) in 1958, 1962-
63, corruption within the most powerful cooperative societies and others was widespread. 
                                                          
25 The strongest of these cooperatives, such as the KNCU and the Bukoba Native Cooperative 
Union (BNCU) actually resisted this until the government forced them to amalgamate in 1974 
(Lyimo 109). 




According to these reports, one cooperative union president who began his position on a 
low income base had acquired within a few years of employment a car, a truck, two 
tractors, a house, a bar, a home for his wife, two canoes, and some fishing nets. Another 
audit showed that one union, filed under “motor vehicle expenses” from 1965-67, had 
spent large amounts of fuel on Sundays and holidays at gas stations owned by 
committeemen while hiring personal drivers for administrative personnel on a regular 
basis. Another union president was also found to have claimed daily allowances for more 
days than the working days in a month, ranging from 27 to 43! (Saul 361-363).  
While the government later intervened to both guide cooperatives further under 
the Ujamaa process and to quell this swell of corruption, its own administrators continued 
to steer cooperative societies further away from the needs of the peasantry as these 
organizations increasingly became driven by those at the top as opposed to being directed 
by all members, allowing the exploitative behaviour of some previous cooperative leaders 
to continue. Indeed, the Tanzanian government was interested not only in cracking down 
on abusive cooperative managers, but also to gain from cooperative taxation and dictating 
how societies’ surpluses would be used (Saul 367). In reflecting on what has transpired 
with regards to the cooperative movement in Tanzania, as well as elsewhere, according to 
John Hamer, “individualism, corruption, and bureaucratization…” appear to be the 
limiting social factors that prevent the development of cooperative movement (127).  
Government control would further increase under an amendment that was decreed 
within the Cooperatives Societies Act of 1968, as all villages that had reached a “high 
stage of development” could register as a multi-purpose cooperative for producing, 
processing, and marketing their products (Lyimo 60). As such, cooperatives became built 




into Ujamaa, bringing these non-government entities closer to administrative control. 
Encompassed within the village structure, cooperatives were to take on the production of 
all farm crops, overextending themselves and causing these organizations to lose their 
autonomy and effectiveness (Lyimo 59, 89). By the end of 1973, there were 380 Ujamaa 
villages registered as multi-purpose cooperatives, and by the following year, all regions 
had their own cooperative union, greatly decreasing the number of registered 
cooperatives seen nearly a decade ago (Lyimo 54, 60).  
Food insecurity, however, would continue to persist. Since the government still 
retained the same agricultural structure that the colonialists had used during their 
occupation, cash crops were still emphasised and received more investment compared to 
food crop production. Their cultivation remained in the most fertile areas, while food 
stuffs were left to marginal ones, with no viable domestic market established 
(Msambichaka 120). Under Ujamaa, roughly 60% of all new villages were located in 
semi-arid areas, often to be situated by roads to make peasants more easily monitored by 
the state (Scott 233, 237, 239). In addition, the variety of food crops was not increased. 
Foods such as millets and sorghum, historically important domestic staples that are 
ecologically sustainable and drought resistant were neglected due to their low value on 
the export market (Msambichaka 119). If the government’s primary goal was actually to 
become self-sufficient in food production, one would assume that increased growth of 
two of the four crops (banana and cassava being the others) that account for 40% of the 
human energy supply of food consumed by Tanzanians would be encouraged 
(Msambichaka 119). 




The production of sorghum and millet was beginning to be replaced by other 
cereals such as maize, rice, and wheat, for they fetched higher prices within the world 
market – a phenomena that occurs when crops are grown not for local needs, but for 
global market desires, something that McMichael and Weis alluded to earlier (Isinika et 
al. 12; Weis 16; McMichael 171). If Tanzania truly felt that self-sustaining food 
production was paramount, perhaps the focus on producing non-food crops such as sisal 
should have declined instead of crops like millet and sorghum. But due to the structure of 
the agricultural sector, Tanzania was dependent on its agricultural exports that brought in 
valuable revenues to purchase imports used for upgrades in other sectors. This is not 
necessarily a negative process, and indeed is a way for Tanzania to use profits from one 
established industry to develop others. However, because profits generated by the 
agricultural sector did not reverberate back to rural communities, the agriculture sector 
and the further development of smallholder farmers did not occur. Potential food 
production, as a result, was thus collateral damage, as Tanzania’s leaders sought to 
develop emerging industries as opposed to supporting their economic backbone 
(Msambichaka 136).  
According to Robert Bates, taking profits from rural economic sectors and 
transplanting that revenue to grow an industrial base is a common practice for African 
states, who have been sold on the idea by Western development agencies and urban 
interests within their own country that moving from an agrarian to an industrial based 
economy is how a nation develops. In many instances, great profits are generated by 
marketing boards, and in the case of Tanzania, cooperatives, who become one of the few 
economic bright spots due to their monopolistic positon as the sole purchaser of crops in 




a newly independent, mainly agrarian country, who finds itself in a dire need of capital. 
As such, profits generated by these rural organizations were diverted to develop industrial 
and manufacturing sectors through heavy taxation policies. Once the government 
increased their role within these organizations, they offered lower prices to farmers for 
their produce, allowing them to withhold the greater profits they were able to accumulate 
upon their sale on the world market, which would later go to benefit urban sectors of the 
economy. This occurs, despite the fact that less than 10% of Tanzanians lived in cities 
during the years after independence, yet 30% of public expenditure in the state’s two first 
development plans went to urban areas (Bates 11, 15, 18).  
In line with the more influential urban interests in Tanzania, in the country’s 
second wave of planning, from 1969-1974, a more urban component is stressed, ushering 
in greater import substitution and capital goods production through the newly 
nationalized industrial sector (Stephens 102). In order to import industrialized goods, 
funds gained through cash crop production would be needed. Backed behind 84% of 
industrial investment made by the government, they hoped to increase productivity by 
7%. In this round of planning, the state adopted a mantra preaching a “self-help” attitude 
for farmers, calling on all people to “work hard” to achieve the common goal of increase 
food production (Stephens 103). In other words, it appears that smallholder farmers were 
left to fend for themselves.26 Less than 6% of all government spending went to the 
                                                          
26 According to Young Kimaro, the isolation between the government and smallholder farmers is 
still evident. In our interview, she expressed her frustration for the lack of support the peasantry 
was receiving from the administration. For her, extension officers were particularly absent, while 
communication and an exchange of information between farmers and the government was sorely 
lacking (Interview with Young Kimaro, Rotary Club Member and expat, July 18th 2013, Moshi, 
Tanzania). 




agricultural sector, while over 80% of this went to parastatals running large scale, 
mechanized farms (Stephens 103; Maghimbi, Lokina, and Senga 42).27 Support towards 
the peasantry was not forthcoming. In fact, despite the Ujamaa mandate, the National 
Agricultural and Food Corporation (NAFCO), a state farm, received more funds than all 
Ujamaa villages put together (Maghimbi, Lokina, and Senga 42). Although its GDP 
increases at this time to 4.8% per capita, food production fell again and the cost of living 
grew by more than 50% (Stephens 103).  
In addition to the sub-par results these policies had on the nation’s development, 
the people of Tanzania did not take to Ujamaa as Nyerere had hoped. At the end of its 
first year of implementation, only 180 villages were formed (Meredith 254). Impatient 
with the country’s slow response to this socialist construct, the government tried to entice 
further settlement by promising improved water, health care, and educational services to 
coerce membership to the newly created Ujamaa villages (Meredith 255). When the 
speed of relocation was still not to their liking, officials increased their militancy. What 
was once a voluntary policy transformed into a forceful process of “villagisation.” As 
authorities throughout Tanzania were losing their patience with uncooperative locals, 
they began destroying property, crops, and burning down houses in order to force people 
into new Ujamaa villages, many situated in poorer agricultural areas, causing production 
rates to decrease in the coming years (Meredith 255; Scott 246). The drive for African 
                                                          
27 Parastatals operate on regional and district levels in which peasants are not involved in the 
decision making process, countering the democratic makeup of cooperatives (Lyimo 70). Dating 
back to the colonial area, these institutions ran railways, harbours, postal services, 
telecommunications, and airlines. By the 1950s they ventured into crop marketing boards and 
after independence went into banking. Their three main goals were to prevent capital from exiting 
the country, to invest in productive sectors with a special focus on industry, and to improve 
transportation infrastructure (Tanzania’s Food Trade 16). 




socialism had undermined both its values and the need to develop the structure of the 
agricultural sector. From 1973-77, nearly 11 million people were placed in newly formed 
villages, amounting to the largest domestic mass movement in Africa’s history (Meredith 
255).  
It was believed that through villagisation, advantages of economies of scale and 
modern farming techniques in food production would be acquired (Msambichaka 135). 
This, however, did not occur. In fact, villages in this era were producing less food than at 
the time of independence (Msambichaka 136). In 1975, about 60% of farmers were 
producing less than the average farmer was capable (Msambichaka 129). Drought in 
some areas and floods in others during this time also intensified the problem, as the weak 
agricultural system could not withstand these harmful internal shocks to its production. 
Production of cereals dipped by more than 1 million tonnes between 1974-77, forcing the 
government to get loans and grants from the World Bank and the IMF as well as over 
200,000 tonnes of food aid (Meredith 256). In some years during the 1970s, as much as 
90% of its imports were food aid (Liisa and Bistrom 12). Instead of achieving Nyerere’s 
dream of becoming self-reliant, his Ujamaa policies helped create a dependency on 
outside assistance. Agriculture itself suffered a drop of 7% in food production due in 
large part to the mass migration of people in a short time span, because farmers could no 
longer tend to their fields and were often transplanted to less fertile areas (Stephens 108).  
Cooperatives too suffered serious blows during this time frame. Fearing their 
growing power, the government tried to collapse market crop cooperatives first through 
the aforementioned amalgamation methods, and later outright abolishing them in 1976. 
The government argued they did so because of the mismanagement and mistreatment of 




its members, but they were also banished because they were seen as a capitalist threat to 
the nation’s socialist desires. After the abolishment of most of these cooperatives, 
stagnation and a decline in agricultural production occurred (Lyimo 60, 67-69).  
The parastatals, amalgamated village cooperatives, and crop authorities that came 
in their place did little to substitute for the departed cooperatives and crop unions (Lyimo 
70; Maghimbi 5). Despite receiving preferential treatment in terms of gaining access to 
credit and resources because they were seen as an instrument that the government could 
use in planning the economy, nearly half of the 354 government run parastatals had 
experienced net losses by 1985. Consuming these subsidies also caused inflation rates to 
increase, discouraging many peasants from producing and selling crops to these 
organizations (Lyimo 70). Thus, poor productivity and a lack of financial control led to 
widening deficits. Despite this, salaries within parastatals were much higher compared to 
those in the private sector, while these organizations also enjoyed a higher employment 
rate compared to those in Kenya. Seen as too bureaucratic, each parastatal had a parent 
ministry, a board of directors, and a general manager who was appointed by the 
President, who often lacked business training. By the 1980s, these posts were frequently 
used as a dumping ground for difficult politicians, while corruption at all levels in the 
form of using public vehicles for private business, misappropriating or embezzling funds, 
falsifying records, and nepotism in hiring was rampant. Despite government calls to 
clamp down on these institutions, between 1973-82, commercial banks’ lending to 
parastatals rose from 31% to 61% of total funding, further demonstrating these state run 
institution’s ineffectiveness (Tanzania’s Food Trade 17, 20-12).  




State farms also generated little profit while government operated crop authorities 
were inefficient, corrupt, and overextended, exemplifying again that too much 
government involvement produced a negative reaction to production (Maghimbi, Lokina, 
and Senga 42). Crop authorities did not provide cash incentives for improved production 
quality, failed to deliver farming inputs, credit, and crops to market in a timely manner, 
and ultimately paid less for farmers’ produce. A distrust within the peasantry grew 
towards these newly government operated institutions, and a once stable cooperative 
movement began to slowly fade into the distance. Production levels also faltered. Cotton 
dropped from 100% production in 1974-75 to 68% in 1980 while cashew nuts dropped 
from 100% in 1974-75 to 16% in 1982. After 1976, smallholder farmers would endure 
without primary and market crop cooperatives that operated independently from the 
government for another six years (Lyimo 80, 87; Maghimbi 6).  
 In the third wave of planning, 1976-81, the Tanzanian government made one last 
effort to become self-sustaining in food production. However, its actual policies again 
failed to target this sector properly, and instead continued to focus on agricultural exports 
in order to correct its balance of payments. From 1976-81, a far less percentage of GDP 
was invested into the agricultural sector, going from 3.9% in 1976 to 2.9% in 1981 
(Isinika et al. 23). The majority of investments that went to agriculture also went to cash 
crops, not foodstuffs. While investment in cereals went from 5.9% in 1975-76 to 35.6% 
in 1980-81, investment in cash crops rose from 15.5% to 55.6% in the same period 
(Msambichaka 129). To this day, most of the country’s food imports are cereals, which 
include wheat, maize, rice, millet, and sorghum (Ministry of Agriculture 4, 2006). 




 Aside from a boom in coffee prices from 1975-77, Tanzania’s focus on cash crops 
also did not equate to the economic growth rates the country desired (Wobst 10). Coffee 
benefitted at this time because world market prices were high due to a lack of supply. 
However, this did not last. Worse, other external shocks had more dramatic effects, 
arguably erasing the positive experience Tanzania had witnessed during its brief coffee 
boom. 
Inflation had grown from 1.8% in 1967 to 12.3% by 1978. Also, Tanzania’s 
balance of payments deficit reached $442 million and its external debt was around a 
billion dollars, equivalent to 25% of its GDP (Yeager 108). Export revenues, after that 
coffee driven high of 1975-77, also fell dramatically. By the 1980s, export earnings only 
covered 40% of the value of imports, 20% less than at the time of independence, causing 
its foreign debt load to greatly increase (Meredith 257). Despite this fall in export values, 
the country did not pull away from its focus on cash crop production. 
 Ten years after the Ujamaa policies were installed, even Nyerere admitted that 
Tanzania was neither self-reliant, nor socialist in 1977 (Stephens 77). Communal farming 
production never amounted to over 0.5% of all cultivated land (Isinika et al. 25). Even 
when these communal farming operations were successful, the government intervened, 
shutting them down, arguing that the village cooperative formed was too capitalistic in 
nature, operating further away from the state’s socialist ideals. As Coulson argues, this 
was the case for the Ruvuma Development Association, which was a collection of 16 
villages, operating closer to the principles of the Arusha Declaration more than any of the 
villages in the country (“Agricultural Policies” 91). Suppressed in 1969, seemingly 
because it was successful in the few years it existed, both Coulson and Scott argue that 




government authorities have always tried to control the peasantry, never realizing that the 
role they should occupy was to support them (“Agricultural Policies” 96; Scott 224).  
Nyerere himself confessed, 
The real failure seems to have been a lack of political leadership and technical 
understanding at the village and district level. Despite the call in ‘Politics is Agriculture’ 
for all political leaders to learn the basics of good husbandry in their areas, and to join 
with peasants in production, we have continued to shout at the peasants and exhort them 
to produce more, without doing much to help them or to work with them in a relationship 
of mutual respect. 
(qtd. in Stephens 78). 
 
Indeed, the real victims, as well as the main target of these poorly planned and executed 
policies were peasants, who were seen as backward and unorganized. Ujamaa was the 
government’s way to uniformly bring them into modernization, but also a way to control 
their production in order to benefit the urban classes. Although this vision of 
development may have had the best intentions, the idea of villagisation, shared at the time 
by various Western development agencies such as the World Bank, USAID, and others, 
did not bring development to Tanzania’s smallholder farmers, further damaging the 
country’s agricultural sector, leaving it more susceptible to internal and external shocks 
(Ergas 387-388; Scott 223, 241, 245-246).  
As oil prices increased they ended up accumulating to 60% of Tanzania’s import 
value. Agricultural production also declined from 1972 to 1982, forcing Nyerere to 
concede that the country was poorer in 1982 than they were ten years ago (Meredith 258). 
He was also embarrassed by the fact that Tanzania had not become self-sufficient in food 
production. Annual foreign aid jumped to $700 million by 1981, accounting for nearly 
70% of its capital expenditure (Stephens 84). In addition, a war with Uganda in 1978-79, 
widespread drought and floods across various regions of the country in 1976, 1980, 1983-




84, falling export values due to the collapse of world market prices, and the breakup of 
the East African community in 1977 further depleted its resources and the country’s 
optimism originating from its independence (Loxley 14; Stephens 102; Wobst 10; Ponte 
5). 
The meltdown from these policies and the internal and external events had left the 
government with little choice in what they had to eventually turn to in hopes of 
improving their situation. Being unable to achieve its goals of self-reliance and heavily in 
debt, Tanzania like many developing nations found itself in the hands of the World Bank 
and the IMF, now firmly in charge of the global developmental process.  
This was a dramatic paradigm shift for Tanzania. Having declared themselves 
socialist, they would now undergo a transformation that would deeply entrench them into 
the global world of capitalism. Although his hand was forced in many ways, Nyerere was 
not afraid to voice his displeasure, “…when did the IMF become the Ministry of 
Finance? When did nations agree to surrender to it their power of decision taking?” (qtd. 
in Loxley 15). These financial institutions claim that through policies of privatization, 
trade liberalization, deregulation, and devaluation of the dollar, economic gains directly 
tied to the developmental process would be achieved. Household income levels as well as 
the nation as a whole were to reap the rewards of these new economic policies. The 
forecast of these financial institutions, however, was inaccurate. And for countries like 
Tanzania, the implementation of these policies had disastrous consequences not only for 
its economy, but also its agricultural sector, smallholder cooperatives, and its ability to 
feed itself.  
 




Structural Adjustment to Present Day: 1982-onward  
 At first, Nyerere was able to hold off the SAPs and the Economic Recovery 
Programs that began in 1982. Unwilling to go along with the conditions proposed by the 
World Bank and IMF, Nyerere invoked his own version of SAPs in 1982-83 instead 
(Holm 95; Liberalized Development 11). To improve the economy,  
the ‘home grown’ SAP of 1982-83 combined an attempt to preserve the basic structure of 
the parastatal sector with increased agricultural producer prices, reductions in consumer 
subsidies and a limited devaluation. It was accompanied by a major attempt…to suppress 
informal trading activities. 
(Liberalized Development 11). 
 
The plan, however, did not work, and in 1985, Nyerere stepped down from office. 
Although his policies were often criticized, particularly by those outside of the country, 
his integrity and love for his people was never in doubt. Always concerned about the 
welfare of Tanzanians, his policies, however they materialized, were rooted in a strong 
ethical foundation that attempted to appropriately address the challenges facing his 
nation. Respectively referred to as Mwalimu, meaning teacher, he is still revered to today 
as one of the renowned fathers of not only Tanzania, but of a pan-African movement that 
tried to drive Africa away from Europe and into the hands’ of its own people (Pratt 137-
139). 
Under new President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, the country fully adopted the conditions 
laid out by the IFIs (Liberalized Development 12). The SAPs that Nyerere had so strongly 
fought against devaluated Tanzania’s currency by 40%, increased producer prices 
between 46-55%, liberalized domestic and international trade, allowed private ownership 
of the land and state enterprises, removed subsidies on foodstuffs and fertilizer, and, just 




as in years past, further encouraged agricultural exports in order to equalize the country’s 
balance of payments (Holm 96; Mung’ong’o and Loiske 162; Wobst 13).  
 Since these policies were driven to increase economic gains, cash crops remained 
at the top of the food chain, while attention to food crop production continued to be 
lackluster. Due to the devaluation of the Tanzanian currency, this further encouraged 
export production as cheaper prices on the world market were believed to create more 
demand (Holm 98). However, as this thesis will illustrate, this did not occur. Although 
the country had always placed emphasis on its export agricultural products, the fact that it 
never diversified them makes their collapse much more crippling.  
In 2014, Tanzania is currently the world’s second largest producer of sisal, a 
major cash crop grown in some of the most fertile regions of the country and was used 
traditionally for twines, ropes, bags, and carpets, but also used today as biofuel, 
composites, and pulp for paper due to its strong fibers (Compact Technologies). 
However, during the 1980s, sisal prices drastically fell as they were replaced by 
synthetics, causing a drop in demand (Osabu-Kle 163). Combine this with the SAPs 
instructed dollar devaluation, and Tanzanian sisal production began to deteriorate. From 
1961-71, the country produced over 200,000 tonnes of sisal every year except in one that 
fell just short of that mark. But with falling prices, only 60,000 tonnes were produced in 
1983, despite the fact it still occupied some of the most fertile land in Tanzania 
(Msambichaka 122). Today, the country produces just over half that amount, with plans 
to expand due to a rejuvenation in demand for its newly found usefulness (Compact 
Technologies).  




In an interview conducted with Mr. Faraji, a highly decorated figure in Tanzania 
as he is a former assistant to Nyerere, a former ambassador to France, a former Chairman 
of the National Bank, and now an advisor to the Coffee board, the issue of land reform 
was raised in order to discover why it had not occurred. While he agreed that it should 
have been done, there was never any initiative by the government to do so. According to 
him, sisal did not need to be grown on fertile lands where maize and other foodstuffs 
could have grown instead, benefitting the people of Tanzania on a whole as oppose to 
plantation owners that cultivated most of the nation’s sisal. Although he has since sold 
his 12,000 hectares of land to Chinese businessmen in 2002, he still expressed regret in 
not transferring the land over to foodstuffs himself.28 
To make matters worse, coffee, now the country’s largest agricultural export, also 
suffered from fluctuating prices as more countries became coffee producers, causing an 
increase in supply. As a result, in 1989 Tanzania lost about $45 million due to a 30% 
decrease in price (Geest and Kottering 75). The situation deteriorated further still, as 
primary commodity values continued to fall, for agricultural export earnings were 60% in 
the 1990s, but slid to 14.3% by 2007 (Ministry of Agriculture 9). Of its exports, 85% are 
agricultural based (Trading Economics). As these figures clearly illustrate, despite its 
decreasing value, Tanzania is still extremely dependent on its agricultural exports and is 
just another example of the folly of the market reliance philosophy that is championed by 
advocates of food security.  
                                                          
28 Interview with Mr. Faraji, former assistant to Nyerere, a former ambassador to France, and the 
former Chairman of the National Bank, July 19th 2013, Arusha, Tanzania.  




The coffee example above also illustrates what is known as the “commodity 
problem,” experienced by various developing countries who rely primarily on agricultural 
commodities for their economic wellbeing. Having so many countries produce goods 
such as coffee, tea, and cotton, Tanzania is trapped in a “race to the bottom” as they, 
along with many other developing countries, continue to produce products that are falling 
in price. Gillson, Wiggins, and Pandian describe this commodity problem as a 
combination of declining terms of trade and price volatility that cause producers to suffer 
from both low returns and high risks of production, resulting in a rapid decline in 
economic standing (6-7).  
According to Julie Dana and Christopher Gilbert, the reason why agricultural 
commodities are so volatile is because planting decisions are made before prices for the 
new crop are known and thus, production responsiveness is low for annual crop 
commodities. As such, the decision to produce a crop is made on expected prices, not 
realized ones. Short term demand may also be low for the raw materials because actual 
commodity prices are rarely a large component of the overall value of the final product, 
such as coffee beans in soluble coffee powder. Without the price protection that 
cooperatives provided farmers in the past, the peasantry has become more susceptible to 
price fluctuations, causing them to further retreat into subsistence, placing Tanzania’s 
food security in greater jeopardy. This dreadful scenario has only gotten worse since 
liberalization, particularly for African nations who at one time heavily controlled 
markets. Since the 1990s, liberalization has allowed for a more rapid and complete pass 
through of world prices that has increased the exposure of smallholders within the Global 
South, making them ever more susceptible to price variability (Dana and Gilbert 1-3).  




In an effort to further remove governments from controlling the market, subsidies 
were also discouraged altogether under SAPs on food crops and fertilizer (Holm 98; 
Wobst 17). Having subsidies completely eliminated in 1994, food production greatly 
decreased. In particular, maize and rice, now Tanzania’s two most produced food crops, 
suffered the greatest losses since the early 1990s, whereas gains after 1994 occurred due 
to land expansion (Isinika et al. 66). In the fertile Southern Highlands (Rukwa, Ruvuma, 
and Iringa), where most of the country’s maize is produced, output declined by 13-19% 
between 1987-89 and 1997-98 (Isinika et al. 56). With respect to rice, Tanzania as a 
whole experienced a decline in paddy from about 1.9 tonnes per hectare in 1990 to 1 
tonne per hectare in 2000 (Isinika et al. 61). Remote producers have also suffered greatly, 
as they became less likely to want to produce for the market without the added price 
protection that subsidies provided (Isinika et al. 54).  
Due to the fact that the lack of incentives and risk protection have caused a 
decrease in production, it can be observed that government can indeed play a valuable 
role in protecting the peasantry from the volatile market. While it did become too 
involved in cooperatives, as well as planning the economy during the 1970s under 
Ujamaa, the government’s support and allocation of monopolies to crop marketing 
cooperatives in the 1950-60s allowed them to control prices and smoothen price volatility 
throughout the year, which greatly decreased market fluctuations to the benefit of the 
country’s peasant producers. This illustrates that ideally, the government’s role in 
accordance to the agricultural sector should be providing price stability, while allowing 
the peasantry to organize and operate independently from state interference. Although the 
pre and post SAP eras overlap decades slightly, agricultural growth in the 1970s and 




1980s was 2.9% and 2.1% respectively, demonstrating that liberalization has had a more 
negative effect on food production than Tanzania’s socialist policies (Ministry of 
Agriculture 4). 
Cooperatives also suffered from this newly directed economic order. Under the 
neoliberal policies of structural adjustment, cooperatives, although being reinstated in 
1982 and fully re-established in 1984 were unable to regain the position of strength that 
they had during the post-abolishment era (Lyimo 87). Many, in fact, upon re-emerging 
went into receivership (Maghimbi 9). As Gibbon and Lyimo argue, the greatest reason for 
their struggles emanates from the fact that cooperatives now had to operate in a more 
liberalized market, and thus no longer had a monopoly on the purchase of crops, having 
to compete with crop merchants and middlemen for business, who were now well 
established and better prepared for liberalization (“Cooperative Marketing” 395-396; 
Lyimo 88, 90). Collecting produce from household units instead of cooperative centres in 
order to bypass individual businessmen also resulted in poor crop grading and poor prices 
given to farmers. Re-established cooperatives were also poorly staffed as they lacked 
training, education, and experience, further dampening their return, escalating issues of 
distrust and mismanagement within its membership.  
Due to privatization, the government was also no longer a trustee for cooperatives 
wishing to secure loans, thus funding became a problem and cooperatives could no longer 
provide credit or advances let alone timely payment to its members (Lyimo 90-91). In 
1960, cooperatives could meet 33.5% of funds needed to purchase members’ crops, but 
by 1996 they could only raise 0.7% of the required funds (Maghimbi 9). Finding 
themselves in a newly structured competitive market, cooperatives were also forced to 




sell to private traders and rented out facilities to them (Lyimo 91). While they failed to 
support cooperative societies effectively after liberalization, the government still 
remained heavily involved within cooperative societies, as they did not alter the previous 
legislation that would allow cooperatives to regain their autonomy. Furthermore, 
leadership of cooperatives was based on political alliances, not managerial skills, and 
thus cooperatives remained extensions of the ruling party (Banturaki 5). These issues 
caused membership to drastically decline. In 1976, there were around 550 members per 
cooperative, but as of 2001 there were only 107 per cooperative on average, while total 
membership dwindled to just over 55,000 nationwide by the year 2000 (Chambo 12; 
Lyimo 91).  
The literature documenting the re-instatement of the cooperative movement under 
neoliberal policies and how they effected cooperatives is further exemplified in the 
experience of the cotton cooperative in Shinyanga. For Joseph Mihangwa, the strength of 
cooperatives was based in their monopoly over crop prices. Having access to financial 
support when needed was also a necessary element of success. During our interview, the 
director of the Shinyanga Region Cooperative Union (SHIRECU), once a part of the 
successful VFCU established during the 1950s, explained to me how the cooperative 
movement began to fall.29  
This descent, he said, occurred around 1972. Once the government went into 
decentralization, declaring that each region needed a cooperatives union, it later replaced 
these with marketing boards in order to control them. As such, inefficiencies and 
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corruption soon polluted the cooperative movement causing it to slowly falter, as these 
administrators used their prominent positions for their own benefit, implementing a top-
down form of governance instead of allowing all cooperative members to democratically 
control their organizations. By 1976, cooperatives were disbanded by the government, 
seen as inefficient, corrupt, as well as a capitalist threat to the state’s socialist agenda. 
Then, despite being re-established by the government in 1984, trade liberalization and 
privatization prevented them from regaining their position of strength.  
For Mihangwa, cooperatives and businesses are operating in the same economic 
playing field, but have different goals that, in a neoliberal economic system, favour one 
over the other. Although cooperative societies operate like a business, their main goal is 
to redistribute its profits equally among its members and collect goods and services they 
need. But a business is directed solely by its bottom line, and thus mainly focuses on 
engineering profits and not equally distributing them with its members or employees. 
Thus, competition with private businesses, especially larger entities, is done on an unfair 
playing field. By 1993, the private sector controlled 50% of the market. Given that the 
banks became denationalized, access to credit became more difficult as agricultural 
cooperatives were seen as too risky and less efficient than their private counterparts, 
which in turn cost farmers dearly. In addition, the liberalized market also allowed for the 
dumping of cloths, crashing the price of cotton and in effect, killing Tanzania’s cotton 
industry and domestic market.  
Today, while at one time the SHIRECU cooperative ran a monopoly on the local 
cotton market, it now holds about 20% of the market share which is declining still. 
Membership within the cooperative is also falling, with many existing members 




searching for private buyers themselves in order to get a better price.30 Indeed, in 
describing what the chief obstacle was for cooperatives upon reinstatement, Tanzanian 
scholar Francis Lyimo states that, “the main constraint was the inability of cooperatives 
to operate under a liberalized economy. Within the free market economy, cooperatives 
were weak structurally and financially” (91).  
Liberalization has also had a negative effect on inflation. In the first few years of 
implementation, SAPs actually resulted in an increase in inflation, not a decrease that 
these policies were supposed to create. From 1986-89, the inflation rate rose to 30%, 
despite the currency being devalued five times at this juncture (Geest and Kottering 70). 
Today, the country still battles with inflation, which currently hovers around 12% 
(Ngowi).  
Conversely, in order to combat inflation, as well as a rise in food prices which 
attributes too it, the current Tanzanian government has imported food in order to stabilize 
the market. The supposed solution has received harsh criticism from some economists 
and both large and small-scale food producers in Tanzania, who argue that flooding the 
market with imports to lower prices will stiffen local economic growth as it harms 
domestic food producers who the government could have purchased from instead. This 
movement of foodstuffs through the global market also speaks to the growing influence 
that private businesses have within the international food system, presenting a new 
challenge for smallholder cooperatives and a serious stumbling block for their current 
rejuvenation process. 
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As this thesis discussed earlier, advocates of food security proclaim that 
agribusinesses are far more efficient producers of food compared to smallholder farmers. 
While proponents of food sovereignty argue that the expansion of industrialized 
agriculture threatens the very existence of the peasantry in Tanzania, food security 
supporters, although criticizing the peasantry for their primitive production methods and 
results, assert that when teamed up with agribusinesses, small-scale operators can obtain 
a gateway “into the market,” and an escape from poverty and hunger. Through the use of 
contract farming and out grower schemes, which have been on the rise within the Global 
South since they became an important part of the development discourse during the 
1980s, advocates of food security purport that smallholders can gain access to not only 
the market, but also advanced technologies, improved farming methods, and economies 
of scale (Collier 73; Little 4). Due to the fact that these large scale operations incorporate 
smallholder farmers, they can also be seen as a threat to replacing cooperatives as the 
most important agent of rural development in Tanzania.  
This is intriguing, for on the one hand the Tanzanian government supports 
commercialized agriculture through policies such as Kilimo Kwanza, which allocates 
funds to fuel the industrialization of its agricultural sector, but on the other hand the 
government is also beckoning for a robust return for the cooperative movement. Although 
various international organizations also champion the importance of cooperatives for the 
betterment of smallholder farmers, the current developmental discourse further 
encourages the state to relinquish its role within the developmental process, one that, 
through allotting cooperatives a monopoly on purchasing certain crops, was a chief 
reason for their success.  




For proponents of food sovereignty, initiatives that support the influx of 
agribusinesses are seen as counterproductive to obtaining food self-sufficiency, for these 
firms are mainly concerned about earning a profit by selling goods around the globe, and 
not securing the nutritional needs of the local populace. While food security proponents 
promote the partnership between smallholders and large agro-firms within out grower and 
contract farming schemes as a way to improve the lives of the peasantry and national 
food security, food sovereignty activists would argue that while those involved may 
benefit from being associated with commercialized farming operations, not all 
smallholder farmers would be included within this relationship.  
Instead, food sovereignty advocates would look to Cuba’s use of cooperatives, as 
well as the state’s role in supporting these organizations, as an alternative solution to food 
insecurity and an improved method that encompasses the peasantry within a nation’s 
fight to decrease rates of poverty and hunger within its borders. Cooperatives are also 
seen as better suited to meet the needs of smallholders compared to engulfing members of 
the peasantry within large-scale farming operations, as they are seen as a way of 
controlling the peasantry, just as large scale agricultural schemes and Ujamaa villages did 
so in the past. As such, the expansion of agribusinesses should be viewed as a serious risk 
to the peasantry as a whole, as well as pastoralists and hunter gatherers, for many are in 
danger of losing their autonomy, lands, and livelihoods, due to the expansion of industrial 








Chapter 5: The Growth of Agribusinesses and the Rejuvenation Process of 
Cooperatives in a Liberalized World 
 
In order to illustrate Tanzania’s current food situation, this chapter will explain the 
increasing role the market is playing in obtaining food security, the growth of 
agribusinesses within Tanzania’s agricultural sector, and the affects this has had on the 
rejuvenation process of smallholder cooperatives. In doing so, readers will understand 
how a deepening of liberal economic policies have allowed for a continuation in food 
price fluctuations and food insecurity, as well as presenting a major obstacle for 
cooperatives from re-establishing themselves as a crucial component of rural 
development. In addition, the current developmental discourse and the role of the state 
will also be analyzed, demonstrating that while the government claims it has made strong 
policy changes to allow for a robust return of the cooperative movement, in reality, its 
policies greatly favour the growth of industrialized agriculture, which counter any growth 
sustained by cooperative societies.  
 
Food Security through the Global Market 
 
In 2012, the Tanzanian government imported sugar and rice with plans to import 
another 50,000 metric tonnes of sugar and at least 60,000 tonnes of rice in 2013 
(Ndeketela).31 The rise in domestic food prices that have in part caused inflation rates to 
increase is said to be caused by a lack of production, often resulting from floods or 
droughts, examples of interior shocks to a weak food system. But for economist Honest 
Ngowi, the lack of food production is due to Tanzania’s predominately rain-fed 
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agricultural sector (Ngowi). Currently, less than 1% of the near 30 million hectares of 
land that can be irrigated undergoes this process. In addition, Tanzania today only 
cultivates around 11% of its 44 million hectares of arable farm land, resulting in the 
country’s inability to meet its agricultural potential (Wolter 14).  
As this thesis illustrated earlier, advocates of food security would argue that both 
the lack of irrigation and levels of cultivated land are due to the fact that Tanzania’s 
agricultural sector is dominated by smallholder farmers, who lack the capacity to develop 
such improvements or to garner advances in technology that would allow them to expand 
the size of their fields (Temu 25; Collier 71-72). Past policies have certainly failed to 
address these issues that do effect production levels and definitely highlight the lack of 
structural development within the agricultural sector. But these reasons are similar to 
what Holt-Gimenez and Patel describe as approximate causes to food insecurity, and thus 
do not entirely explain why food prices climb (10).  
According to Hardari Hainisi Msigwa, director of Young Masitus, an up and 
coming Tanzanian based agribusiness, often rice, as well as other grains are held from the 
market in order to maintain or create a better price for producers. Indeed, this is a 
common practice for businesses, who are described by Deputy Minister for Agriculture, 
Food Security and Cooperatives, Adam Malima as dishonest (Tanzania Daily News). 
What Malima fails to realize, however, is that a business’s number one priority is to turn 
a profit. Flooding the market with more supply would thus be bad business.32 
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As a consequence, the Tanzanian government has been forced to import rice to 
lower prices, because of the practice of private businesses who withhold grains in order to 
fill the supply void. According to reporter Dorithy Ndeketela, the move to import rice and 
other foods to quell inflation rates is an unpopular one, not only for agribusiness directors 
like Hardari, but for smallholder farmers as well. Despite food producer discontent, 
however, these policies are favourable to the country’s urban population, who according 
to Bates, benefit both urban worker and employer. For him, in order to prevent potential 
urban unrest, governments seek not to raise wages or suppress labour movements in fears 
of sparking a back lash, but instead attempt to reduce the cost of living, by keeping food 
prices artificially low. In this light, “agricultural policy thus becomes a by-product of 
political relations between governments and their urban constituents” (Bates 32-33).  
In the Ndeketela article, the author also alludes to the fact that the dumping of 
cheap rice from foreign countries has denied regions like Rukwa, located in Tanzania’s 
fertile South, to sell its surplus, a problem attributed to the country’s poor infrastructure 
(Ndeketela). But for Dr. Mattee, a professor at Sokoine University, the country’s 
agricultural institute, Tanzania itself has the ability and the existing infrastructure to 
supress some of the issues equating to food insecurity and skyrocketing food prices, that 
at the very least should be able to cut down on the amount of food imports. The country’s 
National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) can buy grains from surplus areas to transfer 
them either to the market to stabilize prices or to transport them to areas of food 
insecurity. Indeed, according to Deputy Minister Malima, regions like Rukwa are regular 
customers of the government run NFRA (Tanzanian Daily News). However, as Dr. 
Mattee stated in our interview, the NFRA must compete with private buyers, who can 




offer better prices, both at home and abroad.33 According to Malima, farmers with border 
access often sell their produce to those in neighbouring countries, where export purchases 
can be more than double the local price (Tanzanian Daily News). Again, this is par for 
the course in the business of food when the global market is allowed to dictate who gains 
access to this highly valuable commodity.  
This scenario also illustrates how the current development discourse would rather 
have countries achieve food security through the global market, rather than being self-
sufficient in food production. Indeed, for Tom Hobgood, the director of USAID’s Feed 
the Future program in Tanzania, the country’s practice of stocking its grain reserves 
higher than required is not cost efficient and unnecessarily discouraging the export of 
maize. The NFRA has the capacity to store 214,000 metric tonnes of grain, but only 
requires about 100,000 tonnes in order to cover shortfalls in production that occur, 
according to Hobgood, every 5 years. Anything above that mark could increase storage 
costs over $6 million which would lead to wasteful subsidies, and thus it would be far 
cheaper to import grain in the case of an emergency (Kasumuni). In other words, it is best 
to rely on the market in order to achieve Tanzania’s food security.  
 This mantra goes hand in hand with the neoliberal mindset. It is also eerily 
familiar to the misguided advice that the IMF provided Malawi in 2001 where the 
financial institution told the country to slash its strategic grain reserves from 165,000 
metric tonnes to at least 60,000 metric tonnes.34 The reasons for this were the same as in 
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the Tanzanian example; for cost efficiency and predicted good harvests in the future. A 
year later, famine broke out, while at the same time grain was being stockpiled by 
businesses speculating that famine would drive up the price of maize. While the two 
countries and scenarios are slightly different, the lessons they provide are the same; 
relying on the world market does not ensure food security. The IMF later admitted to its 
own mistake, stating that it had not given proper attention to poverty and social safety 
nets when advising these structural changes (Patel 150).  
 Perhaps this mindset has also led many, as Dr. Mattee mentioned earlier, as well 
as educated farmer and horticulturalist David Nyirenda, to suggest that there have been 
many inefficiencies with the NFRA since liberalization. Indeed, since the 1981 Berg 
Report issued by the World Bank, African governments have been encouraged by SAPs 
to remove themselves from interfering with the market, and thus grain reserves should be 
left to decay (Patel 151). As this thesis will discuss shortly, the state’s retreat from 
structuralist economic policies in favour of neoliberal market principles also casts doubts 
for a rejuvenated cooperative movement-which would require government support in the 
form of funding as well as being permitted to have a  monopoly over crop marketing in 
order to be successful. In the absence of an activist government, private industries have 
been able to manipulate the market for their benefit, making food insecurity the price 
countries must pay for their business decisions.    
 Coinciding with this, Mr. Nyirenda in our interview further stated that the system 
that used to disperse grains throughout the country no longer had enough support to 
function properly. He also argued that the logic of relying on exports was flawed, 
dangerous, and unreliable. For him, each country must be responsible for feeding its own 




people first, as well as buying from local producers, and not export markets.35 In the case 
of Tanzania, and in particular for those farmers who do not have border access, if their 
own government did not take up the responsibility to purchase their food production, who 
would?  
Indeed, this scenario depicting the action by the government to go onto the world 
market to purchase rice instead of supporting its own farmers carries the comments by the 
farmers of Nhobola to illustrate an insightful conclusion. In my interview with a group of 
farmers in an isolated village about thirty minutes outside of Shinyanga town, when 
asked where they market their produce, their reply was profound. One of the elders 
sniped, “What markets? There are none.”36 This comment further echoed the effects of 
the history of food aid and the dumping of Northern subsidized food imports, illustrated 
by Holt-Gimenez and Patel, mentioned previously (24-25). In addition, the example used 
in this chapter highlights the effects that the business of food and the neoliberal policies 
of trade and development have had on Tanzania’s food security, as well as the welfare of 
its smallholder farmers.  
With large scale agribusinesses gaining more of a hold on Tanzania’s agricultural 
sector, thanks to the current social, economic, and political climate within the country, the 
environment that agricultural cooperatives must operate in is far different from the one 
they excelled at during the 1950-60s. In addition, given their previous failures 
characterized by the government’s encroachment, corruption, and mismanagement that 
has created a sense of distrust with Tanzanian small farmers, the climb back to 
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prominence will indeed be a difficult one to achieve. The next section of this thesis will 
document the rejuvenation process of cooperatives that occurs within a free market, and 
alongside the emergence of agribusinesses.  
 
The Rejuvenation Process of Cooperatives and the Rise of Agribusiness in Tanzania 
 
 
At the turn of the millennium, the cooperative movement had still not gained any 
real momentum since officially being reinstituted by the government in 1984, nor have 
they recovered since liberalization policies came into full effect in the 1990s (Banturaki 
7). When cooperatives were reinstated, cooperative legislation stated that they were still 
under the patronage of the ruling political party. It was also compulsory for members to 
sell their produce to cooperatives regardless of the prices they received, potentially 
limiting their returns. This changed in 1991, as the Cooperatives Act made membership 
voluntary, meaning peasants were no longer obliged to sell their produce to cooperatives, 
following more in line with a Rochdale type of cooperative (Maghimbi 9). Membership 
continued to stagger, however, as cooperatives failed to provide price incentives as 
mounting debt continued to wreak havoc on the remaining cooperatives. By 2001, mostly 
attributed to government administrators who poorly managed cooperatives upon 
reinstatement, cooperative societies’ owed banks close to $11 million even after the 
government forgave over $27 million in loans over the last ten years (Banturaki 7; 
Maghimbi 9).  
 In an effort to rejuvenate cooperatives, the government appointed a Presidential 
Committee in 2000 to discover what was preventing the cooperative movement from 




taking off and too advise the government on what policies it must enact in order to re-
energize the movement (Maghimbi 10). The committee found that the main constraints 
for cooperatives was having to operate in a liberalized market, followed by poor 
management (CRMP 1). According to the committee’s report,  
Professional management is lacking and many cooperatives are engaging in activities that 
do not benefit their members. Some Primary Cooperative Societies operate as agents of 
private traders and rent out their facilities to the latter. In addition, Unions operate 
facilities that may not be financially viable such as under-utilized cotton ginneries, oil 
miles, transport facilities, and hotels. Increasing events of misappropriation of 
cooperative society’s resources by dishonest cooperative managers and management 
committee members is another bottleneck to cooperative development. [As is] lack of 
training… 
(CRMP 2).  
 
Despite these glaring weaknesses, the committee also reported that without cooperatives, 
smallholder farmers were without proper organized support, leaving them isolated from 
both markets and development (CRMP 2). In light of these findings, the committee 
recommended the Cooperatives Development Policy as well as a new Cooperatives Act 
which the government implemented in 2003 (Maghimbi 10).  
 For Mrs. Faraji, however, recent policy changes have done little in erasing many 
of the managerial and organizational problems that have plagued the movement for 
decades. In our interview, the coffee farmer and member of the Tanganyika Coffee 
Growers Association explained to me that cooperatives continue to fail to collect money 
from its members on time, preventing the timely delivery of valuable farming inputs such 
as fertilizer or seeds, which could improve production levels. In addition, according to 
Mrs. Faraji, those in managerial positions often administer from a distance, isolating 
themselves from farmers, thus giving cooperatives a top-down appearance as oppose to 




one that allows all members to have an equal say in how the organization is run.37 For 
Samy Munuo, a farmer of organic coffee, student, and tour guide from Materuni village 
located just outside of Moshi town, another issue facing cooperatives is their inability to 
provide members with good prices for their produce. As such, Munuo and others within 
his village will often sell Arabic coffee outside the local cooperative in order to obtain a 
better price.38  
Even for the historic KNCU, members often sell outside the cooperative in order 
to fetch a better price for their coffee, something that the liberalized market has helped 
create, as an increase in competition from firms emanating from within and outside 
Tanzania are able to offer higher prices for primary goods because of their volume, 
market penetration, and economies of scale. In fact, 32 primary cooperative societies 
have come together under the banner G32, in order to better facilitate the needs of KNCU 
members. Although the group has been in operation for ten years, it was legally 
recognized by the government in 2007, despite the KNCU’s protests that it runs parallel 
to its operations and is thus violating the Cooperatives Act (Simbeye). The issues that 
have allowed for these problems to persist within the various cooperative societies has yet 
to be addressed by any decree from the government.  
Included in the recent legislative reforms are also those that limit cooperative 
directors to three, three year terms, mandatory leadership training, and stipulations to 
allow staff the freedom to complain as well as improved audits and inspections used to 
cut down on corruption. There are also provisions that attempt to improve the education 
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of members on farming, members’ roles within a cooperative, as well as making it easier 
to register a cooperative. There are, however, no provisions that appear to address 
cooperatives’ weak presence in the open market. According to Maghimbi, many 
cooperative experts and leaders within cooperative societies believe that the recent 
legislation will not assist the movement, and are likely to further impede cooperative 
development within the country (10). Some also suggest that while the new government 
policy aims to assist cooperatives, its actual objective is to control them (Maghimbi 11). 
Although there were over 8500 cooperatives registered as of 2008, almost 80% are 
dormant, while only eight out of the 44 cooperative unions were active (Maghimbi 30). 
These policies have also failed to address the problems facing the TFC, the autonomous 
body that oversees all cooperative societies within the country, taking over from the 
Cooperative Union of Tanzania Ltd. (CUT or Washirika) in 1994 (Maghimbi 14).  
 According to its director, Agnes Nanushisa, the TFC’s role is to support 
cooperatives and represent smaller ones in order to ensure that their needs are being met. 
They train and educate farmers and cooperative members in order to improve farming 
methods and to run cooperatives more efficiently, as well as assist cooperative societies 
in finding markets for their produce and inform societies of how political policies may 
impact them. While they are economically stable as they possess many land holdings, 
their budget is quite low and they are severely understaffed, having only 18 workers, 
when at one time the TFC had 300. Ideally, she would like to have at least one 
representative in every regional zone. This has not been addressed in the Cooperatives 
Act of 2003.  




 In order to attempt to grow and re-establish trust in the movement throughout 
Tanzania, the TFC has used media outlets and publications in order to get positive stories 
and advertising out to farmers as well as conferences and demonstrations in hopes that 
they buy into the changes that have gone on within cooperative societies. The TFC has 
also been preaching to existing cooperatives to diversify their production in order to 
become more flexible under the liberalized market, something that had been neglected in 
the past. Still, despite some positives as well as what appears to be encouragement 
emanating from government circles to grow and improve the movement, according to 
Nanushisa, the cooperative segment within the department of Agriculture, Food Security, 
and Cooperatives is often ignored in favour of departments dealing more with food 
security and advanced agricultural technology, and as such the cooperative division of the 
department is heavily underfunded.  
Along with a lack of government funds, another obstacle that cooperatives will 
increasingly face is the growing presence of agribusinesses within the country. When 
asked if the TFC had a stance or policies that planned to address this issue, as well as the 
advancement of agro-fuels and biotechnology, Nanushisa stated that the organization was 
somewhat hesitant because the government had no official policy on these issues either.39 
While this is certainly true, if one observes the rhetoric stemming from the current 
administration in the press as well as understanding which direction policies that favour 
the modernization of the agricultural sector plan to take the country, such as Kilimo 
Kwanza, Tanzania’s expansion into the world of industrialized agricultural is already 
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underway (“Kilimo Kwanza” 5). In this light, the TFC should take more of a position on 
such an issue and educate farmers on the potential effects that GMOs will have on 
farming, as well as the ongoing land grabs that are occurring in the country. Perhaps 
because of their close proximity within government circles, they wish to avoid a potential 
conflict. Johnston Birchall and Richard Simmons also question the direction and 
influence the TFC has, describing it as a “hanging structure” because only tobacco 
remains as an associated apex body, while the cotton, cereals, and coffee members have 
since collapsed. These authors call for a restructuring of the TFC, but argue this is also 
unlikely, for the government would be unwilling to turn the organization into a structure 
that could be better suited for meeting the needs of primary cooperative societies, perhaps 
because of funding issues, which Nanushia alluded to in our interview earlier (Birchall 
and Simmons 493).  
Instead of updating the cooperative sector, the Tanzanian government appears 
more focused on supporting the growth of agribusinesses. For President Kikwete, if no 
major adverse side effects can be found by the country’s scientists, then he sees is no 
reason for continuing the current ban on GMOs. In his statement made to the African 
Green Revolution Forum on September 2012 in Arusha, along with an increase in 
investment on the research and development of seed technologies, Kikwete also called for 
a mechanization of agriculture and more use of fertilizers, pesticides, and insecticides to 
ensure increased agricultural production in the face of climate change, as well as an 
influx of private sector contributions in hopes of adding more large scale farms and 
encouragement of agro entrepreneurs (Kikwete). In addition, he praised the recent 
partnership the country has undertaken with AGRA, which is also in association with the 




Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which has provided funding for research and 
development on GE crops, as they encourage their usage throughout the continent 
(Kikwete; “Out of AGRA” 468). The current Minister of Agriculture, Food Security, and 
Cooperatives echoed this motion, adding that without implementing the improvements 
that these biotechnologies create, the country’s agricultural sector would continue to 
decline (Majaliwa).   
This encouragement is also witnessed in a variety of multimedia platforms dating 
back to the early 2000s. Many headlines are filled with statements such as,   
‘Tanzania cannot afford to be left behind in technologies that increase crop yields, reduce 
farm costs and increase farm profits.’ ‘Tanzania jumps on the GM bandwagon,’ or ‘GM 
crop gets green light in Tanzania,’ or ‘Tanzania ready to accept GMO technology,’ 
(qtd. in Mugwagwa and Rutivi 104). 
 
Headlines like these clearly indicate which direction the leaders of the country would like 
to take the nation’s agricultural sector. This government initiative is also witnessed in its 
Kilimo Kwanza policies which are geared towards further encouraging the 
industrialization of Tanzanian agriculture. 
Kilimo Kwanza has eliminated the value added tax (VAT) that it places on intra-
transport for agricultural products such as sugarcane, sisal, and tea from the farm to the 
industry for processing (Policy Forum 1). All of these are generally cash crops or 
cultivated mostly by large scale farmers. Horticultural farming (cut flowers), a growing 
agricultural export sector, and production for animal feed also receive similar tax breaks. 
The policy also calls for a duty exemption on the importation of tractors for farms larger 
than 1.2 hectares, disqualifying many smallholders while favouring large ones (Policy 
Forum 2).  




The goal of Kilimo Kwanza is to modernize the country’s agricultural sector and in 
effect, to jumpstart Tanzania’s Green Revolution. However, critics argue that 
smallholders, who make up the bulk of the agricultural sector, are ignored within the 
framework of this strategy that instead favours large scale farms, many of whom are 
foreign owned and operated. According to reporter Edward Qorro of The Citizen,  
Kilimo Kwanza will never materialise if the peasants, who are the main players, are not 
fully empowered…farmers would not understand this slogan which they come across on 
banners and other adverts because they were not fully involved in the first place…the 
private sector through the Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC) developed 
Kilimo Kwanza in order to seek financial commitments from government and donors, 
ostensibly to address lack of transformation of the sector.  
(Qorro).  
 
If farmers were truly to come first, then this new agricultural policy would be geared 
towards smallholders, who are the majority. If food security was a top priority, perhaps 
subsidies would go towards paying local farmers to stock the country’s grain reserves as 
oppose to providing tax breaks for large scale mechanization.40 However, just as policies 
of the past ignored the needs of the peasantry, so too does Tanzania’s most recent one as 
large scale agro-businesses pose a serious threat to the welfare of smallholder farmers. 
Coinciding with the proposed expansion of industrialized agriculture are also 
developments of biofuels and the aforementioned GMOs. 
Perhaps the worst case to date involving the expansion of biofuels that also 
demonstrates the disastrous effects of agribusiness growth on smallholder farmers 
involves AgriSol Energy LLC, an American based firm working with a few Tanzanian 
businesses and investment groups, as well as Iowa State University. Their plan is to 
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large scale farming operations, but cringe at the idea of financially supporting a nation’s grain 
reserves.  




develop an agricultural project cultivating over 325,000 hectares in the Kigoma region, 
which lies on the shores of Lake Tanganyika (The Oakland Institute 2). According to 
AgriSol’s own website, the project itself is to assist in the transfer of agricultural 
knowledge and technology to existing smallholder farmers, creating new markets, 
prosperity, and food security in Tanzania. Through state-of-the-art, large scale farming 
practices, and modernized seeds and inputs, AgriSol plans to grow maize and soybeans 
for Tanzanians, to be stored and used to produce added value products like animal feed, 
cooking oil, and protein-rich meats, first with poultry and later beef, eventually to be 
exported to neighbouring countries (AgriSol). 
According to The Oakland Institute, a policy think tank that focuses on 
encouraging public participation and fair debate on critical social, economic, and 
environmental issues, the commercial agricultural development project in Kigoma is also 
looking to expand its operations into biofuel production, with the entire procedure 
potentially displacing more than 160,000 refugees from neighbouring Burundi who have 
called the area home for close to 40 years (The Oakland Institute 2). The project itself is a 
part of Kilimo Kwanza’s plans of modernizing Tanzanian agriculture and was enticed by 
the government who offered the refugees full citizenship rights and $200, only after they 
agreed to dismantle their homes and depart from the land they now called home (The 
Oakland Institute 2). Plans for their removal occur despite the fact that these farmers are 
highly productive, producing over 40% of the district’s food, while only occupying 4% of 
the land (Rather 10). 
 These developments of what Marx called “primitive accumulation” pose serious 
challenges to the health and welfare of the peasantry in Tanzania. Despite the increasing 




risks, the government seems ill prepared, as awareness of these activities persist without 
proper legislation to regulate these initiatives – which even Paul Collier warned would 
negatively impact the peasantry (Sulle and Nelson 30; Collier 73). In 2006, the 
government established a National Biofuels Task Force (NBTF) in an effort to promote 
the development of a biofuel policy in the country, which completed its draft in 2008. It 
has yet, however, to be formally adopted (Sulle and Nelson 32). Ultimately, the 
Tanzanian government will need to create a land tenure policy that clearly outlines its 
policies on land ownership in conjunction with biofuel production. 
 Land tenure in Tanzania is currently categorized under the country’s Land and 
Villages Acts of 2001. Under these Acts, land is classified as either reserve, village, or 
general. Reserve lands are conservation areas, national parks, and game reserves while 
village lands are defined under the Village Act as customary lands managed by village 
councils, whose borders are defined by local governments, of which legislation dates 
back to the 1970-80s. General land is any land which is neither reserved nor village, but 
confusingly can include village lands that are deemed unoccupied or unused (Sulle and 
Nelson 38). This lack of clarity, as well as the role in which the President can play in this 
categorization process has led to some controversy.  
 Under decree of the President, who is the trustee of all lands owned by 
Tanzanians, village lands can be transferred into general or reserved lands if deemed in 
the “public interest,” which can include “investments of national interests” (Sulle and 
Nelson 37; Mousseau and Mittal 10). While terms of ownership may vary, the President 
has the authority to offer land deeds for 33, 66, or 99 years, which can be renewed 
(Maghimbi, Lokina, and Senga 50). Once villagers are compensated, foreigners are then 




able to purchase the newly declared general lands. The classification of general lands, 
however, does not cover usage, and thus the occasional use of these areas by pastoralists 
or surrounding communities who depend on grazing and forest areas for their livelihoods 
can go ignored or unnoticed (Sulle and Nelson 38). It is this grey area that has also been 
the primary focus of land acquisitions and a prime example of the glaring weaknesses 
within the country’s Land Tenure laws (Sulle and Nelson 46). The Land Act itself tries to 
administer land to make available for private ownership and foreign investment, while the 
Tanzanian Investment Centre (TIC) is responsible for declaring which land falls into 
which category. Described as a “land bank” or a “one-stop shop” for land acquisitions, 
foreign investors must go through the TIC to obtain land (Mousseau and Mittal 10; Sulle 
and Nelson 38-39). Thus, while customary lands are seen as equal to lands that are 
granted and titled under the law, it appears that the state, just as the government did under 
colonial rule, can still intervene to confiscate lands in favour of promising business 
ventures that are supposedly in the nation’s best economic interests.   
One such example involves 11 villages in Kisarawe, located Southwest of Dar es 
Saleem, that sold over 8,000 hectares of land to British owned Sun Biofuels for biofuel 
production in 2009. Villagers agreed to the sale when the company promised to give 
compensation and provide over 1000 jobs that would be associated with the cultivation of 
crops, mainly jatropha, for biofuel production. In order to complete the deal, the 
government, in the nation’s “public interest,” converted village land to general land, 
leaving it in control of the government, leased out to the company for a period of 99 
years, so it could begin to produce biodiesel for European markets (Wise). 




The business venture, however, was a complete bust, largely because the 
company, like many others before it, believed in the myth of jatropha. Considered a 
miracle biofuel crop because it is inedible, it can potentially be produced without taking 
away from the food supply, while also being able to grow in semi-arid conditions where 
most plants cannot survive. Many companies and countries throughout sub-Saharan 
Africa have also jumped at this potential revenue stream. However, although it can grow 
in semi-arid conditions, it still requires water and nutritious soils to flourish, which means 
it does, in fact, compete with other food crops for these resources. By 2007-2008, most 
companies who had jumped on the bandwagon were off soon after, as it did not produce 
high enough yields (Charles; “Jatropha” 28-29, 35-36, 39-40). Sun Biofuels, however, 
continued to believe in this myth, and in 2014, the villagers are still left with 5,000 
unusable jatropha trees, who are guarded by security to keep them off the land they used 
to own (Wise).   
Worse still, most of the land acquired in the deal was a forested area, the 
villagers’ primary source of food and income, which was removed to pave the way for 
biofuel production that ultimately did not produce the desired returns. Too add, the 
company has recently transferred its lease not to the villagers, but to another company, 
Mtanga, who has “overlapping shareholders” with Sun Biofuels. While villagers are still 
demanding they receive compensation, Mtanga objects, stating that they are not obligated 
to keep Sun Biofuels’ commitment. The current land owner plans to maintain the jatrohpa 
trees while adding 1,200 head of cattle, and is partnered with the SAGCOT project 
(Wise).  




 While biofuel production is only beginning in Tanzania, it is not the only 
controversial issue surrounding the country’s agricultural sector that is an extension of 
agribusiness. GMOs, as mentioned earlier, are being encouraged by the current 
administration to be adopted in order to increase yields for both large and small scale 
farmer alike. But like biofuel production, adoption of this element of modernized 
agriculture must be closely analyzed in order to fully uncover if it really benefits 
smallholders as well as having a positive impact on Tanzania’s food security.  
 According to scientist Dr. Fred Tairo, Tanzania is currently testing two GM crops, 
water efficient maize and GM cassava.41 WEMA (Water Efficient Maize for Africa) is in 
the field trials stage while cassava is still undergoing tests in the lab at the Agricultural 
Research Institute in Dar es Salaam to see if scientists can create cassava varieties that are 
resistant to both brown streak and mosaic diseases. The two diseases are said to be 
responsible for wiping out up to 80% of farmer’s yields in some areas, and is spreading 
with great speed across sub-Saharan Africa (Faul). After touring the year old lab, 
decorated with pictures of Bill and Melinda Gates to witness what is truly a fascinating 
scientific operation, Dr. Tairo, who is an assistant to Dr. Ndunguru who heads the 
operation that focuses on GE cassava, explained to me in our interview the process of 
creating GM crops. According to Dr. Tairo, a genetically modified organism is one that is 
                                                          
41 The project known as WEMA is conducted in cooperation with Monsanto, and is funded by the 
Bill and Melinda Gates and Warren Buffet Foundations. The field trials are currently being 
conducted in Dodoma, Tanzania (AATF). According to Joseph Mihangwa, director of SHIRECU, in 
our interview he mentioned that Bt cotton has also found its way into Tanzania and has not done 
well in some regions. The seeds as well as necessary inputs for smallholders have also been too 
expensive, and peasants are resisting the technology. While this cannot be confirmed, reports 
indicate that the country is looking to produce Bt Cotton by 2020 (Interview with Joseph 
Mihangwa, Director of SHIRECU, July 31st 2013, Shinyanga, Tanzania; “GM Cotton”). 




infused with a single gene (it can be more but this complicates things) from another 
variety within that species, typically a plant or in this case, the virus itself, in hopes that 
this will give the genetically altered variety a desired trait such as requiring less water to 
germinate or to create a variety immune to a specific disease or chemical. The full 
process from beginning trials to commercial availability can take anywhere from 7-10 
years.  
 Although our interview was mostly based on the science behind the 
biotechnology, I also asked if alternative methods were being used to counter the spread 
of these diseases in order to discover, as Shiva and other food sovereignty advocates 
argue, that biodiversity is the planet’s greatest asset in fighting against disease, hunger, 
and climatic change. According to Dr. Tairo there are, in fact, multiple traditional 
varieties of cassava that are proving to be resistant to the two viruses effecting the crop, 
such as improved varieties known as kiroba which are fairly resistant to brown streak 
while many varieties have been found to be resistant to the mosaic virus. Other varieties 
have also proven to be successful in halting the spread of the diseases, as well as methods 
such as improved field hygiene which have been successful in quelling the viruses in 
parts of Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Malawi, and Mozambique (Omongo 10-12). The 
method of breeding improved traditional varieties also take less time to create than 
developing a genetically modified version. According to Dr. Tairo, around 3-5 years are 
needed to create a naturally improved variety which would also require undoubtedly less 




resources to support. In closing, Dr. Tairo stressed that GM crops were not the cure to 
hunger, but are meant to complement other foods in the fight for global food security.42 
 Acknowledging the fact that natural varieties of cassava that are proven to be 
resistant to the brown streak and mosaic diseases exist should be explored further and 
should also eliminate the need to create an expensive and time consuming GE cassava 
that does the same as a naturally created improved variety. However, the country as well 
as others within sub-Saharan Africa continue to try and develop this biotechnology that is 
arguably wasting valuable resources that are needed elsewhere.  
But just as big business controls the food market, so too does big money control 
the developmental discourse. Large amounts of money that are funding the development 
of the biotechnology, seen as the backbone to Africa’s Green Revolution, are emanating 
particularly from organizations run by wealthy philanthropists such as the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Warren Buffet 
foundation. All of whom wish to alleviate the world of hunger and poverty, but also align 
themselves within AGRA and various multinational corporations like Monsanto and 
Syngenta, that some argue have helped create more hunger and hardship in the first place. 
The complaint proponents of food sovereignty have is that this biotechnology, which was 
originally stolen from smallholder farmers, is inaccessible to them and thus paves the 
way for their demise (Stolen Harvest 7-9; ETC Group 13; Patel, Holt-Gimenez, and 
Shattuck 17).  
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If Tanzanian scientists are successful and WEMA and Bt cassava are released 
commercially, it is highly unlikely that peasants will be able to afford this technology let 
alone the inputs necessary to facilitate its growth. This technology, according to Joel 
Kalagho of the Swiss Development Agency, is completely out of reach for smallholder 
farmers, unless of course they are supported by wealthy investors who assist them in 
adopting the technology. More likely, however, large scale commercialized farmers and 
projects like AgriSol as well as the SAGCOT will benefit most from these technologies 
that are in line with and the main beneficiaries of Kilimo Kwanza. As Kalagho told me in 
a meeting he attended just a few days prior to our interview, the head of SAGCOT was 
extremely excited about the use of this biotechnology, praising their proposed high 
yields.43  
While the government supports the advancement of modernized agriculture 
through its Kilimo Kwanza policies, from AgriSol to SAGCOT, to biofuels to the use of 
GMOs, it counters the very rejuvenation process of cooperatives that it also claims to 
support and strengthen through its Cooperatives Act of 2003. The emergence of 
industrialized agriculture, which foresees agriculture as occupying primarily an economic 
function, runs in direct opposition to the socially organized cooperative societies that 
offer an alternative form of development that differs from ones headed by big business 
and big government (Dogarawa 2). While the government maintains it recognizes the 
need to include smallholder farmers in the development of its agricultural sector, it 
appears that large scale agricultural projects, and not cooperatives, have been given the 
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opportunity of leading the agricultural “Green” Revolution. This current trend speaks to 
the privatization of the developmental process that seeks to end both poverty and food 
insecurity through an economic approach, led by big business, wealthy philanthropists, 
and the free market, and not by a state whose previous market interference practices were 
deemed by neoliberals as inefficient.  
Within this framework, SAGCOT, a government affiliated project under Kilimo 
Kwanza, is spearheaded by a “who’s who” of corporate agro giants such as Monsanto, 
DuPont, Syngenta, Yara International, Bayer Crop Science, and Unilever as well as 
organizations such as USAID, AGRA, and the World Bank, whose goal is to develop 
Tanzania’s fertile Southern corridor (Africa Practice and ESEA).44 The project aims to 
develop its 300,000 km2 of land into clusters, combining large and small scale farming 
methods in order to reach the land’s agricultural potential (“Land Draft” 7). Although 
SAGCOT is in its infancy stages of development, to what extent the role smallholder 
farmers will play in this arrangement is highly contested.  
In its own land development draft, SAGCOT acknowledges the historic failures 
the country has witnessed from large scale farming schemes, particularly the groundnut 
scheme highlighted earlier in this thesis, but claims that small scale agriculture has also 
failed despite being heavily funded. It also sites Kilimo Kwanza’s initiatives in 
encouraging large scale expansion of agriculture, and that it will take, “…particular care 
to respect the rights and interests of smallholders as well as the environment and wise 
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companies in the world in terms of percentage of market share and profits generated from seed 
sales. Bayer is also the world’s largest pesticide company while Yara is the second largest fertilizer 
company. Unilever is today the fifth largest food and beverage firm in the world (ETC Group 11, 
15, 17, 21). 




management of natural resources” (“Land Draft” 7). As this thesis has shown, however, 
throughout its history, Tanzania has not supported its peasantry financially but instead 
has taken the profits it has produced and transferred it to other sectors. Furthermore, as 
the research paper composed by IAASTD has shown, industrialized agriculture is 
anything but environmentally friendly, whose expansion is often found to be at the 
detriment of smallholder farmers (Ludwig).  
Dr. Gabagambi of Sokoine University, is also highly skeptical of SAGCOT’s 
claims. In our interview that occurred, fittingly during the Nane Nane celebrations in 
Morogoro, a weeklong festival promoting and showcasing the advances of Tanzanian 
agriculture, Dr. Gabagambi explained the role of smallholders within this so called 
partnership. According to him, smallholder farmers would participate through an out 
grower program or as contract farmers, as they are to sell their crops to larger farm 
operations, who provide them with an accessible market. But for the professor of 
agricultural economics, there is no incentive for large scale farmers to purchase goods 
from smaller ones if they themselves already cultivate thousands of hectares of land. For 
him, in this petty relationship, smallholder farmers appear to be mere labourers, who are 
more likely to be bought out over time.45  
Those advocating for a food security based approach to Tanzania’s food 
insecurity argue that these out grower schemes will provide small farmers with new 
crops, farming techniques, and increased incomes as they are provided with a readily 
accessible market. Indeed, the World Bank itself calls out grower schemes and contract 
                                                          
45 Interview with Dr. Gabagambi professor of Agricultural Economics at Sokoine University, August 
8th 2013, Morogoro, Tanzania.  




farming as a way to link agriculture to the market, and a way out of misery for 
smallholder farmers (Oya 1). But food sovereignty proponents counter this statement 
claiming that these projects negatively affect food security, nutrition, income distribution, 
the environment, and the welfare of labourers and women (Senanayake 1). Indeed, 
according to researcher S.M.P. Senanayake, multiple studies on the subject around the 
world have only revealed a few cases where out grower schemes achieved growth 
without sacrificing their equality objectives (Senanayake 2). Being linked to the 
development of agribusinesses, in general these initiatives have also been found to 
produce mostly cash crops for export rather than foodstuffs, placing food security in 
further jeopardy in various developing countries (Senanayake 17).  
Out grower schemes themselves gained popularity in Mexico during the 1980s as 
a part of the reform process and Western led development strategy under structural 
adjustment. These programs, similar in appearance to those occurring in Tanzania, 
teamed foreign based agribusinesses with local peasants that helped the country account 
for 25% of the United States’ fruit and vegetable imports, effectively turning Mexico into 
America’s salad bowl by the early 1990s (Little 4). At the same time, however, food 
availability in Mexico stagnated after decades of growth, while foodstuffs continued to 
leave it borders (Sharma and Gulati 3).  
For advocates of food sovereignty in Tanzania, the fear is that out grower 
schemes will have the same effect as they have had in Mexico and elsewhere. Indeed, if 
one observes not only the large corporations that are participating in SAGCOT and what 
they practice, but also the intellectual literature this operation is based on, one can 
conclude that smallholder farmers and food security are likely to be ignored from this 




developmental project. In their land development draft, SAGCOT states, “…there is 
much debate on the comparative advantages of small scale and large scale farming.” 
They then ask readers to observe the various viewpoints by citing examples of works by 
Binswanger-Mkhize, Vermeulen and Cotula, and Collier, all of whom are proponents of 
large scale farming operations that at the very least assimilate smallholder farmers into 
the capitalist mode of agricultural production (“Land Draft” 7).46 Furthermore, Andrew 
Temu, who this thesis mentioned earlier for blaming smallholder farmers for their lack of 
production due to their small scale operations is, in fact, a SAGCOT board member and 
as such one can assume that he also has a bias against smallholder farmers (Africa 
Practice and ESEA). Again, this project is in its early stages of development, and thus 
how this will effect smallholder farmers exactly remains to be seen. However, as the 
history of those involved and other large scale agricultural expansions projects occurring 
throughout the Global South have shown, smallholder farmers may be facing a period of 




                                                          
46 While Collier’s views on smallholder farmers have already been discussed, Binswanger-Mkhize 
believes the peasantry should be a part of a solution to food insecurity by being transformed into 
commercialized farmers. He also encourages a relationship with the private sector and an 
increased use and research of biotechnology. While he admits that there are risks involved with 
large scale agricultural expansion, the government can mitigate these dangers by providing 
favourable macroeconomic policies, adequate infrastructure, a strong human capital base, 
reasonably competent government administration, and political stability, similar to how 
governments in Brazil and Thailand have operated (Binswanger-Mkhize, et al. 7, 9, 13, 16-17). In a 
similar fashion, Vermeulen and Cotula, while highlight the alternative to ‘land grabs,’ encourage 
smallholder farmers to be included into relationships with larger agricultural firms in contract 
farming schemes, joint ventures, management contracts, and new supply chain relationships that 
bring in both small and large scale farming networks together (Vermeulen and Cotula 3).  




Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Given the current status of the cooperative movement, cooperative societies also 
face a future filled with many obstacles and uncertainties both old and new. The most 
recent challenge to the movement is the emergence of agribusinesses, who alongside 
cooperatives are being cited by the Tanzanian government and international development 
agencies as a way of supporting smallholder farmers in their fight against poverty and 
hunger, which would ultimately assist the nation in solving its issues of food insecurity. 
As this thesis has illustrated, however, one proposed solution comes in direct conflict 
with the other. The growth of agribusinesses, who are backed by far greater financial and 
political support, are seen as an overshadowing force that will eclipse the rejuvenation of 
cooperatives, which in comparison are seen as being supported by the government largely 
in rhetoric alone.  
The two proposed solutions to Tanzania’s food insecurity are not only on 
opposing sides in practice, but in theory as well, for industrialized agriculture can be seen 
as a primarily economic, market based solution to food security, while cooperatives, 
created mainly to benefit its members, are more of a social organization that offer to 
empower Tanzania’s peasants, rather than overpower them. While cooperatives do not 
play a large role within the literature surrounding food sovereignty, in Tanzania they have 
a history of supporting the peasantry, enabling them to surpass the barriers that impede 
their development. Since they have played such an important role in assisting smallholder 
farmers, an integral part of food sovereignty, cooperatives must be included in this 
instance within food sovereignty circles, particularly because they can be seen as an 




alternative to industrialized agriculture, which jeopardizes the socio-economic and 
cultural existence of the peasantry.  
While proponents of food security deny this, claiming that peasants will be 
included in commercialized farming operations through contract farming and out grower 
schemes, this thesis has shown otherwise. By illustrating other examples within the 
Global South as well as in the early developments of industrialized agriculture in 
Tanzania, smallholders outside these schemes are threatened by their expansion. Their 
participation within these schemes is also limited, both in the number of smallholder 
farmers that are included in these operations, as well as in what role they are likely to 
play, having their fate ultimately decided by their larger and more powerful business 
partner. As a result, with agribusinesses gaining a greater hold on Tanzanian agriculture, 
despite making up the majority of the population, the peasantry appears to be 
marginalized from the country’s current path towards development.   
While cooperatives do offer an alternative solution to developmental hurdles 
surrounding the country’s rural population, given the current policy environment in 
which cooperatives must operate, this thesis argues that the cooperative movement is, at 
this time, largely dormant. While there may be some positives, overall the movement is 
stifling, hindered by a lack of government support, financial troubles that have existed 
since being reinstated in 1984, and because they have to compete in a liberal market 
alongside well-established agribusinesses. While it is believed that a comeback is still 
possible, the policy environment must change to allow cooperatives to enjoy the same 
advantages as it did in the past, in particular its monopoly status on purchasing crops and 
to receive financial backing from the state, in order to be viable once more. Cooperatives 




themselves must also maintain the principles outlined by the ICA in order to clamp down 
on corrupt administrators who in the past, ran cooperatives for their own benefit, and not 
for its members. Providing members with powers of removing managers who abuse their 
power is vital to any cooperative comeback. As mentioned earlier, according to Hamer, 
individualism and petty corruption are commonly cited as a social weakness within 
cooperatives, which he argues has been present since the introduction of the cash 
economy (122). In an effort to clamp down on such incidences, Hamer suggests weekly 
or bi-weekly meetings, with members actively participating in decision making in order 
to curb power from administrators and return to the “grass-roots” objectives that many of 
these organizations were formulated upon, having been born out of discontent (113, 121, 
127). The state must also, as Coulson argues, assist when necessary, but ultimately 
maintain somewhat of a distance from cooperatives and the peasantry, and forgo the 
belief that bureaucrats alone hold the key to agricultural development (“Agricultural 
Policies” 96).  
Until cooperatives are provided with an environment they can thrive in, judging 
by the current direction of the country’s agricultural policies as well as the existing 
economic climate within the country, agribusinesses and not cooperatives will have a 
greater impact on smallholder farmers. If the rhetoric of these agribusinesses does, in 
fact, ring true, then the peasantry could become engulfed in the agro-industrial complex, 
and the industrialization of the peasantry will have taken place. Some, particularly those 
in the government, as well as international organizations and academics may welcome 
this modernization of the country’s agricultural sector, believing that development and 




food security has finally taken root, even in the most isolated and impoverished rural 
areas of Tanzania.  
But what is more likely to occur is that hundreds of thousands of peasants will 
lose their lands to the massive agricultural expansionist projects, with more looming on 
the horizon. What reaction from the peasantry this will invoke exactly remains to be seen. 
However, if one can observe the riots that occurred in May 2013, in Mtwara, perhaps a 
glimpse into the future can come to light. In Mtwara, hundreds of locals took to the 
streets in protest over the government’s decision to build a pipeline that would bring oil 
to Dar es Salaam, to be used to power the commercial capital, instead of developing the 
area where the resource had been found. In clashes with polices, a handful of protesters 
were killed while a few buildings and homes were vandalized and burned. Civil unrest 
has been growing in other parts of the country as well, as a younger, more educated 
populace slowly emerges, hungry for change (Guardian Correspondent).  
Bringing this example to agriculture, the reason for contention here is not oil, but 
soil, or more appropriately, the land that is and has been cultivated by smallholder 
farmers for millennia. As more and more peasants begin to lose their land, violence is a 
potential rebuttal. Indeed, in October 2013, pastoralists in the Morogoro region who have 
lived in the area for decades threatened to take up arms against the government if they did 
not return their livestock after sweeping them off their lands (Balaigwa). These violent 
threats may also increase further given the fact that there is an ever widening gap between 
the rich and the poor, rated the second largest in East Africa behind only Burundi, while 
food insecurity remains at dangerously high levels, as the process of deagrarianization 
continues. For Deborah Bryceson, unlike in the West, urban employment opportunities 




are not as abundant in the Global South, leading to a swelling of urban slums, caused 
either by rural dwellers hoping to discover greater fortunes in the city, or because 
peasants have been forcefully removed from their lands by the expansion of modernized 
agriculture, possibility adding to the discontent in these regions, posing a potential socio-
economic disaster in the future (David; Swenya, Kabisama, and Kipobota 178; 
“Deagrarianization” 102). Currently, according to a World Bank report, poverty levels, 
while showing a slight decline recently, remain the same as they did in 2000-01. Around 
12 million people, close to 27% of the population are living below the poverty line, while 
4.2 million people, or close to 9% of Tanzanians, live in extreme poverty with barely 
enough food to survive.47 Many people, particularly those in rural areas, have also not 
benefitted from any recent economic growth that has occurred in the country, as this has 
largely been driven by non-labour intensive sectors in urban areas, such as the tourism 
and service industries (“Economic Update” viii, 20).  
In addition to the continuing high rates of poverty and hunger, as well as the 
potential removal of rural inhabitants from their lands due to the expansionist practices of 
industrialized agriculture, there is also the likelihood that more food and wealth will leave 
the country, at the hands of agribusinesses and the market that advocates of food security 
champion. In both platforms of SAGCOT and AgriSol, two of the country’s largest 
commercial agricultural projects, cash crop production was seen as a staple for their 
respective schemes (Africa Practice and ESEA; AgriSol). Ramping up agricultural 
exports is also highlighted in the government’s policies of Kilimo Kwanza, as well as 
                                                          
47 The poverty line in Tanzania is the equivalent to $22.4 per month while the extreme poverty line 
is equivalent to $16.1 per month and per adult (“Economic Update” 20, 60). 




within its own National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, referred to in 
KiSwahili as MKUKUTA. According to the report,  
…the [agricultural] sector has been identified as a growth driver. The diverse climatic 
zones provide potential for many crops, livestock and forestry products, as well as 
sufficient water for irrigation and livestock, and large size of arable land. Thus, given its 
role in supporting the rural poor and in reducing malnutrition, agriculture has the 
potential of lifting many of the poor out of poverty. Moreover, increased food demand in 
neighbouring countries provides further opportunities for agriculture to expand and 
increase exports to these countries 
(Ministry of Finance 7).  
 
These initiatives, calling for an increase in food exports while at the same time the 
country continues to suffer from food problems of its own, suggests that obtaining food 
self-sufficiency and feeding its people is not a priority. Instead, Tanzania continues to 
gear its agricultural sector towards the global market, maintaining a food security based 
approach, and will thus likely retain its food insecurity. Profit security for the food 
industry is prioritized over the food needs of the people. As private entities are further 
welcomed, this mantra is only likely to spread.  
As food insecurity is expected to continue and even increase under such practices, 
discontent and anger will also likely escalate. I witnessed such heated opposition 
firsthand when attending a smallholder farmer conference in Morogoro as a part of the 
Nane Nane celebrations, held by MVIWATA, where invited speakers voiced their 
displeasure to an audience of around 1,000 farmers. Dissatisfaction over government 
policies dealing with export bans, failed fertilizer subsidies, as well as market isolation 
were some of the many points of disgruntlement and some of the approximate causes for 
their hardship. Two speakers in particular spoke of the ills of neoliberalism and trade 
liberalization, arguing that they were the real reasons for why poverty persisted for these 




rural farmers, and why a country where the majority of people farm continued to remain 
food insecure. They also spoke of poor government policies, corruption, and land 
grabbing as attacks towards the peasantry, and how they and other global organizations 
favoured large scale agribusinesses over them. In retaliation, these speakers spoke of 
rebellion, even armed revolt towards a government that they say, does not speak for them 
or care about the plight of smallholder farmers in Tanzania.48 
 It may be a little presumptuous to think that a few passionate speeches will spark 
a violent uprising, but it does bring Raj Patel and Eric Holt-Gimenez’s point to the 
forefront. For them, Africa is a critical battleground for finding any sustaining solution to 
global hunger. Adding that the fight for food sovereignty within African countries 
parallels Africa’s fight for independence, could also ring true for the plight of 
cooperatives in Tanzania, who were also instrumental in the country’s independence 
movement in the 1950s (Holt-Gimenez and Patel 130, 132; Iliffe 57). The current 
environment for cooperatives is not suitable for a sustainable return, but as opposition 
towards the country’s existing direction persists, a return to a more apt climate may be in 
the distance. Although down on the cooperative movement, Joel Kalagho of the Swiss 
Development Agency did state that the spirit of cooperatives was still alive, just not in a 
conducive setting to support farmers given its disadvantageous position within the free 
market.49 The cooperative movement may be in hibernation right now, but if the 
peasantry is successful in obtaining a hold on the direction of the country’s agricultural 
                                                          
48 MVIWATA Conference, July 24th, 2013, Morogoro, Tanzania. 
49 Interview with Joel Kalagho of the Swiss Development Agency, August 13th 2013, Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania.  




sector, cooperatives could once again return to a position of prominence, if a change in 
policies occur.  
While such a transition may seem radical, it is not without precedent. Prior to 
1989, Cuba was regarded as having the most industrialized agricultural sector in Latin 
America. Being dependent on the Soviet Union for modern farming technologies and 
equipment, however, left Cuba without its agro-inputs and oil supplier after its collapse at 
the end of the Cold War, forcing the country to find an alternative farming model in the 
midst of the economic and food security crisis it now found itself. Among the major 
policy changes within the government’s Special Period was a radical transition toward 
sustainable agriculture, based on the principles of agro-ecology, with smallholder farmers 
being the main producers of food, overtaking lands that had gone unused or even 
occupied by large scale farms. Dubbed the “Revolution within a Revolution,” the state 
was pivotal in assisting the peasantry, as cooperatives provided an organized mode of 
production while peasants received subsidized farming inputs and extension officers to 
guide production, provided by the government (Nelson et al. 233-235, 237-238).  
Tanzania’s own cooperative movement was also born out of necessity, as the 
British issued cooperatives as a way of easing discontent within the peasantry. 
Smallholder farmers were frustrated, as middlemen exploited them by offering unfair 
prices for their produce, forcing the colonial administration to allow cooperatives to 
facilitate the needs of locals by providing them with better prices and readily available 
markets, in the hopes of increasing production and preventing a potential revolt. Having 
achieved initial success, the movement spread alongside colonial administrative support, 
even though these societies would help foster and grow Tanzania’s drive away from 




European rule (Iliffe 57; Lyimo 40, 46). After independence, the state provided 
cooperatives with a monopoly over certain crops, providing them with the support they 
needed to then insulate their members, and peasants received the goods and services they 
required to improve their standard of living.  
While not operating under a food sovereignty framework initially, as they were 
used to ensure high production levels that would ultimately benefit their colonial masters, 
and later the interests of Tanzania’s urban classes after independence, these organizations 
still greatly assisting improving the wellbeing of the peasantry. Members benefitted from 
using cooperatives in a variety of ways, as they were able to profit from the use of 
bulking and storage facilities, while previously isolated farmers were able to gain access 
to markets in order to sell their perishable goods (Msambichaka 121; Chambo 6). In the 
early 1970s, however, under its Ujamaa policies, government administrators began to 
infiltrate these organizations on the grounds of curbing corruption, but more so because 
they wished to drain the surpluses accumulated by these societies that were increasingly 
seen as a capitalist threat to the state’s socialist agenda, which caused cooperatives to 
falter. While they were later abolished in 1976, only to return in the early 1980s, 
cooperatives have never been able to recapture their position of strength within a 
liberalized market.  
In 2014, that liberalized market remains, and since its unfavourable for 
cooperatives to operate in, a comeback under such conditions is highly unlikely. With this 
in mind, if cooperatives are to return to a position of prominence within the agricultural 
sector, it will not be under a colonial framework, or an overbearing government, or a state 
that is guided by the principles of the free market, but under the direction of a state that 




adheres to the needs of its disenfranchised peasantry. Perhaps, as the growth of 
agribusiness continues, political opposition within the country will grow, forced to adhere 
to the rising civil unrest emanating from smallholder farmers, who are fighting for an 
alternative form of development. Under such a scenario, allied with potential policy 
makers that operate under the guidance of food sovereignty, cooperatives could again 
enter the fray once more. For now, however, peasants will have to endure in the 
competition for their land with emerging agribusinesses, until they are able to cooperate 
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